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Basques

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Basque Reg. 6381a
+ State Dept
+ Intermediate
+ Latin America

Copy to
G. R. Wilson
7/9

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

File

July 8. 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have read with interest your letter of July 3, 1942 in regard to the Basque leader in New York, and particularly in regard to the relations of your organization with him.

I am sure that you will understand that while maintaining relations with the present Spanish Government, this Department cannot associate itself with the enterprise suggested in your letter. I may add that the Basque movement, aiming as it does toward autonomy, is not one which is likely to be received sympathetically by any Spanish faction outside of Euzkadi, with the possible exception of the Catalan autonomists.

Sincerely yours,

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

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Confidential
6 Sec.
x State Dept.
ISA 702 4
x Information
x Latin America

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 3, 1942

The Honorable James Dunn
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Will you look over the attached letter to the Secretary and if you approve I wish you would take it up with him.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Basque Rep. 6288
+ Latin Am.
+ Information

July 3, 1942

SECRET
SEC DIVISION OF INFORMATION

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

My office in New York has been in close touch with a man who carries the designation of the President of the Basque Republic. As you know the Basques have been confirmed Republicans. They seem to be, to a man, opposed to Axis ideas. They are a sturdy and intrepid folk. We feel that a considerable degree of dependence can be placed in this organization.

Furthermore, a high proportion of the sailors on Spanish ships are Basques which gives them considerable mobility. Also, their location in the Pyrenees would make them useful persons for transmission of information both to and from occupied and unoccupied France.

The President of the Basque Republic has a well set-up organization functioning out of the Iberian Peninsula, and is very desirous of placing this organization at our disposal, and we are equally desirous of making use of it for the benefit of our cause.

A certain proportion of this transmission of information would have to be made through parts of Latin America

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SECRET
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

which would make it essential that some freedom of communication be permitted and some travel provision made for the agents of this organization. Unless this functioning machinery can be set up, I fear we will be unable to profit by this very advantageous opportunity.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Donovan

HRWilson:vbp (5/25/42 S.A. File #7024

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COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

July 2, 1942

Our Basque friends have informed us that one of their reliable partisans, JOSE LARADOGOITIA MENCHACA, was a stowaway aboard the S.S. Aldecoa when this ship was recently stopped by a submarine for refueling in mid-Atlantic.

The Naval Attache in Rio de Janeiro might find it of interest to interview LARADOGOITIA with a view to establishing the facts which surround this incident. LARADOGOITIA can be reached in Rio de Janeiro through COMM. CATHALA, Flamengo Hotel, Praia do Flamengo. He may also be reached direct at the following address:

Bar Casa Carioca
Largo da Carioca
Rio de Janeiro.

Our Basque friends, who received this news in a letter from CATHALA, say that LARADOGOITIA was recommended to CATHALA by the Embassy of one of the Allied Nations. Our Basque friends believe that this may have been the United States Embassy, in which case it is possible that LARADOGOITIA may already have made the full statement of any knowledge he may have had concerning the submarine incident.

LARADOGOITIA was formerly a resident of Salt Lake City, where he was taken into custody by the United States Immigration Authorities and sent to Ellis Island, whence he was deported. LARADOGOITIA has asked our Basque friends to use their influence in Mexico to obtain an immigration visa for him to that country.

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Basque Info. Service 7228
Oil
Mexico - Pet. -

CONFIDENTIAL

Coldicon
Navy

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

Sometime ago Mr. Hugh Wilson called on Colonel Thomason at my suggestion, to explain the outlines of the Basque Information Service and to request that a message be sent to Buenos Aires, as a result of which the Naval Attache there would interview a certain Basque in respect of the alleged furnishing of oil to German submarines by the steamer ALDECOA. Colonel Thomason was good enough to dispatch a message in this sense.

I am in receipt of a further communication of an analogous character. I append herewith the pertinent portion thereof. You may feel that it is advisable to instruct the Naval Attache in Rio to interview Mr. Laradogoitia.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure (1)

HWilson:ch
7/4/42

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COPY

July 2, 1942

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Rio de Janeiro.

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Bruce 8860
X Communications
X Transmission
Diss. Through

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: November 24, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: David Bruce

SUBJECT:

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

To bring you up to date on the matter of assistance requested by President Aguirre, I am attaching copies of memoranda which are self-explanatory.

In view of the fact that his requests are receiving active consideration, perhaps it will not be necessary to make any further statement to him at this time, in connection with Gregory Thomas' F-K of November 14th, which is returned herewith.

D.B.

D. B.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

November 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: Major David Bruce

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Jose Antonio Aguirre and Assistance to be given the Basque Intelligence Service.

With reference to my attached memo to you of November 11 and your request to have me advise you in writing as to how these matters have been attended to, I wish to advise as follows:

Point 1. - This has already been attended to, and the cipher in question was dispatched to Madrid in the pouch that left on Nov. 20th.

Point 2. - Two radio sets were dispatched to Madrid in the pouch which left on Nov. 20th. These will be turned over to the Basque Organization on instructions to be later issued by Aguirre. Preliminary contact between one of our representatives and the Basque Intelligence Service is scheduled to take place this week or next in Bilbao.

Point 3. - This point is one that requires considerable negotiation but is being actively worked on by Capt. De Vries in conjunction with Mr. Bowden.

Point 4. I refer you to Col. Huntington's attached memo of Nov. 20th - to me - which I believe is self explanatory.

F. T. R.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

November 20, 1942

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Memorandum to Mr. Ryan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

Subject: Iberian Peninsula, Independent Basque Government - Jose Antonio Aguirre

1. In connection with your memorandum of November 11th I think the answer to Senor Aguirre should be about as follows:

a You have certain connections which may be able to assist him in regard to items mentioned under paragraph 4 of your memorandum.

b This assistance would probably come from North Africa where proper contact would have to be made in due course.

c You will within the next few weeks give Senor Aguirre the name and address of a person who may be contacted in North Africa and with whom discussions concerning possible arrangements may be had.

2. It would appear to me to be very dangerous for this organization to openly use groups of this sort as possible political repercussions are serious. From an SO standpoint I would wish to designate one individual who would contact and negotiate with the group in question. This individual would, of course, be a part of the SO Mission in North Africa, but

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COPY

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

November 20, 1942

Mr. Ryan

should not be known as such. Under this type of arrangement it would be possible to receive and train groups, work out programs of operation and supply, etc., without disclosing our own identity. This is the basis on which SO is working with other groups of this character and is the procedure I would like to follow.

3. Please state to Senor Aguirre that you cannot speak for your friends and let him know that the arrangements respecting the amount and kind of supplies available will have to be worked out in North Africa.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Copy to: Colonel Donovan
Lt. Potter

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COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D.C.

DATE: November 11, 1942

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major David Bruce

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Jose Antonio Aguirre - President of the Independent Basque Government

The subject, accompanied by his colleague and secretary, Senor de la Soto, saw Colonel Donovan yesterday on an appointment arranged by Gregory Thomas.

The purpose of Senor Aguirre's visit was to unfold to the Colonel certain plans, the fulfillment of which would require the assistance of this organization.

As you know, Senor Aguirre, in addition to being the President of the Independent Basque Government, actively directs the Basque Intelligence Service, which I understand is quite well organized in Latin America, as well as in the Basque Country of Spain.

Specifically, the assistance Aguirre is interested in receiving is outlined as follows:

1. To send through our communications to Spain a cipher, which he wishes delivered to a designated party in the Basque Country. I was informed that this cipher covers approximately three typewritten pages.

2. To deliver two, or possibly three, radio sending sets to their organization in Spain.

3. To arrange a visitor's visa to this country for a Spanish officer of the former Loyalist Army, at present living in Venezuela, for the purpose of training him in radio sending and receiving. The idea behind this being that the officer whom Senor Aguirre wishes to select would be chosen from five former Loyalist officers

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

November 11, 1942

Major Bruce

residing in Venezuela. The officer selected for radio training in this country would return to Venezuela and transmit as much of the radio training knowledge that he received to the other officers. This group would then embark for Spain. Aguirre's organization can arrange their transportation.

4. To supply arms, ammunition, explosives and other equipment to this group when they have established themselves in the Basque country. In this connection, Aguirre pointed out that they would have the facilities of small fishing craft and other smaller vessels that could meet at specified rendezvous and unload these supplies from our larger boats for transference to selected spots on the Spanish coast.

Senor Aguirre is in principle interested in learning whether or not our organization is prepared to lend him assistance on any one or all of the above mentioned points.

The question of our (Washington Headquarters O.S.S.) making contacts with subversive elements that are directly opposed to the present Spanish Government is one of high policy. The events of the immediate future will, no doubt, indicate whether or not Spain will in some way or another enter the present conflict in North Africa. If she is determined to resist all German pressure, including that which may be exerted upon her for the use of air-bases in Southern Spain, then it would be my personal belief that it would be a mistake to jeopardize our relations with Spain by attempting to enter joint operations with revolutionary or independent groups such as represented by Aguirre and his Independent Basque following.

I informed Aguirre that we would take under consideration his petition. Will you please, therefore, let me know just how far we are prepared to go on the assistance which Aguirre has asked for .

F.T.R.

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COI FORM-93

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE TTTNYKI US GOVERNMENT NOVEMBER 14, 1942 9ET AM Nov 14 12 00 PM '42

FROM

H. GREGORY THOMAS OSS FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK NY

TO (FOR ACTION) SECRET:

COLONEL DONOVAN OSS WASHINGTON DC

TO (FOR INFORMATION)

TEXT

PRESIDENT AGUIRRE HAS JUST ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT HE IS PREPARED TO TAKE ANY OR ALL STEPS WHICH THE SITUATION MAY WARRANT, IN YOUR OPINION, IN OUR MILATARY INTERESD. HE WISHES ME TO REITERATE HIS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEDE TO SPAIN, OR THE BASQUE COUNTRY, AT SUCH A TIME AS YOU MAY CONSIDER IT NECESSAIRY.

THIS STATEMENT IS MADE BY HIM TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE MATTERS WHICH HE DISCUSSED WITH YOU ON NOVEMBER 10.

H.G.T.

TOD 1155 AM IBW

11/16 1 copy Major Bruce

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Basques 5860
x Communications
x Transmission
x Aguirre
x Nelson

October 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Frederic R. Dolbeare

FROM: Colonel William J. Donovan

Thanks for your memo about Aguirre.

I have noted the impression Congdon has. Will you tell me what yours is?

William J. Donovan

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

FROM: Frederic R. Dolbeare

Referring to the conversation between you and Dulles, I am enclosing herewith the letter from Colonel Heard of October 17, with annex from the Military Attache at Montevideo.

In connection with this matter it may be of interest to you to see Mr. Wilson's letter of October 5, dealing specifically with the transmission of unsealed communications from the Basques in Latin America, to which as yet no answer has been forthcoming. I understand that at a somewhat earlier date Wilson arranged orally with Heard for the transmission through the military attache pouch of letters written by Aguirre while en route. These were described as "Aguirre's communications." I gather that somewhere the phrase "Aguirre's communications" was understood by the New York office or by Aguirre to mean not only letters written by him en route but also letters addressed to him from his representatives in South America.

Colonel Heard left Saturday afternoon for Miami and should be back here by the fifth or seventh of November.

F. R. D.

F. R. D.

Enclosure

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Basques 8865
x Communications
x Transmission
x Aguirre
x Nelson

COPY

October 5, 1942

Dear Colonel Heard:

With reference to the Basque organization of which we have spoken several times, may I bring up another phase of it?

We are anxious to facilitate as far as possible communication dealing with European matters from Basques in South America to Aguirre in New York. To this end it occurred to me that it might be possible for Basques in Latin America to submit communications unsealed to the military attaches in the various capitals, such communications to be forwarded to you addressed to President Aguirre in care of Allen Dulles or of Gregory Thomas of his office.

By this means you would have complete check of the operations; Dulles could also have check and the communications, if it is thought advisable, could reach Aguirre.

Would you let me know whether such procedure would be acceptable?

Sincerely yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

Colonel R. T. Heard
War Department
2-E-736, Pengaton Building

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Basques 8863
x Communications
x Transmissions
x Aguirre.
x Nelson

C O P Y

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
Military Intelligence Service
Washington

October 17, 1942

Mr. Hugh Wilson,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ambassador:

I enclose herewith a report from our Military Attache in Montevideo regarding the visit of Mr. Aguirre. I have had reports from both the Military Attaches at Santiago and Buenos Aires which indicate that their views correspond with those of the Military Attache at Montevideo.

Needless to say I am informing the Attaches that the use of our offices by his followers for sending codes and other secret communications has not been directed by the War Department. I have taken this matter up with General Strong who says he will discuss the question with you at your next meeting.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Townsend Heard

TOWNSEND HEARD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, American Intelligence Command.

Encl.
Report from M.A. dated 9/22/42

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Boogres 8865
X Communications
X Transgression
X Aguirre
X Nelson

SECRET

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

September 22, 1942

Subject: Additional Coverage in Latin America.

To: Chief, M.I.S., War Department, Washington, D.C.
(For Col. Heard or his executive for Special Intelligence)

1. In reply to your circular letter, subject Additional Coverage in Latin America (referring to AGUERRE, President of the Bask Republic) dated August 15, 1942, the following report is submitted covering the subjects as outlined in the above-mentioned letter.

a. AGUERRE visited this office on September 11, 1942. He was accompanied by the regional director of the Bask movement, Dr. Ramon Ma. ALDASORO of Buenos Aires and by the senores Ricardo de GUISASOLA and Aritor HORMAECHE, the chief and the secretary of the movement in Uruguay respectively.

b. AGUERRE told us of his organization which consisted of representatives all over the world and especially in South America. He told us that his organization in Uruguay which consisted of 10,000 Basks, would be at our disposition to perform any service which we might ask of it through either of the two Uruguayan representatives who were present. He said that there were many Basks scattered throughout the Republic who could be of immense help in gathering any information which we might need -- or do any other job for which they were qualified.

AGUERRE claims that Basks are anxious to do this because of their extreme pro-Allied sympathies and that they would sacrifice anything for the cause. He further stated that because of the fact that the Spanish were being used by the Axis for the distribution of propaganda and the carrying out of their under cover work, the Basks would be extremely helpful in not only the gathering of information, but also for purposes of counter propaganda and espionage. He stated that 98% of the officers on Spanish ships were Basks, loyal to our cause.

AGUERRE said that Washington had issued orders to all Military Attaches to allow his representatives use of the diplomatic pouch and our codes to send messages

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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back and forth, with the idea that we do all the encoding and decoding and examine all correspondence that is thus handled. This office has not as yet received any word of this, although it is the claim of AGUERRE that all the other Military Attaches in South America have already received these instructions.

AGUERRE boasted that the "War Department and Col. Donovan" had been much impressed by the fact that he had a worldwide organization already completed which was being placed at their disposal -- and that they had snapped it up.

c. All of the local papers carried articles of his arrival and lectures. The comments were all favorable. Most of the papers carried photographs. Evidences of his great popularity were apparent in gatherings where his name was mentioned great bursts of applause were heard.

d. The only contacts which were furnished us were the two local representatives who accompanied AGUERRE on the visit. These men were again contacted on the following Monday. They were not as sure of themselves as was AGUERRE and the Secretary, HORMAECHE, who seemed to be the more practical of the two admitted that it would be a long and difficult job to organize the Basks into something that would be smooth running as was painted by AGUERRE, or that would have anywhere near the numbers suggested by him. They admitted there were many Basks who could not be trusted and many who have little education. The conservative estimate is about 7,000 Bascos in Uruguay and not all of these to be trusted.

The officers of this station were both pleasantly and unpleasantly impressed with AGUERRE's personality. He has much personal charm and magnetism, is forceful, forward, and boastful, and does not hesitate to bluster, bluff, or lie to further his ends. What his motives are could not be determined but he is probably ultimately sincere, even if not in his methods of attaining his desired ends. I believe his two local representatives realize that he "talked too big" for a started and that they cannot produce to his pattern.

The ultimate organization of Basks for, intelligence must, however, await the visit of Jose Maria de LASARTE, the "chief of intelligence." According to AGUERRE that gentleman is the paragon of all intelligence

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

September 22, 1942

men tho very young, and should arrive here within two months and, within a few days thereafter 10,000 Basks will suddenly become "the best intelligence organization at the disposal of you English and Americans."

The spelling of the name of AGUERRE in the above report is that used by the press in Montevideo. It is noted that in Buenos Aires the press emblazons him as AGUIRRE and in your letter it is AGUIERRE. According to GUISASOLA the proper spelling is AGUIRRE, as used in Buenos Aires

Norman A. Congdon,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Military Attache.

NAC/wm

SECRET

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SECRET

Basque 9197
Spain

November 20, 1942

Memorandum to Mr. Ryan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

Subject: Iberian Peninsula, Independent Basque Government - Jose Antonio Aguirre

1. In connection with your memorandum of November 11th I think the answer to Senor Aguirre should be about as follows:

a. You have certain connections which may be able to assist him in regard to items mentioned under paragraph 4 of your memorandum.

b. This assistance would probably come from North Africa where proper contact would have to be made in due course.

c. You will within the next few weeks give Senor Aguirre the name and address of a person who may be contacted in North Africa and with whom discussions concerning possible arrangements may be had.

2. It would appear to me to be very dangerous for this organization to openly use groups of this sort as possible political repercussions are serious. From an SO standpoint I would wish to designate one individual who would contact and negotiate with the group in question. This individual would, of course, be a part of the SO Mission in North Africa, but

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November 20, 1942

Mr. Ryan

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3. Please state to Senor Aguirre that you cannot speak for your friends and let him know that the arrangements respecting the amount and kind of supplies available will have to be worked out in North Africa.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

Copy to: Colonel Donovan
Lt. Sutter

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HGT.

THE BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Translation

SECRET

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S.P.
Project 24.

SECRET

THE BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

I. ORIGINS

II. DURING THE CIVIL WAR

III. SINCE THE CIVIL WAR AND DURING THE WORLD WAR

IV. FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE

V. THE PRESENT SITUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

VI. THE BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN AMERICA

New York, August 9, 1942.

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ORIGINS

The Basque Intelligence Service began to operate during the Spanish Civil War. At the start it was necessary to struggle with enormous difficulties, because everything had to be improvised, there having been no Basque Intelligence Service prior to the Spanish Civil War. To complicate matters even further, the Basque capital was only forty five kilometres from the battlefront. The Intelligence Service was one section of the General Staff of the Army of Euzkadi (The Basque Army).

The loss of the territory of the Basque Country and the subsequent settlement of the Northern Republican Front (Santander and Asturias) provoked the transfer of the Basque Government and a part of its people to France and Catalunia. At this time, the Basque Service was reorganised and from then on depended directly on the orders of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE. Since that time (August 1937) this Intelligence Service has expanded rapidly.

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PERIOD OF THE CIVIL WAR

The double principle which guided the work of the Service was:

1. While the Basques were fighting for their national liberty and for universal democratic ideals, they adhered to a program of full collaboration with the Republican Anti-France Front.

2. The conviction that the Spanish War was nothing more than a battle in a World War which would soon become general.

In agreement with these basic principles, the work to be done was two-fold:

1. An immediate intelligence activity necessary for the conduct of the war.

2. The organization of a political network so as to cultivate the Basque political mind and to convert it into an instrument for action.

This organization had as its missions:

A. Propaganda

(a) Positive: The spread of Basque political ideals and the aims of the Republicans by word of mouth and in writing through broadsides, folders, books, etc.

(b) Negative: Against dictatorship, against German intervention and all collaboration with the Axis, against racial persecution, etc.

(c) Indirect: The cultivation of all themes which might split the various groups supporting Franco, for example, the weak and apology of Falangism against the conservatives, and vice-versa; the same thing for Carlism against Falangism, and vice versa; Falangism against the Army, etc.

B. Action

In the military field, through the formation of shock troops and sabotage agents; preparation for the restauration of the military front of Euskadi (the Basque country), etc.

These aims were being attained following the loss of the war in the Basque country until the end of the Spanish War in

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January 1939, constantly in a more satisfactory way.

The importance of the Basques in religious, social, economic and political life of the Peninsula rendered it easy for them to receive daily detailed intelligence concerning the development of the Francoist regime in all its aspects.

As a curious indication, although it is certainly not a matter of supreme importance, it will suffice to note that the Basque Service always knew in its smallest details and sometimes even before acts were committed every successful manifestation of Franco's persecution against the Basque people: prisons, shootings, etc. This allowed the Basque government to conduct a diplomatic and press campaign which enabled it to avoid the deaths of many of its adherents.

In military intelligence, the Basque program enjoyed notable success. The fact that numerous Basque elements were on the 19th of July 1936 on the side led by Franco and that others who had been taken prisoners were later incorporated in his army permitted the Basque government to have an endless reservoir of agents who provided important strategic information concerning the composition and orders of the Franco army, including its plans, its offensives as they were being prepared and during their development.

The Basque Service worked throughout this period in close relations with the services of the Republican General Staff with the Minister of State, the Minister of National Defense, and without fear of contradiction it may be said that none of these were more efficient.

The political network expanded rapidly through all the Basque provinces and reached into the most important vital centers of the Peninsula. It acted with positive results in the fields of propaganda described above, strengthening Basque and anti-Francoist opinion, and opposing one to the other the various elements of the new regime that France was endeavoring to implant following his victory in the Civil War. Several times Franco's government was obliged to make declarations against trends of public opinion which, starting from groups favorable to the Mouvement, disturbed the Francoist rear-guard. These trends had their roots in the Basque Services.

Concerning the preparation for war-like action, progress was also made within the limits imposed by the need for secrecy and care. There was a time when serious preparations were made for the opening of a new war front in Euskadi (the Basque country)

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through a landing to be made from France, near the town of Santoña, but unfortunately international circumstances and the unfavorable development of the Spanish Civil War prevented the realization of this project.

With the definite triumph of Franco's army, the entire organization; the intelligence, and other similar services which were working for the Republic collapsed. Only the Banque Service remained in operation and continued to develop in a direction of increased activity, intense work and greater fruitfulness.

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PERIOD FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR

The Basque government foresaw the World War. On several occasions, but particularly on December 22, 1938, President Aguirre in a broadcast speech announced the approach of war and pointed out the role which would be played by Franco's Spain. The Basque delegations in France and in England never ceased calling attention to the danger and pointed out the necessity for making preparations with regard to Spain, with full knowledge that this country would sooner or later adopt an attitude of collaboration with the Axis, which would be more or less active according to the moment and the opportunities afforded. These cries of alarm were not heard as they should have been by the British and the French politicians. However in France the General Staff was aware of this threat to the degree which shall be seen, and it was from this that there grew the close relations between the Basque Intelligence Service and the Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff. These relations, begun before the World War, were intensified at its outbreak and grew steadily closer as their usefulness became more evident as the war developed.

The aim of these contacts between the two services was for France the obtaining of valuable military intelligence. The classic rivalry between military and diplomatic services prevented the Deuxième Bureau from giving the fullest support to the Basque plans for the organisation of a political network for extensive action throughout the Euskadi (the Basque country) and Spain. According to the line of thinking previously outlined, with the allegations that France's foreign policy must be one of reconciliation with France, the French political organisation prevented the adequate preparation for direct action, without understanding that Spain's attitude would be against France insofar as Franco had always played the part of a collaborator with the Axis, and notwithstanding, that the Basque Services were completely underground and offered guarantees that France should never appear to be publicly compromised. Unfortunately, the French diplomatic error has prevailed, and although the Deuxième Bureau was obliged to relinquish its timid position in face of the positive results secured by the Basque Intelligence Service and in view of the unfavorable development of the war, it was never able fully to accept openly the hypothesis that the war could lead to an open declaration of collaboration between France and the Axis.

The French obtained important results from the Basque Intelligence Service. Two years have passed since this collaboration has been suspended, and without having the archives in front of us it is difficult to give a graphic view of these specific results. However, we give some of the subjects concerning which the French Deuxième Bureau was informed with regularity and preferred attention:

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1. Military garrisons in the Basque country.
2. Periodic situation of army corps and, in particular, of divisions and brigades obtained in the Central office of the army post organization.
3. Military movements and strategic works in the Pyrenees zone.
4. Commercial and military movements in Basque ports and the other important ports of northern Spain.
5. Axis activities (certain special results can be indicated, such as the spying on the Italian cartographic center at Victoria; procurement of the most recent military studies on the construction and operation of the Heinkel prototypes which were used in the Civil War; the supply of German submarines and bases on the Cantabrian coast, etc.).

6. War industries.

7. Secret archives (of war inventions from the War Ministry (from this we obtained plans and memoranda explaining a model for a flame-thrower and a new machine-gun).

8. Counter-espionage.

9. Political situation of the Franco government.

10. Political situation of the high military command and of the Falangist and Carlist groups.

11. Hispano-American plans and their connection with Axis penetration of the American hemisphere. This subject was studied in all its aspects since the year 1937, and was the subject of various reports.

This data was obtained from specialized agents entrusted with particular subjects or particular geographic points, and in obtaining it these agents were helped by the other members of the political organization of Basque public opinion. The work of these agents depended on their individual initiative within the framework of the general instructions periodically given them by the chiefs of the Service and the questionnaires prepared by the Deuxième Bureau.

The relations of the Basque and French Services were normally carried out in Bayonne (Basses-Pyrénées) in the French Basque zone, where the headquarters of the Basque Service was located, and where the French established a liaison office in charge of several high French army officers. The headquarters of the Basque Service, which had an interior organization similar to a General Staff, was financed on the financial basis of 75,000 francs per month, to which were added from the middle of 1939 the subventions paid regularly by the Deuxième Bureau in compensation for the work conducted there.

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The relation of the French and Basque Services was very close and daily interviews were held between specially designated agents for the liaison between both Services.

The strategic information obtained by the Basque agents which reached the headquarters of their Service through a system of communication links after having been submitted to study and analysis, were rapidly transmitted to the French Service with a note indicating the evaluation of reliability, following an agreed system and indicating the background of the agent, in accordance with a nomenclature which also had been the subject of mutual understanding. The quantity of material and the speed of communications permitted us to provide the Deuxième Bureau with several notes each day. The French received these intelligence bulletins with great interest and were quite frank in stating that they were in many cases from original sources concerning matters and places to which they had no access and they had found these reports valuable and always truthfully as representative.

The communications with agents who were operating in Euzkadi, (the Basque country) and in Spain were assured by land across the Pyrenees and by sea. It is important to note that the Pyrenees in their western half which was the most accessible constitute the historic road for invasions. Both sides of the mountains here are inhabited by Basques and for them, far from being a frontier between France and Spain, the Pyrenees become the backbone which join the Basques of Spanish citizenship with those who are French citizens. The Pyrenees for the Basques are not an insurmountable difficulty but rather an attractive base for operations and the scene of countless smuggling adventures. The same can be said of the Cantabrian Sea or the Bay of Biscay. The Basques with their century-old contraband traditions break through any obstacles which are placed in their path on the high seas. The Basque communication system, which included a black chamber for coding operations using the necessary technical means, was so secure that never in the three years past was any of their communication intercepted nor any secret pouch containing information from its agents discovered, although this pouch crossed the frontier several times each week.

At a time when the French Service was particularly concerned of the Spanish danger several short-wave sending and receiving transmitters of the latest model used by the French army were made available to the Basque agents. These transmitters were introduced into the Basque country and located at certain strategic points. As soon as everything was arranged (operators, codes, keys, etc) to begin the operation of this system of communication, the events which we will describe later occured and because of them the Basque Intelligence Services were suspended.

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We have already said that in the opinion of the Basque Service, intelligence work was a part of the total operation which was principally dedicated to the organization of Basque opinion, with the aim of creating a fifth column for agitation and military action.

Then, as now, the Basque Service was convinced that it can be an important support to the democracies at the very moment when Spain enters the war.

With this thought, and in spite of the lack of understanding shown by the French but in due honor to the truth, with the knowledge and agreement of the Deuxième Bureau, the Basque Services operated during this entire period. Here follow the results obtained in the fie of propaganda and organization.

It is not necessary to insist on the German control of all the propaganda means at the disposal of Franco's Spain. The press, the radio, and all publications in general, as they continue to do today, were then exclusively dedicated to the propaganda lines dictated by the Germans. As an answer to this state of affairs, the French and British showed too much weakness. Rather, they gave no answer to it. The Basque Service, putting into practice the attitude of the Basque government which declared itself not neutral but belligerent in favor of the Allies, undertook this work and effected an intense propaganda campaign over the underground network with this double objective:

(a) Positive: To spread Allied information about the progress of the war, the aims of the democracies in fighting the war, etc.

(b) Negative: In combatting the German directives and declarations, in exposing the dangers of a German triumph for Spain, and stressing the incompatibility of the German character with that of the Spanish people, etc.

This propaganda was realized by the spoken word and in writing (distribution of broadsides, pamphlets and books, newspapers, French and English publications, etc). The Basque Service was a decisive instrument for propaganda war against Germany and Spain. Franco's followers, instigated by the Germans, called on their friends in France to unleash a persecution of the Basques in an effort to break up their organizations. In this sense, the right-ist deputy, Xavier Vallat, present commissioner for Jewish questions in the Vichy government asked a question in the French parliament urging the government to take steps against the Basques. He was not followed on that occasion, but the Francoists did not admit their defeat and later took advantage of the French Minister, Ibarnegaray, to consummate the persecution to which we will refer later.

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The design to make of the Basque opinion an instrument of war which would be, at the necessary moment, at the disposition of the Allied High Command, was in the process of elaboration until June 1940. The headquarters of this organization was located in Bayonne and operated alongside of the headquarters of the Basque Intelligence Service. It was organized as a General Staff with various sections, and had in command of each a Basque chief from among those who had commanded in the war in Euskadi (the Basque country). These headquarters were divided into regional sections, a chief for each Basque region, Navarre, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava, and local sections with a chief for each locality, including each of the Spanish cities where any substantial Basque colony was to be found.

The body of this organization was composed as follows:

1. Organization of prisoners
2. Emakumas
3. Amarrekos
4. Euzko-Gudarostea

Organization of Prisoners - The triumph of Franco scattered outside of the Basque country through the various Spanish prisons of Burgos, Saltoka, Puerto de Santa María, Astorga, Miranda de Ebro, etc. a great number of political leaders, chiefs and soldiers of the Basque army, intellectuals and priests who were taken prisoner. At the start their number was in excess of 30,000. The Basque Service created a complete organization for the spiritual and material aid to these prisoners and to maintain communications with them. Probably because they were a selection of the best Basque patriots, these prisoners have been and are an inexhaustible fountain of anti-Totalitarian energy. These prisoners were organized in each prison and they occupied their posts in the "Amarrekos" as they were progressively liberated.

Emakumas (Patriotic Women) - This branch of the organization which joined together women patriots had as its function appropriate activities such as collection of money for the victims of persecution, evasions within the country, etc.

Amarrekos - This was the name given to groups of ten men under the command of a chief imbued with the spirit of sacrifice for the fatherland and with full military discipline. The Amarrekos were the arm of the organization. The basis for these activities was the former "Gudaris" (soldiers of the Basque army during the Civil War). They organized themselves independently in Amarrekos of "Gudaris" on sea and on land, and they were extended throughout the entire country.

The action of these Amarrekos directed towards becoming an instrument of the Allied war also was held back for two reasons:

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Chiefly since they did not wish to provoke, without necessity, a premature suppression which would kill or grievously wound the organization, and secondly the lack of means, money, arms, etc., since you will have noted that the French Service, which knew and which was interested in these plans, could not lend them the aid which it would have desired and which was necessary, because of political, diplomatic, etc. obstacles which were placed in its path.

In spite of this, several acts were carried out with complete success. These can be considered as training. They were the pasting of Basque flags and slogans in the streets; the sending to Franco of letters and manifestos from President Aguirre; the organization of patriotic gatherings which had as their pretext acts of religious cult or folklore festivals; the presentation of petitions to foreign commissions visiting the country, etc. To summarize, they were all acts none of which had any great importance, but all of which served to draw attention to the continued existence of the Basque country.

With the greatest and most extraordinary difficulties, they also began to build up arsenals of weapons and munitions.

Euzko-Gudarostea. With the "Gudaris" who had escaped to France [illegible] certain bodies of the "Euzko-Gudarostea" (the Basque army) formed them into groups which lived together in [illegible] villages, principally in the French Basque region, in the [illegible] of the Pyrenees. All these refugees were organized along military lines, without the slightest external indication thereof. From this and what we have said previously, it will be seen that the French government gave no help in the [illegible]mation of these units, nor took into consideration their position, etc. These battalions were destined to enter into the Basque country through the Pyrenees at whatever moment the Allied Command should decide, and they would serve as a framework to guide and employ the organization of "Amerrakos" described above.

In spite of the lack of understanding on the part of the French government for the aims of the Euzko-Gudarostea, it went on training and perfecting itself until such a time as the French government destroyed all its plans by the means which we will set forth later.

Thus, we have described the Basque organization which, with its system of communications and its intelligence agents, constituted the Basque Intelligence Service.

The British Services learned of and used the Basque works through the French Service. The Basque Service had some contacts with British agents, and in the spring of 1940 was beginning to work directly with them on matters of naval intelligence.

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SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE

The French Government against the Basques

On May 3, 1940, the Basque Service obtained information from a person close to the Franco Government. This report announced that the German Government had indicated to SERRANO SUNER that he should take steps against the Basques in France, in order not only to persecute the persons who adhered to the Basque Movement, but also to attack their honor and public reputation. SERRANO SUNER forwarded the necessary instructions to AMBASSADOR LEQUERICA in Paris, who failed to take the desired steps against the public reputation of these individuals, since he believed it inopportune in view of the general esteem which was enjoyed by the leaders and people of the Basques in exile. SERRANO SUNER insisted and would admit of no discussion, because the Basques in Spain, in France and in America were hindering the development of important political plans. These indications were given in Paris on May 5 to the French Service and the Official Centres of Authority.

On May 26 the newspaper "Paris Soir" published certain declarations of MR. YBARNEGARAY, who had just become a Minister in the French Cabinet. In these declarations MINISTER YBARNEGARAY inveighed against the Basques, announcing that they were about to be interned in concentration camps, and he then calumnied the Basque leaders, accusing them of being in possession of treasures proceeding from the sale of stolen jewels. In his reviling he did not even allow the universally acknowledged prestige of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE to stand in his way. He twisted the well-known fact that PRESIDENT AGUIRRE had been caught by the German invasion when he was visiting his family in Belgium, accusing him of having gone there with the express intention of placing himself at the service of the Germans. The threats of YBARNEGARAY bore fruit, and that the German will was done.

All the Basques were carried off to concentration camps without any consideration or distinction of age, snatched from their homes by the military authorities. It is important to note that among these Basques many were working in the French war industries. Persons who were employed in the Intelligence Services suffered the same fate, even though the Basque Bureau did everything it could to avoid this sorry event. But at other times, it was not able to overcome the political crisis of the Paris Government, and thus was accomplished the shameful persecution of people who were working unselfishly for the cause of France.

ERNEST PEZET, Deputy and Vice-president of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, and Secretary-General of the French Section of the INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE OF THE FRIENDS OF THE BASQUES, undertook the defense in this matter, which would certainly have had unforeseen political repercussions, if the French State had not collapsed,

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because of the obvious proof of infiltration of German influence. One of the personalities to whose attention this injustice was brought was MARSHALL PETAIN. It is to him when he came to power that we owe the possibility for the release of the Basques from concentration camps.

Important Elements of the Basque Service Detained in Spain

The headquarters of the Basque Service prior to the time when its members were placed in concentration camps, was able to dispose of its affairs in an orderly fashion and to effect the hiding of its archives with every security. We had thus believed that we would be able to weather the storm of the German invasion, but unfortunately the French debacle had not yet produced all its tragic results for the Basques. The Germans seized important French archives and in the following months many agents of the Basque Service were arrested in the Basque Country. Everything led to the belief that the Germans had supplied the Spaniards with the information available in the French archives, in which there was much material supplied by the Basque Service. The study of this material by technicians and the subsequent action by the Spanish police led to a large number of arrests. Our impression that these arrests, which were simultaneous with those of many agents of the French Service, were attributable to the seizure of French archives was corroborated in December 1941 by the French Basque Colonel, GOROSTARZU, Military Attache of the French Embassy at Madrid when PETAIN was Ambassador there, and at the present time on the Military Staff of the Marshall. As a result of these arrests, the trial before a special War Court against twenty two Basque leaders of the secret organization was held in Madrid. All of them, including priests and women, were condemned to death. Thanks to diplomatic intervention through the accredited representatives of several countries, the penalty was commuted and the sentence was revised. Today the matter is pending revision by the courts.

Since the spring of 1941 Basque elements residing in Occupied France have been requested to renew the relations between the Basque Service and the Resistance Bureaus. They have not agreed to do this, since they do not trust the transitory policy of the French Government, in spite of the fact that these requests were presented to them in the appearance of being inspired by anti-German sentiments.

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PRESENT STATE OF THE BASQUE SERVICE

From all that has been said, it is easy to see what is the present situation. The collapse of France with its serious repercussions for the Basques which have already been related, forced the Basque Service into a period of difficulty. This does not mean that the organisation has died; on the contrary, the determined will to win has shaken off the momentary demoralisation which events brought about, and under these hammer blows a new determination has been born which will intensify the close relations which exist between the Basque Government and its people in France.

The sentiment of Euskadi (The Basque Country) is an always solidly attached to the cause of the Allies. The elements which had participated in the organisation of the Basque Services still exist and operate even within prison walls. In spite of the arrest of many of its known leaders, there still remain others who are at liberty.

There still remains in full operation the organisation of the [redacted]S and the prisoners' organisation.

The organisation of ANARRENOS is awaiting orders which may be sent to it.

Numerous intelligence agents are at their posts. All of them regret that there has been a break in their ties with the Allied High Command and that as a result their work has now lost its efficacity. It is necessary to point out that sometimes difficulties arise where they are least to be expected. Thus, for example, according to our best information, which however we must express with reserve, we know that our agents do not trust the United States Consul in Bilbao (not the present Consul, but the preceding one), and a certain employee of the Consulate.

In France there are outstanding Basque elements in both the Free and the Occupied Zones. In the Free Zone there are two members of the Basque Government. In the Occupied Zone, there is a group of military chiefs and of secret agents of the Service, who used to work in Bayonne, and who today are in the neighborhood of Dax. Among these who are under German domination, we feel that we must point out that there is a group in contact with the Germans with the aim of gathering information for the Basque Service. We point this out so that there may be no false interpretation of the position of these agents, should doubts arise in the future.

In French Morocco there are also certain Basque elements, who have escaped from the Germans. Many of them are in a pitiful situation in forced labor battalions, but there also exist some who are at liberty and who could do useful work.

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We must draw your attention to the possibility that affords itself in DAKAR, which because of the importance of its position and the circumstances which surround it, needs some explanation. MR. MENDIA, Minister of the Basque Government, in coming from France to America, was forced to spend half a year at this place. During this time he established intimate relations with MR. CHIRAMBERRO, Chief of Police at Medina, a small town six kilometres from DAKAR. We have the following information concerning CHIRAMBERRO. He is an enthusiastic Basque patriot; a determined and intelligent man; he knows intimately and frequently visits the several French authorities of Senegal, especially MR. BIRAES, Governor of DAKAR; he has a close friendship with the principal French Naval Authorities stationed in DAKAR. At the time of the invasion of France, he championed the continuation of the battle from the colonies, but the Battle of Dakar aroused his animosity against the British. He has feelings of friendship for the Americans. This information dates from October 1941.

Concerning the present vitality of the Basque Service, it is possible to get some indication in the American Hemisphere. Basque elements aboard Spanish ships are constantly reaching American ports, principally in South America. These have already rendered important services. Aboard these ships, principally those which call at Buenos Aires, are to be found the key figures in the communication system of the Basque Services.

Although it is an incomplete and slow means of communication, it offers great advantages from the point of view of security. At the present time an agent recently arrived from the Basque Country is waiting in Buenos Aires to convey orders from PRESIDENT AGUIRRE back to the Basque Country, when PRESIDENT AGUIRRE undertakes his forthcoming voyage through South America.

Practical Conclusions and Present Considerations

1). The Basque Intelligence Service began their work during the Spanish Civil War and developed progressively until the collapse of France.

2). For the reasons described in this report, the overthrow of France by the German invasion and the persecution of the Basques disrupted the progressive work of the Basque Intelligence Service, and its organization and activities were deprived of active leadership.

3). Today all the elements of the Service are establishing and coordinating while awaiting for positive instructions to begin operation.

4). The efficacity of this Service has been proven by experience through its activities in collaboration with the French Deuxieme Bureau.

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5). The power of the Basque Service is derived from the expression of a force organized before the War, the force of the Basque people. This instrument that the Basque will and PRESIDENT AGUIRRE are now offering to the Allied High Command, if it is to be useful in the line of the prosecution of the War, must receive necessary instructions and means corresponding to such aims as will be determined.

6). The problem of the invasion of Europe presents under another aspect the importance of the Basque Service. The Basque Country is one of the possible points for such an invasion. It will suffice to look at a map to be convinced of the necessity of studying and preparing for such a possibility. Euskadi represents:

a). An important and strategic position (between France and Spain), the principal and easiest zones of communications between the two countries running through its territory.

b). A people ideally prepared, firmly democratic, and attached to the cause of the Allies.

c). A country which is organized from within to aid in every military way possible any invasion forces for the liberation of Europe.

It has already been stated twice that a plan for the invasion of the Basque Country from France has been studied and prepared. Under the first plan, the offensive would have as its first objective to seize a stretch of the coast by landing in Santona and the Bay of Laredo, so as to spread the bridgehead into the Province of Burgos, and to infiltrate from the sources of the Ebro, following its course, and leading to the uprising of the entire country. In the second, the centre of the offensive was the Pyrenees. The march of the invasion would spread out through the regions of Guipuzkoa and Navarre.

These plans, together with all of our secret archives are still hidden in France; therefore, we are not able to present them at the present time. However, we believe that what we have said on this theme is sufficient for the purposes of the present report, which can be amplified in detail at the proper time.

7). The most urgent need at the present moment is to better the communications between our agents here and the organization which is now working in the Basque Country.

a). For the present we enjoy communications by sea which will improve as more Spanish ships come to America.

b). It would be advisable to prepare for communications by radio, at least in the form of a dispatch of messages

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from America, so that as was previously arranged, they may be received in the Basque Country.

c). Another practical advantage would be the use of the means at the disposal of the American Service. With this aim in view, it is recommended that some contact in the Basque Country be established between a representative of the Basque Service and an agent of the American Service there.

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BASQUE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

On the eve of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S departure for South America, it is premature to speak in precise terms of the organization of the Basque Service in America, which will be the object of detailed study upon PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S return from this trip, but at this time and within the scope of this report, it will appear desirable to make the following declaration on two points:

1). The Basques are especially fitted for the task of realising an intelligence and counter-espionage service in favor of the Allied cause in the Western Hemisphere, because of the ease with which they can penetrate the Spanish colonies in these countries which are the principal sources from which Nazi and other Axis agents often rise, and because of the splendid situation which they enjoy in all the American countries of Spanish language, where the Basque colonies are of the greatest importance in religious, political and economic spheres.

2). The Basques with their Catholic and Democratic sentiments are the most appropriate instruments for the psychological warfare which must be waged against the imperialist tendencies of HISPANISMO, which is the enemy of the United States and the countries of Latin America, and the cloak under which totalitarian doctrines are introduced into these countries.

This matter has been the subject of previous memoranda by PRESIDENT AGUIRRE. Because of this reason and because of the voyage upon which the PRESIDENT is about to embark, we are leaving the description of a detailed plan of action for his return.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

November 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM: H. GREGORY THOMAS

SECRET

Attached I am sending you a translation of that part of the Basque President's report which refers to the organisation of the Basque Intelligence Services. Another part, which contains AGUIRRE's reactions to the persons and situations encountered in the course of his trip, will follow within a few days.

You will note that PRESIDENT AGUIRRE speaks of the liaison through the United States Military Attaches. In view of the certain lack of cooperation in this field, arrangements have been made for communications from the Basque representatives to us, for our purposes and for AGUIRRE, to be forwarded through the local representatives of the F.B.I., instead of through the Military Attaches. This new arrangement is possible through plans made by Mr. BOWDEN.

There has been a regrettable delay in implementing the plan which concerns the operation of the Basque Intelligence Services in cooperation with us. The details for immediate action along the lines discussed in the attached and previous memoranda have now been elaborated, and I am doing everything possible to secure speedy and fruitful results.

(HGT)

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November 11, 1942

ORGANISATION OF SPECIAL BASQUE SERVICES DURING PRESIDENT AGUIRRE'S TRIP

One of the purposes of President AGUIRRE's trip was to establish a network between the Basque organisation and the American services, specifically with the Military Attaches named by the American Army in the different Embassies of South America, as was agreed upon.

The network was established in those countries in which it was possible to meet the Attaches.

When the presentation of the Basque Delegate in each country was made, PRESIDENT AGUIRRE made the following observations:

1). The Basques carry out the orders of their Government, which considers itself at war. They are not, therefore, individual agents with personal motives and a desire for gain, but rather they are part of a loyal organisation which is friendly to the Allied cause.

2). The services will be developed in each country, and the results will be put in the hands of the Chiefs of the American Service.

3). The Basque organisation is disposed to work on all the aspects which might interest the American Services. The Chiefs will indicate to the Basque Network what interests them most at every moment or what it is most urgent to verify or obtain, whether it be information, negotiation or action.

4). PRESIDENT AGUIRRE asked the American representatives to accept from the Basque Delegates, or to deliver to them or to the persons designated by them, such communications as the Delegates might not consider suitable to be sent by ordinary mail, because of their secret nature.

5). He announced to the Attaches the coming visit of DR. LASARTE, informing them of his identity and of the purpose of his trip, which would be none other than to organise the Basque Services so that they might be of the greatest benefit, mobilising in each country the Basque forces.

The visit of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE was necessarily limited to the presentation and endorsement of the Basque Delegates for these Services, and the explanation of the general plan. Later, DR. LASARTE will come to perfect the plan and to work it out in detail.

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The following contacts were made:

Mexico.

DR. FRANCISCO DE BELAUSTEGUIGOITIA was designated as Chief of the Basque Services in that country and as contact with the Military Attache of the Embassy. DR. BELAUSTEGUIGOITIA is a person of high moral reputation and of solid economic and social position. The Basque colony in Mexico is not large, although it represents several thousand persons. It is well proven and scattered throughout the Mexican territory; organised for these particular purposes, it is able to render worthwhile results. There are organisations in the capital and in the coastal cities.

Panama.

The Delegate, PROFESSOR JUAN MENDOZA GARRAYALDE, who after being a Professor at the University, was named by the Minister of Public Instruction for certain confidential duties, has been put in charge of the contacts and services. Among other tasks, he has the responsibility of organising student groups of Panama to guard the coasts and and roads, using boys for this work.

The Military Attache was not in Panama. DR. AGUIRRE visited and had a long conversation with the Ambassador, MR. WILSON, to whom he presented the Basque Delegate. He also took advantage of his visit to bring to his attention the case of DR. VILLALAZ, Minister of Panama in Berlin. DR. VILLALAZ, who is now in Switzerland, is in the unpleasant position of having had his diplomatic status taken away from him by the present Panamanian Government. DR. VILLALAZ spent twenty four years in Berlin, married a German woman and became related by marriage to several generals of the German Army. When the previous situation in Panama — President Arias — occurred, he was accused of being a Nazi. This is not true; he is not a Nazi. DR. AGUIRRE pointed this fact out to the present President of Panama. On the contrary, DR. VILLALAZ was the one who aided DR. AGUIRRE to escape from Berlin, guaranteeing his false Panamanian personality. During his stay in Berlin, DR. AGUIRRE spent much time with DR. VILLALAZ and knew his anti-Nazi sentiments. DR. VILLALAZ could be an observer of unusual importance in Switzerland, if he had a diplomatic status which would protect him from persecutions and trouble. It would be helpful to obtain it from Panama and to establish contact with him. His knowledge of Germany, his contacts, and his observations from Switzerland could be most useful. AMBASSADOR WILSON took note of the case, being very grateful for the visit of DR. AGUIRRE.

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There is a very small number of Basques, but they have prestige and they are hard workers, having accomplished useful services. Up to the present time they have not had contact with the American Services, with the exception of LUIS GOMEZ LEKUBE, called "lame Gomez," a relative of the President, who is adventuresome in spirit, efficient and daring. The American Services know a lot about him. He will always obey the orders of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE, for whom he feels veneration. At present he is in Colombia, where he went by way of the coast of Panama on an intelligence mission. All of the Panamanian - Columbian coast is dominated by his organisation.

It would be convenient for the Basques to be able to work in the Canal Zone. If this restriction were removed, the Basques would be able to render interesting services in this zone. This is the opinion of our Delegate, who has requested the removal of this restriction from the American authorities. It would be wise to support his petition.

Colombia.

The Basque Delegate, DR. FRANCISCO DE ABRISQUETA, is in charge of the contacts and services with the Attache of the Embassy, to whom he was introduced. DR. ABRISQUETA is a young man and enjoys high prestige in Bogota. He is a professor of the University, a specialist in matters of state, and a consultant for several South American governments. He might have to go to Washington to work with the Pan-American Union. In that case, D. ANDRES DE PEREA, who is at present a high official in the Ministry of the Interior of Bogota, would be in charge of the Basque Services.

The Basque colony in Bogota is not large, but of very high quality. In Colombia, as well as in Ecuador, there are groups of Basque clergy exiled by Franco who have performed services, but who are able to render still more, if there were adequate means of organising them. There are vast regions in Colombia and Ecuador, in which there are only Basque clergy, on the one hand, and Italian and German clergy, on the other.

Peru.

Because of the pressure of time, it was not possible to establish any contact. The Delegate, D. RAFAEL DE ORBEGOZO, manager of one of the most important enterprises in Peru, was given the responsibility of visiting the Attache. The Basque colony is also small in number here, but is well established socially. There are about a hundred Basque monks and priests.

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Chile.

The Delegate, D. PEDRO DE ARECHABALA, was introduced to the Military Attache in Santiago. Because of special circumstances, the services have not yet been adequately organised, although there exist groups which work along these lines. Because of the large number and firm economic and social position of the Basques in Chile, it can be expected that their work will be effective. The principal groups are in Santiago and Valparaiso.

Uruguay.

Both the Delegate, D. RICARDO DE GUISASOLA, and the Secretary, D. AITOR ORMAECHE, were presented to the Attache.

In Uruguay the principal interest of the service is in the frontier, and the country in general is perhaps the most closely attached to the Allied cause. The route of the German agents who are fleeing Brazil for Argentina is through the Uruguayan-Brazilian frontier. The colony is made up of fine members, some of whom are situated on the Brazilian frontier.

Argentina.

The Basque Delegate in Argentina is DR. ALDASORO, Minister of the Basque Government. He and D. ENRIQUE DE ABAROA, manager of Massey, Harris, Ltd., are in charge of contacts with the Attache of the Embassy. Both were presented to the Colonel.

Argentina is the country of South America, in which there are the most Basques, and also the country in which the Axis forces are working the hardest.

The services are well organised, and they may become most effective, if the necessary means for carrying on work on a large scale can be granted. They maintain contacts with the Basque Country, which, although they are reliable, suffer from lack of speed, because of the use of communication by ship.

There exists a telegraphic code agreed upon among them for use in certain situations, so that changes in the secret code and orders may be sent at any time to ships under the Spanish flag. These codes may be obtained again with relative facility, provided that photographic apparatus may be placed at the disposal of the Basque Services at any time.

The brother of MR. ABAROA, a high employee of the port of Rosario, is in charge of interviewing and questioning our agents on Spanish ships on their arrival at that port or at Buenos Aires.

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At the present time this work is carried out in Rosario preferably, since the ships come into that port. It may be said that they control perfectly all the ships, since our agents sail on them, and our agents are numerous, well disciplined and well disposed.

The basic Basque organisation is in Buenos Aires, and extends through the principal cities -- Rosario, Cordoba, Bahia Blanca, Tandil, Salta -- and through all the Argentine countryside, where there are scattered groups.

The numerical importance, the social prestige and the contacts that the Basques in Argentina have, constitute an element of primary importance if their work is taken advantage of. To do a good job, it is indispensible that the Basque organisation in Buenos Aires be supplied with rapid means of communication.

Venezuela.

A good service is in operation here. The Delegate is D. JOSE MARIA DE GARATE and the Chief of the Services, D. JUAN DE OLAZABAL. Both were put into contact with the Military Attache at the Embassy.

The Basque colony is made up principally of elements which have recently become refugees from Spain. They have achieved a great prestige, and because for the most part they are young and hardened in battle, they have enthusiasm and have performed notable services.

During the time that DR. AGUIRRE was in Venezuela -- from October 5 to October 8 -- the Basque organisation obtained the entire Spanish secret code, the one with which one Embassy in America communicates with another, as well as the one which Madrid uses to communicate with them. The agents of the F.B.I. intervened finally, since they were the only ones who had the use of adequate photographic apparatus. It was a question of a note-book, 30 by 20 centimetres, which contained all the codes. In the presence of PRESIDENT AGUIRRE and by his order, the sealed envelope which contained the supplementary code was opened by MR. OLAZABAL. It had not been opened before his arrival, so as to get his opinion before doing so. The intelligence work had been accomplished several days before. The opening of the envelope was witnessed by DR. AGUIRRE, the Secretary of the American Embassy in Caracas, two young agents of the F.B.I. who arrived in Caracas a month ago, and MESSRS. GARATE and OLAZABAL. A pledge was given DR. AGUIRRE that Washington, specifically MR. HOOVER, would send him a copy when he asked for it.

The organisation in Venezuela also has contacts with

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Spanish maritime trade, which, as is common knowledge, is directed almost entirely by Basque officials.

Porto Rico.

As this country is a territory under the control of the United States, there is no network there. It could, nevertheless, be established, if it would be of interest. The Basque colony is very small, but there are several very worthwhile members.

The Basque Delegate is DR. JUAN ANTONIO DE IRAZUSTA, Basque Deputy in the Spanish Cortes, at present Colombian Consul in Porto Rico. He is a person of great prestige and consideration in official and social circles.

Santo Domingo.

The contact between the Military Attache and the Delegate, MR. GALINDEZ, professor at the University and official of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Santo Domingo, was established. PROFESSOR GALINDEZ is a young man of good repute, who can furnish fine services. The remainder of the Basque colony is small and can be divided into two parts: The sailors of some age, in whose charge were the Dominican ships which were torpedoed, and their families. These men enjoy great prestige; the other part is made up of the most displeasing element of the Basque emigrants -- in general the most extreme elements, who live almost in misery, and who are not reliable for use in delicate missions. There are among them some decent persons, who, if they were to be removed from their present situation, could be useful.

Cuba.

Contact was established between the Military Attache of the Embassy and the Delegate, JOSE LUIS DE GARAY.

The Basques in Cuba constitute a very select and worthwhile colony, although they do not attain the numerical importance of the South American countries. Some work has been done; if they were adequately organized, they would be able to do much more.

Cuba is at this time the central location of the Spanish Communist organisation with views to action within Spain. From there go out persons of this ideology on "missions of service," as they call this kind of activity. Several have been captured and shot when they reached Spain. There exists also a strong group with totalitarian tendencies.

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IMPRESSION OF THE AMERICAN SERVICES.

PRESIDENT AGUIRRE got the impression that the American services had not penetrated the mind of the South American peoples, because they do not use those elements who are familiar with the soul of these peoples, and because they move in circles quite separate from the psychology of the South American peoples.

When one of the Military Attaches asked SENOR AGUIRRE if the Basques, and specifically PRESIDENT AGUIRRE, were friends of Franco, it is easy to understand how with this question alone a lack of adaptation to his surroundings was made evident. The results of technical perfection will be insufficient, if one does not know the land in which one works. In general, almost no one had taken account of the repercussion which DR. AGUIRRE'S trip made on public opinion, or of its spiritual meaning and its value for penetrating enemy centres. Another had on the table a clipping of a photograph of DR. AGUIRRE, which had appeared in the press of the day, and which he was regarding attentively as proof of the identification of his visitor, and there was no other clipping of the many which had appeared in the newspapers.

He does not mean that their work is not successful. He wants to make it clear that something very important is lacking, namely, a knowledge of the spirit and reactions of the South American peoples, which is the basis for any efficient action whatsoever.

Almost none of them had instructions to facilitate the use of the diplomatic pouch for the work that the Basque Delegates would complete.

On the other hand, DR. AGUIRRE was received with great sympathy by the Military Attaches, who were very grateful for his visits, some of them, as the one in Santo Domingo, inviting him to dine at his home. In other places it was not possible to accept their invitations for lack of time. DR. AGUIRRE believes that a thorough penetration of Basques and Americans will result from our common task.

This sharp impression is summed up by the statement which the Cultural Attache of the American Embassy made to PRESIDENT AGUIRRE: "Washington has not succeeded in understanding this situation; there is no direction or orientation. I do not understand why they sent me here."

SENOR LASARTE'S TRIP.

DR. AGUIRRE was hoping that DR. LASARTE would be able to carry out immediately his anticipated trip, the object of which was,

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as was agreed upon, to perfect as rapidly as possible the organisation of the Basque Services from New York to Paris, passing through South America, Africa, Spain, the Basque Country, and Occupied and Unoccupied France. Difficulties which we know have impeded this trip, which is of such great necessity and urgency.

Each of the points treated above will be developed by SENOR LASARTE. It is necessary, for this reason, that he be able to leave as soon as possible to carry out his assigned task.

URGENT NECESSITIES.

1). To definitely unite the American Service with the Basque organisation in South America, which shall have as its duty to maintain the contact and to collaborate.

2). To determine how the Basque organisation may send its written communications and confidential telegrams, which are made necessary by the work which they are doing. Slow communications make results impossible.

3). Facility in material means, including the economic. The Basque Delegates have solved the problem of earning a living by working. We have already said that it is not a desire for gain which motivates their activities. Up to now it has been their private funds which have taken care of the expenses involved by the service. This imposes a permanent restriction. If this concern were to be removed, the results would be much greater. It will be possible to reach higher spheres than it has been possible to reach up to the present time, because of the above reason.

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Basque Intelligence 11,019
× Spain
× British Intelligence
× Bandres, Juan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM: WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON

Following is a translation of information supplied through Basque sources, which may be of interest to you:

"ENGLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

/This note which is dated August, 1942, reads as follows:/

The intelligence services have broken down in Spain and in France. We are sure of this fact. Don Juan Bandres from Tolosa, a Republican and former resident of Bordeaux, has just arrived from Laburbi. He is an agent of the Intelligence Service to which he has rendered services of some importance. This person has been perfectly well-known to us since before the Civil War. He fought as a major in the Basque Army, and later in that of the Republic with a combat car unit. He has invented a port or sight (mirilla) for tanks, and embrasures (troneras). He crossed the Pyrenees and stayed in the Basque country - Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Pamplona - for several weeks, protected by Basque nationalists, Requetes, who are increasingly more united and confident among themselves - he affirms - against the Falange. He embarked for England from Gibralter. His brother is staying on in Madrid at the direct service of the British Embassy. He may perhaps leave for America. The confidential information which he has supplied to us reveals that the British services in Spain have broken down. British agents are followed by the Gestapo, which operates from the direccion general de Seguridad (general directorate of security). The Belgian, Czech, and Polish organizations, which operate in Western Europe, have been likewise disseminated. Under these circumstances, and in the face of the peremptory necessity of working out new means of penetration and information, the elements responsible for carrying on warfare, the armed forces, are again looking toward the Basques. Senor Bandres has declared to his superiors that his actions can in no way supplant official Basque actions, which would be splendid."

W.H.S.

cc. to Mr. Bowden

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Basic D. Policies # 23?
x Representation
x Latin America
x Relations
x F.B.I.

April 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: FERDINAND L. MAYER

Attached is the translation of a report made by one of our national Bureau representatives, on the results of his recent trip around the Caribbean. I believe that there is considerable body of interest and significance. As you know, similar activities are under way in other parts of Latin America under the same principle.

Mr. Dyar will be very glad to explain, or to enlarge upon, any aspects of this report that you may find of interest. I have attached several copies with the thought that others might likewise be interested. I am sure that General Donovan would like to see this, as he has been concerned about the state of our relations with the F.B.I.

F.L.M.

Attachments

FLM:DyarJrnt

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I left Miami on the 8th of March. I stayed in Venezuela 9 days and 10 in Havana. The trip was prolonged some days more than expected by delays in the airplane service, and other details of no importance. In Santo Domingo where I stopped en route, I talked during the stop with our Delegate, Senor Galindez.

VENEZUELA

Situation of Basque Service -

I sought to inform myself concerning the state of our Services, work already accomplished, present activities, and future prospects, in order to coordinate the efforts with a view to their perfection and more perfect execution.

Antecedents -

In one form or another, the Basque Services have been functioning since the start of the war in Europe. At the beginning, contacts were had exclusively with English Agents. The Chief of the latter stated repeatedly that at difficult moments such as Dunkirk, when discouragement was wide-spread and friendships were strained, the Basques were the only people who stayed at their posts with unswerving loyalty and enthusiasm to carry out whatever should be asked of them. Without going into the details of the many and constant activities, we point out two outstanding facts: When the attack on Pearl Harbor

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case the English Chief believed that means should be taken against a possible armed intervention on the part of the Germans, in combination with the Japanese. The Basque Service, utilizing military officers who had fought in the Basque Army, organized secretly such elements of the Basque refugee population in Venezuela as were utilizable, as well as certain other foreign elements in our confidence. All this was camouflaged under cover of sporting and other activities. Basque fishing boats and their crews were made ready to transport arms from Trinidad. Detailed studies were made of centers which would be likely to be taken by force, destroyed, or watched over. This action, although fully prepared, was never undertaken because the danger which was feared did not become a reality. It is significant that this work was carried out with such reserve that no detail of the projected action became public or reached the ears of Venezuelan authorities. On another occasion this same English Chief asked us for two volunteers for secret missions involving disembarkations from submarines in Spain and Africa. The volunteers were supplied but were not made use of because of a change of instructions received from the English authorities.

Present Situation -

With the entrance of the United States into the war began our contact with the American authorities - a contact which has been constantly improved and perfected with the passage of time. The efficacy of the work of the Basque Service culminated in the penetra-

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tion of the Spanish Legation and the obtaining of their secret cipher.

At the present moment the Basque Service has a considerable number of agents in the capital and at the most significant points in the interior and on the Coast of Venezuela.

Upon my arrival in Venezuela I found myself faced with a delicate problem which it was necessary to resolve with all haste. It concerned a search in the [illegible]ish Legation to obtain details of the matter of the jewels, of which we shall speak farther on, of obtaining the seal of the Diplomatic Pouch, and of obtaining that part of the cipher corresponding to the Circular Telegram section. Immediately after this it was planned to make a careful search of the Diplomatic Pouch which would be carried from Caracas to La Guaira to catch the Spanish ship which left this port on the 25th of March. The most minute details of the two operations had been studied and planned out so that it might be done successfully and without risk. Through the searching of the Pouch we could have cleared up definitively the matter of the jewels, and in addition acquaint ourselves in detail with the activities of the German Agents, since we are assured that his communications are sent by means of this Pouch. Before my arrival in Venezuela, the Chief of the Basque Service discussed the problem with the FBI and the English Chief. The former two wanted to carry out the scheme - their inclusion in the scheme was necessary for technical reasons; obtaining photographs of documents, and so forth. The English Chief was opposed; he wasn't inclined to run the risk of destroying previous successes still continuing to give results at the present time. The Basque Chief, in view of the disparity of opinion, decided

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to go ahead with the undertaking. Duly informed of the details of these projects, I asked them to hold off to give me time to think it over, and I decided that this operation should be held up until such time as the advantages and dangers could be discussed in New York. My general interest in all these matters taken together obliged me to adopt this measure of prudence. Later events confirmed that this was the correct procedure. We found out at once that Senor Sangroniz had been recalled to Madrid and that he was going to leave, along with his family, on the Spanish ship sailing March 25th. It appears that Senor Sangroniz has been chosen to represent Spain in Canada. There remains thus, the same and perhaps even greater possibility of carrying out in Venezuela the two above-described operations some time during the next two months. Furthermore, the first steps have been taken successfully to make it possible to obtain the cipher of the Spanish mission in Canada when Senor Sangroniz arrives there. In view of these facts, it is necessary to decide what is best to do in order to dispatch the indicated orders to Venezuela.

Our knowledge of the texts of ciphered telegrams from the Spanish Legation permits us to direct our work carefully and with efficacious results. The FBI submits them to the Chief of the Basque Service as soon as they are received. Some of the more outstanding topics are as follows:

The intervention of Senor Sangroniz to support the conversion into the money of this country (Venezuela) of a considerable sum in dollars, which was brought into Venezuela by the Japanese and which came apparently from the American money which the Japanese seized in the Philippines.

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The personal intervention of Senor Sangroniz in support of the activities of the German Chief, Braun, in the matter of the Caracas - Valencia Railway, with German capital, but under the cover of a Spanish corporation domiciled in Madrid. The German, Braun, proposed and defended his sale to the Venezuelan Government of what is reputed to be the quantity of 8,000,000 bolivaras on which he hopes to realize 4,000,000 in cash.

The activities of the German Chief of Espionage, in which he asks that additional care be taken with the Berlin wave-length on which he transmits messages because it is not being received with clarity. In the telegram he sets forth the characteristics of this wave-length which may have resulted in its becoming completely unusable.

The activities of the German Chief of Espionage in which he asks that the question of his autonomy with respect to the Spanish Legation be decided in order that the Legation shall not interfere in his affairs, and that he may act with freedom of movement and full authority over the Legation. The answer to this request has not as yet been telegraphed.

Concerning the matter of the jewels, the following is the situation:

It is common knowledge in Venezuela that the Spanish Legation is involved in the purchase of jewels of all classes and in great quantity, up to the point that their value in the market has risen to almost double that of the original. We have been able to obtain some concrete data and various other threads of the scheme. There have arrived several jewel technicians from Spain. Senor Sangroniz spends much money, and apparently without any preoccupation, a fact which gives us assurance that he is profiting from these operations. It is known at the same time that he arranges the exportation of pesetas from Spain to convert them into bolivaras at official exchange rates.

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The fact that in the forwarding of these jewels to Spain, the Diplomatic Pouch is most certainly made use of gives one good grounds to suspect that quite above and beyond any profit to Senor Sangroniz there is in all this business a further interest redounding ultimately to the benefit of the German war effort. In the near future we expect to receive a detailed report on this question.

I do not believe this occasion opportune for setting forth in too minute detail the activities which the Basque Service has carried out in connection with the above-indicated matters and with the innumerable details which investigative activities demand, whether they be labors undertaken on our own initiative or work entrusted to us by our American friends. Concerning counter-espionage, the Service has operated with success in searching the homes of Germans and in intercepting their correspondence---taking as a base of operations houses and hotels in which Basque Agents have means of penetration.

Right at this moment we are about to achieve the penetration of the Swiss Legation where we have every right to suspect we shall find matters of interest concerning the protection which that Legation gives to Italy and perhaps through the latter to the other Axis countries.

Our agents along the coast and in the interior act generally on the basis of specific missions which are given to them by Basque headquarters and others in furtherance of the American Services. For our communications we use the American interior pouch along with the air service.

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Expeditions have been organized to the German towns of the interior in an effort to locate secret radio transmitters. We used physicians in our organization for this purpose. The undertakings were, unfortunately, quite without success. It is generally conceded to be practically impossible to locate these sets because of the nature of the terrain. There are enormous expanses of territory completely isolated and covered with jungle.

For the Future -

If the activities of the Basque Service in Venezuela have given good results on the whole, our work nevertheless suffers from two considerable defects: The lack of an office to enable us to pursue with any degree of system all our activities; regular communications with New York concerning our undertakings and the results that are being obtained. Certainly these deficiencies are not imputable to the Services per se: the absence of precise instructions on the one hand and the lack of financial means on the other which would permit those responsible for the direction of activities to dedicate themselves exclusively to these activities have been the principal reasons for this situation. Since the Chief and the other agents are obliged to work for a living and to dedicate themselves to the work of the Service only during the time they have free, results have not been as perfect as otherwise they might have been.

On our part we have sought to give precise instructions on the form of organizing our work for the future, and to aid them financially in the manner known to you.

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Mission of Letamendi -

My arrival coincided closely with the departure of the ship for Spain. His (Letamendi's) departure and cover had been perfectly worked out in such a form that neither the Spanish authorities nor, indeed, the Basque colony in general had the slightest suspicion. His negotiations with Senor Sangroniz were handled with great tact and cleverness to the point that Senor Sangroniz himself took charge of the details and red tape involved. As they were leaving to go on the same boat, it is quite possible that the greatest protection conceivable will be found in Sangroniz himself, and that Letamendi may well obtain information of interest to us. He is a great friend of the daughters of Senor Sangroniz with whom he is also travelling.

It was possible for me to give him his instructions with the greatest tranquility and precision, and all in the most discreet form. I do not believe that it could have been possible to arrange everything any better in a matter of this nature. All in all, the situation has been, up until the present time, most favorable. My arrival in Venezuela, I am sure, was well covered by the nature of the work in which I engaged during my stay there. However, in order to short-circuit the consequences of the always possible risks, despite the apparent normality, I gave strict orders to Letamendi that under no circumstances whatsoever was he to contact any American Agent or sub-agent. I cannot do less than stress the magnificent spirit of Letamendi. He is giving up in Venezuela an excellent position, he has refused also to accept the money which has been assigned to him upon his arrival and is going to limit himself solely to what is absolutely necessary for him.

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SANTO DOMINGO

It was not possible for me to stay in Ciudad Trujillo more than the short space of time that the airplane stops there. I spoke with our Delegate who is also the Chief of our Service there. From him I learned that he keeps up a close collaboration with the American authorities. At the period of my interview with him they were busy in making a complete investigation into the retinue of President Trujillo and of his brother, for the purpose of getting at the bottom of an accusation attributing to the brother of the President the protection and concealment of two German agents disembarked from a submarine on the island. As of the day of my visit no results had been obtained.

CUBA

Upon my arrival in Havana I was summoned by the Ambassador of the United States. He received me in company with his Secretary, Mr. Joice. He was under the impression that I was Jose Maria de Lasarte, whose arrival had been announced to him some time before. I explained to him about Senor Lasarte's trip and the reasons for which I was substituting for him in the Carribbean countries.

The Ambassador made the statement to me that he was the Chief of all Information Services. From the questions that he asked me I deduced that he was trying to coordinate them to a common end

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but that each service was continuing to preserve its own personality. He proposed to me an interview to work out details with Mr. Joice, the local Chief of the FBI - Mr. Ledy - and a certain Senor Duran, a Spaniard and Partisan of the Republic who had reached during the Civil War the rank of General of Militia, and who is today an American citizen. This interview took place in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality, speaking in general terms.

With the Chief of the FBI, I had two long private interviews. He stated to me that he was most satisfied with the collaboration which the Delegate and the Chief of the Basque Service had rendered him. I indicated to him that our activities in Cuba had been practically nil, not through any fault of the organization in that country, but rather because it had been impossible for us to give them any aid. The FBI Chief declared in turn that collaboration with our organization had begun only very recently because since he had received the corresponding instructions he had been away a considerable time and it had not been possible for him to do as he might have wished. He considered that our people had demonstrated sufficiently their efficacy in work already done and which is described in the note recently received from Cuba (that work surely is related with the Santo Domingo matter which I mentioned above).

We exchanged impressions of the problems of Cuba in order to arrive at an agreement as to the line of work to be followed by our people in the future. I indicated to him my points of view as follows: (1) As concerns what goes on in other South American countries and

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as for information obtainable in Cuba, I do not feel that any concern is indicated in connection with the Falange-Espanola and the old organization of the Partisans of Franco. The South Americans who gave their names to said organizations did it for utilitarian and opportunistic reasons. In general, they are excessively selfish people lacking in sufficient spirit of sacrifice to be able to take part in any work as risky as espionage; that, although I did not believe that they indulged in espionage as an organization, this did not mean that they did not do so as individuals and as agents paid by the German services or the Spanish Embassy. Questions of propaganda and psychological warfare are another matter; (2) That we consider that communism maintains in Cuba a true central headquarters for all of America. We know that from Cuba there sailed for the Spain of Franco communist agents proceeding from other countries, including Chile. The communists maintain suspicious relations with Cuban elements of a significant pro-Franco tendency, and by making use of threats and promises they obtain from these people significant benefits, not the least of these being economic. The communist organization is expanding rapidly in Cuba. They have strong groups and recently have acquired [illegible] radio broadcasting equipment.

****

I proposed to him the following line of action: (1) In order to locate Axis Agents, instead of shadowing all known pro-Franco people or persons with totalitarian tendencies or contacts - an idea which has

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been proposed by some American agents, but which would constitute an interminable labor - rather to dedicate ourselves with all vigor to turning up some of their activities in order to penetrate thus into the center. Among these approaches may be: clandestine radios, personal tie-ups with Mexico, Santo Domingo, Venezuela, and the United States, the Spanish Embassy. It will be perfectly feasible for our organization to work on these personal contacts through Venezuela, Santo Domingo and Mexico. I asked him if he had penetrated the Spanish Embassy and he said no. I asked him if he had the list of the Embassy personnel and he answered that he would facilitate our obtaining it. (2) We could work into the communist organization following up independently the Spanish and the Cuban ones, both in the capital and in the provincial towns. (3) We would have the means for making a special study on the situation of the clergy and the Catholic world in Cuba, utilizing Priests from among our own people in whom we repose complete confidence and who are ideally situated. (4) Organizing the personnel which is at our disposition on various vessels which ply between the Antilles and which have Cuba as their base. (5) A study of the Cuban press based on: the organization of each newspaper, the economic situation and financiers; editors and collaborators showing marked personal inclinations and ideologies; influences emphasized by each newspaper.

The Chief of the FBI was interested very particularly in the Spanish ships which touch at this island. I indicated to him that since these ships touch also at the United States ports, there was a question

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of its being handled from here. I added that in the United States the matter had already been considered, insofar as it concerned us, but that the ultimate solution was still pending.

Relations with the American Services - FBI -

The impression which I received of the collaboration of our Services with the FBI could not be better. The personnel of this American Service with whom I spent considerable time in Venezuela and Cuba, had a great effect on me: young men who were meticulous in their obligations, dignified and affable, it is evident that they are subject to rigorous discipline which they accept with enthusiasm and even affection for the cause which they serve. In their relations with our people they have arrived at a perfect degree of mutual understanding and confidence as a result of which the Basque Agents have been delighted. The same satisfaction was manifested to me by the American Agents concerning everything having to do with our men. From this mutual intelligence will be derived good and increasingly better results. All of this is being carried out with the greatest respect discretion on the part of each one for the sphere of action of others.

The FBI has been helping the Basque Service in Venezuela with a thousand bolivares a month, apart from expenses and specific missions entrusted to our people. In Cuba they have reimbursed us for expenses and missions which likewise were entrusted to us, and according to what the Chief there stated to me, they are disposed to supply the money which would be necessary on a permanent basis to

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permit the Basque Agents to devote themselves to intelligence work without other preoccupations. We knew before that that the same offers were made in Santo Domingo. I indicated in Cuba and in Venezuela what the desires of President Aguirre were concerning the payment of money to the Basque Service. We have already laid down the general regulation that our agents shall not accept money and I added that President Aguirre is trying to take care of our Service according to the necessities of each locality to the best of his ability. Within a few days we shall transmit to Venezuela the order to stop receiving the monthly sum above-mentioned.

American Military Organization -

Upon arriving in Venezuela I was acquainted with the fact that due to President Aguirre's not having seen the Military Attache, the Basque Service had not maintained relations with him. On My own initiative I visited him twice - the first time to inform him of our orders, that the Basque Service should hand him all the information it obtains, and the second time to present to him our Chief in order that the contact should continue in the future. On my first visit I presented our apologies for the fact that the contact had not been made before, explaining that this was not due to a lack of attentiveness on our part towards him, and less to the American institution which he represents. At the same time I expounded to him in general terms the work which had been done in Venezuela.

The Military Attache asked me the following: If we were

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collaborating with any other American agency; if we received any financial remuneration; how many agents we had in Venezuela. I answered: that the Basque Service maintained relations with the FBI; that the general order of President Aguirre to all our organizations is that they are not to accept financial remuneration of any sort; that the principal agents in Venezuela number some 15, but that the actual number of agents is much greater and that they are utilized according to the exigencies of our work. The Attache stated that he was familiar with our collaboration in Naval matters with the Naval Attache with whom he is in close touch. He accepted the arrangement that we should deliver information to him.

In Cuba I also visited the Military Attache. Our Delegate maintains direct contact with him and quite a close contact with his Aide, Captain Roger. I gave an account to him of the reasons for which we had not accomplished any great work in Cuba and indicated our desires of doing everything possible to increase our output, solving the problems which to date have impeded us in fulfilling our mission as we should desire.

April 8, 1945

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

Aguirre Sr. to. Lisbon
x France x Spain
x Tangier, Paris

26 March 1945

To Major General William J Donovan

From John C Hughes

When you were in the office Saturday, I neglected to tell you about the departure of Aguirre and his Secretary the day before but I asked Lieutenant Eliscu to give you this message and understand that he told you when they left from Washington.

They expect to be abroad only for about a month on this trip but if you should have occasion to be in Paris during their stay there I think it would be most helpful if you can find it possible to talk with them. On the day they left we sent cables to Forgan and Gamble and they, therefore, doubtless would be in touch with them and will be able to tell you of their whereabouts.

Spencer Phenix and I discussed our various plans with them just before their departure and I am sure that in spite of their delay in getting abroad, they can be most helpful over there. We also discussed their trip with Whitney Shepardson, insofar as it pertains to SI work.

JCH

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19 December 1944

Mr. James C. Dunn, Director
Office of European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmie:

I thought you would find something in this suggestion of Spencer Phenix.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Incl.

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16 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

The Spanish situation at this particular moment offers an opportunity for constructive statesmanship. The question is whether the United States must maintain a completely aloof attitude or whether it should endeavor affirmatively to facilitate a peaceful transition from the Franco dictatorship to a democratic form of government.

It is generally agreed that the Franco regime is tottering but unless appropriate steps are promptly taken, its fall can be the signal for civil war, chaos and anarchy. Such a development would not only have serious repercussions in Latin America but its effect might well be catastrophic to the cause of popular government in Europe particularly in the light of recent disillusionments in Belgium, Italy and Greece. Given the power, influence and prestige of the United States as a democratic nation it is arguable that we have a certain responsibility in seeing that democratic movements are not crushed between dictatorship and Communism. Although the incredible complexity of the Spanish political problem may make it impossible to reach a peaceful solution, if it is agreed that an effort along such lines should be made, the Office of Strategic Services is in a position to carry out for the President and the Secretary of State (unofficially and secretly so as not officially to compromise the government of the United States) a definite program for the development within Spain of a movement for the creation of a democratic Spanish government.

For nearly three years certain members of the OSS organization have as you know cultivated intimate friendly relations with the Basque Delegation for intelligence purposes. With the aid of the Basques in Spain intelligence chains have been maintained across the Pyrenees and information regarding enemy activities on the Continent has come to OSS from such sources and also through the Basque organization in South America which maintains direct secret communications with its fellow countrymen. This collaboration has been very valuable and has resulted in the development of an atmosphere of mutual trust and esteem. We feel confident that our relationship can be developed to include active cooperation for the establishment of a democratic government in Spain.

The Basque people are ardent democrats and lovers of liberty. They are religious, idealistic, well disciplined and fanatically loyal to their leaders. Because of their solidarity and their devotion to their President they offer the strongest and most effective single nucleus for any pro-democratic movement in Spain. Their President, Jose Antonio de Aguirre now lives in New York. He is highly regarded

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by liberal democrats everywhere and it would seem that he if anyone can play a vital part in the recreation of democracy in Spain. He is the unquestioned leader of his people and it is our information that important colleagues of his have recently arrived from Mexico and that another is due shortly from the Argentine to discuss the Spanish situation with him.

Meanwhile, President Aguirre keeps closely in touch with his colleagues in Paris and tries to do the same with Madrid but communication difficulties are much greater. We have learned from a confidential but entirely reliable source that he recently sent special instructions both to Paris and to Madrid regarding the efforts of Miguel Maura to promote a peaceful transition from Franco to democracy and we understand that these instructions contemplated Basque cooperation with the Maura movement. More specifically the Paris Basque organization has been authorized to inform Maura that the Basque Committee is able to maintain order in the Basque provinces and will guarantee to do so by organizing the country and occupying key posts in the local government thus helping bring about the peaceful transition which Maura is attempting. If complete local authority cannot be given to the Basques at first the Paris group is authorized to agree with Maura on the nomination of four Basque governors to take charge of public order and to prepare for the transition to a popular legitimate government. Since the Maura movement may not succeed the Basques are taking the greatest possible security precautions lest their people suffer reprisals. In general the position of the Basques seems to be that since their people are united behind their President they should wait for the union of now divergent Spanish groups and then to join in the formation of a single constitutional Spanish government. We have also learned from unimpeachable sources that President Aguirre holds himself in readiness to leave at any moment for France and that his Paris colleagues are taking steps to obtain a French visa for him.

We thus have ready to hand a strong and functioning Basque organization composed of energetic, courageous and competent people unalterably devoted to the cause of democratic government and alive to the dangers of Communistic machinations and we believe that with appropriate support and guidance this group can play a possibly decisive role in the present critical chapter of Spanish history. The opportunity for constructive collaboration seems great. Ambassador Armour has had personal and intimate knowledge of Basque activities in Buenos Aires and has, we understand, a high regard for the Basque representatives there. We know for a fact that the Basques themselves regard Ambassador Armour very highly and have great confidence in his ability and sympathetic understanding of the Spanish problem and their

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part therein. OSS has as its representative in the Iberian Peninsula a man intimately acquainted with leading Basque personalities in the United States, in France and in Spain and a man of unusual experience in and capacity for the discreet manipulation of circumstances for a desired political end. We have in New York a firm basis of cooperation with President Aguirre and his immediate associates. We have offices in Paris which are in frequent and direct contact with the Paris Basques. You yourself are well acquainted with Aguirre and his high regard for you will be an invaluable asset in any program of cooperation. If the White House and the State Department should agree that the United States should take affirmative steps looking to the peaceful creation of a democratic regime in Spain to take the place of the Franco dictatorship it seems clear that OSS can render invaluable assistance. If this policy is determined upon the OSS representative in the Iberian Peninsula should be instructed to prepare plans and to discuss them unofficially with Ambassador Armour immediately upon his arrival. The general program having been approved by the President or the Secretary of State, the greatest care must be taken in its execution so as not to involve the United States in diplomatic embarrassment. The OSS and OSS personnel in this particular set of circumstances seem admirably qualified for the actual implementation of such a program.

In conclusion it should be stated that there is no guarantee that such a program will succeed. On the contrary, it is almost too much to hope that any basic Iberian political problem can be solved peacefully. But the consequences of a hands-off policy could be so disastrous not only for Spain but also for the cause of democracy and liberty in other parts of the world, that the seizing of even a forlorn chance would seem worth while.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

SECRETARIAT

1944 DEC 11 AM 10 37

OSS

9 December 1944

To Lt (jg) E J Putzell, Jr

From John C Hughes

As per telephone conversation, I am sending you herewith photostatic copies of the material we discussed.

JCH

Will do
please file these

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OSS Form 40016

DATE 7 December 1944

TO: MR. HUGHES

SECRET

1. You will note that the Director has approved Mr. Phenix's recommendations.

2. Mr. Shepardson and Col. Rehm have been notified.

3. The original approval slip from the Director may be retained by Mr. Merrill.

JBD

James B. Donovan

Office of the General Counsel

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Even ...

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of

5 SPY SUSPECTS NAMED

Argentine Newspaper Lists Aides of Falangist Group

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, May 23, (UP)— The newspaper Critica yesterday named five alleged accomplices of a Falangist spy ring reported to have been uncovered after the arrest of Rosario Almozara Lombera, a member of the crew of the Spanish ship Cabo de Hornos.

It was reported last week that as many as forty persons, mostly Spaniards, had been arrested. The Critica said that one, Miguel Moreno, had transmitted instructions to Axis agents and that Lazaro Martinez had photographed the ports of Curacao, Puerto Cabello and Trihidad during stop-overs of the Cabo de Hornos

The ring also smuggled platinum and fashion designs.

Even [illegible]

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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Nov 25/44

To Privy Council —

I - Please see this thro' pass through as approved by me.

II - It should be taken over to Privy Council and it will be arranged and suppose all for its distribution

III - Tell Mr. Shipman it is being done and bring the Board of Review that this is not a new project but a continuation of the war committee for this year SECRET Duncan

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25 November 1944

To Brigadier General William J Donovan

From Spencer Phenix

As a result of the liberation of France, the New York office has an opportunity to exploit still further its relations with the Basques. The purposes of such further exploitation would be to lay the groundwork for the development of secret intelligence sources in France and Belgium, the integration of these sources with existing Spanish sources, the procurement of South American information independent of existing FBI channels on subjects such as the Hispanidad movement and the welding together of an information network covering Spain and France and having outlets to Washington through both Lisbon and Paris. This network would be a clandestine network and would operate independently. Its construction in Spain under Argus would be a valuable laboratory experiment since it would afford a practical test of what is actually feasible along such lines under existing conditions.

There are many Basques in France and their leaders are loyal to President Aguirre. These Basques have facilities for collecting information which we cannot hope to duplicate. A recent message reports the re-opening of their Bayonne Center. A letter from Paris reports the re-opening of their headquarters there at 11 Avenue Marceau and states with reference to their Paris situation:

"It could not be better. We are esteemed, we are appreciated, we are listened to. If the policy for the Peninsula presents in general difficulties of various kinds in its development and gives rise to misgivings, that is not true in Paris. During the years of occupation we maintained relations with our old French friends, all of them active members of the Resistance and today persons of importance. Mauriac, Pezet, Laurent, Bidault, Hay, Terrier, Mathieu, etc. ...."

That the Hispanidad question is still significant is shown by a Falangist radio broadcast from Valladolid on 22 November continuing the Franco thesis that Spain is the spiritual, intellectual and physical mother country of the Americas and discussing Spain's role as the "discoverer and civilizer of those nations on the other side of the Atlantic", portraying the newly redoubled interest on the part of Mother Spain in her "children" on the American continent as due to the "great movement which has shaken our people out of inertia" and complimenting the Falange which has "fundamentally swerved Spain around so that she

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again turns her face and heart towards far-off America where her seeds have borne such good fruit".

President Aguirre desires to go to London to get in personal touch with his associates there and on the continent and we are told by our British friends that the British Embassy in Washington has cabled London strongly recommending the granting of a visa. According to information given Argus by the State Department, the latter has no objection to such a trip. Another member of the Basque Delegation in New York wants to go to France as soon as possible to re-establish direct relations with his colleagues there.

It is too early to know precisely how we can best cooperate with the Basques for the accomplishment of the purposes indicated above. It seems clear that we should be able if necessary to finance and facilitate President Aguirre's trip to England as we did his trip to South America, and that we should also be able to finance the trip of his colleague to France if either or both should prove practicable. We should attach to the OSS office in Paris a man qualified to cultivate our Basque friendships and collect and transmit to Washington the secret intelligence reports furnished by them - for example, reports on Communist movements, activities and policies in France, biographical sketches of new figures of power in the political world, important underground trends and personalities, etc. No. 55[illegible] heretofore in Barcelona has been suggested by Argus for this post. We should be able to finance a clandestine courier system linking Madrid with Paris so as to have an outlet in addition to Lisbon and so as to have direct communication between Madrid and Paris in both directions. We should test against actual experience in such work our plans for the development of a permanent secret intelligence system in Spain and France.

If you approve of the above project I very much hope you can arrange to see President Aguirre either in New York or Washington before your departure so that you can tell him yourself how much value you place on his assistance and outline to him the subjects in which you are most interested. Since contact with the Basque group has been maintained through the New York office I also suggest that the expenses of the project be paid through the New York office without reference to Washington for approval of specific items or conformity with the increasingly restrictive limitations on the disbursement of special funds. If, for example, we are to meet the expenses of President Aguirre's proposed trip we cannot for obvious reasons require signed receipts from him or call upon him for any detailed accounting. I recommend therefore that a lump sum of $25,000 be allocated for this project, to be expended by John Hughes as Chief of the New York office for such purposes as in his judgment seem reasonable or necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes in mind, and that you instruct the Washington Special Funds office that Mr Hughes' certification of expenditure is the only accounting required.

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[illegible]

74 de mayo, 1943

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José Laradogoitia Menchaca, natural de Urduliz (Vizcaya), vivió en Butrón localidad cercana donde parte de su familia reside en la actualidad. Llegó a Estados Unidos el 11 de diciembre de 1930. Residió en el Oeste de U.S.A. en Boise, Idaho y en Salt Lake City, Utah. Salió de los E.U. el 6 de noviembre de 1941. Ha llegado el 17 de mayo de 1943 con el vapor "Manuel Calvo" al puerto de Philadelphia. Desde el tiempo transcurrido de su salida de los Estados Unidos hasta su actual llegada ha estado en comunicación y contacto con los alemanes en España, con quienes ha actuado como agente. Su nombre de agente es "G" que corresponde a la primera letra de la palabra Guernica. Tiene 30 años.

INICIACION: José Laradogoitia por motivos y circunstancias que precisaremos al final y que la Delegación Vasca conocía al detalle, fué expulsado de los Estados Unidos. Antes de la salida del país permaneció en Ellis Island durante algunos días. De allí fué trasladado al "Marqués de Comillas" para ser enviado a España como pasajero de turista por acuerdo de las autoridades americanas. El barco salió del puerto de New York el 6 de noviembre de 1941.

Laradogoitia con el fin de asegurarse su situación ante las autoridades de Franco, comenzó a hacerse pasar en el barco como amigo de Franco y de ideas totalitarias. Después de varios tanteos, dió con Valeriano Peña, barbero del barco, 42 años de edad, 5' 11", con quien trabó cierta amistad. Valeriano Peña es un agente secreto en el barco. Este informó a la llegada a Bilbao de las condiciones en que Laradogoitia salía de los E.U. y de la posición ideológica que él había manifestado. El "Marqués de Comillas" llegó a Bilbao el 19 de noviembre del mismo año. A la llegada le interrogó el jefe de policía local Sr. Cabezas quien consultó el caso con el Jefe de la Policía de Bilbao Sr. Aparicio. Ambos creyeron de interés la forma en que se manifestaba Laradogoitia y decretaron que podría actuar con libertad de movimientos, dejándole sin tomar medida policíaca alguna. Laradogoitia fué a Bilbao donde se instaló en el Hotel Excelsior. El mismo día de la llegada al hotel le llamó por teléfono un individuo que le preguntó si tenía inconveniencia en hacerle alguna declaración que le interesaba pues decía ser un agente de información. Por el acento, aún cuando el castellano del interlocutor era correcto, Laradogoitia comprendió que se trataba de un extranjero. A los diez minutos de la conversación telefónica se presentó en el hotel un señor que manifestó había estado en contacto con la policía que le había interrogado en el puerto y que deseaba conocer personalmente sus impresiones. El visitante se presentó bajo el nombre de Emilio. Le dijo que era Suizo y que estaba al servicio de los alemanes. Le pidió una declaración de lo que sabía Laradogoitia sobre la situación de los E.U., etc. Emilio al final de la conversación le preguntó si tendría inconveniencia en tener relación con él y le citó para otro día. Laradogoitia acudió a la cita y Emilio le propuso el plan de servir en trabajos de información para la causa que él representaba que al fin y al cabo perseguía un bien para España. Laradogoitia no se negó y dejó seguir el asunto. Emilio expresó deseos de conocer a la familia de Laradogoitia, y éste le invitó a comer en su casa de Urduliz, comida a la que asistió el padre de Laradogoitia con otros miembros de la familia; de parte de Emilio tres compañeros más, uno, cuyo nombre no sabe, que debía ser algún alemán y dos españoles, José Gallego, 24 años, moreno, cabello negro, 5' 7½"; Alejandro del Carmen, 6', rubio, bigote, 32 años, de unos 75 kilos: ambos de la policía secreta española. Laradogoitia consultó la proposición con su padre dándole que conoce su asunto y éste le dejó en libertad para que actúe entendiendo que aunque asunto delicado, podría ser un medio bueno de defensa personal y conseguir otros beneficios en especial la llegada a América.

PERSONALIDAD DE EMILIO: Aún cuando el dar todos estos datos no supone el seguir cronológicamente los pasos de Laradogoitia, los indicamos aquí para mejor comprensión del relato. Emilio es un jefe de la Gestapo en España a cuyo cargo corresponde la sección de Bilbao. Su verdadero nombre o por lo menos el nombre por el cual le conocen los alemanes es Jorge Lang, de 5'10½", moreno, pelo ne-

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gro, se peina para atrás, constitución bastante fuerte, 72 kilos, 41 años, casado con la española Antonia (?) Crespo, hija del conocido monárquico de este nombre, mujer guapa. El domicilio familiar lo tiene en Madrid en Infantas 22 2º. Lang emplea corrientemente para asuntos del servicio dirección de correos, etc., el nombre de Emilio Martincho, para personas que no le son conocidas tiene una tarjeta a nombre de Julio Martín. La oficina de Bilbao donde lleva Lang todos los trabajos está situado en la Alameda Mazarredo 10 3º derecha, teléfono 19391. Es un piso amplio que está regentado y guardado por una señora con dos hijas cuyos nombres desconoce Laradogoitia. En esta oficina trabajan permanentemente unos 5 o 6 personas alemanas. Hay una habitación cerrada que Laradogoitia no ha visto. Es donde supone tienen algunos aparatos técnicos y otras cosas de valor y donde cree existe el aparato de radio emisora. El aparato receptor lo ha visto y está en otra habitación. Con anterioridad a esta local tenía la oficina en la calle Aguirre 1 - 3º derecha. Los alemanes reciben correspondencia para la oficina, aparte de los sistemas que más adelante daremos: en el Hotel Excelsior, a nombre de personas interpuestas y muy frecuentemente a nombre de Emilio Martincho, Julio Martín y también a nombre en Enriqueta (el apellido no recuerda) calle Colón de Larreategui (el número tampoco recuerda). Enriqueta es una chica soltera, ya pasada en años, que se presta de intermediaria.

Laradogoitia cree que Lang cuenta con unos 60 agentes en Bilbao y su zona, algunos de los cuales o bastantes trabajan en diversos barcos. El conoce por haberles descubierto de una u otra forma los siguientes: Francisco Montes de Valladolid, de 22 años de edad, 5'5½", 130 libras, moreno, ayudante maquinista en el "Monte Contes" que hasta la fecha no ha venido a América. Cree que Francisco Montes será hecho maquinista en breve y que seguramente navegará en barcos que vengan a América. Pablo Moreno, agente en el "Cabo Hornos" que va camuflado en diversas ocupaciones, tiene 5'8", 150 libras, y de 28 años. Un tal apellidado de Luis cuyo primer nombre no recuerda, también agente en el "Cabo Hornos" de 5'4½", pesa 130 libras, moreno, gallego, 22 años. Uno de los agentes más antiguos y competentes del mismo "Cabo Hornos", el Dr. Torres, segundo médico de abordo, 38 años, 5'11", 70 kilos, moreno. Rafael Gutierrez Cuesta que vive en Madrid, Calle Orense 13, llegó de Buenos Aires donde residió cuatro meses y vino en el "Cabo Hornos" el 19 de noviembre de 1942, llegando a Bilbao, 5'10", cabello castaño, 150 libras, 35 años. Bernardo Romillo que vive en la calle Sendeja 7, Bilbao, vino también en el "Cabo Hornos" desde Buenos Aires, fué teniente de Franco durante la guerra civil, le llamaban el teniente "malacara". Tiene un tío rico en Argentina, aunque no con seguridad pero Laradogoitia cree que en la provincia de Mendoza, 5'7", entradas marcadas de pelo color castaño, se peina para atrás, 140 libras. En el "Manuel Calvo" el camarero de maquinistas llamado Carmona, anteriormente estuvo en Cuba donde realizó activa propaganda totalitaria es otro agente, así como el agregado del barco Emilio Pis (?) a quien ha visto frecuentemente con agentes alemanes en San Sebastián y Bilbao. Más adelante daremos la explicación de por qué Laradogoitia ha podido enterarse de la organización del "Cabo Hornos". Laradogoitia no puede dar los nombres de muchos agentes alemanes con quienes se ha relacionado en diversas ocasiones aun cuando los conozca personalmente porque los ocultaban cuidadosamente.

ACTUACION POSTERIOR DE LARADOGOITIA: Aceptado por Laradogoitia el entrar en colaboración con los alemanes, el jefe Lang le propone ir a Madrid para presentarle a sus jefes superiores y después organizar la forma de recibir la instrucción y órdenes pertinentes. Se trasladó a Madrid hospedándose en el Hotel Alcoriza, Avenida José Antonio, número 20 o 22. Era la primera vez que Laradogoitia estaba en Madrid. Allí Lang le llamaba por teléfono de su domicilio, organizaba las citas con discreción y le llevaba a diferentes lugares donde se veía a su vez con diferentes personajes alemanes que le sometían a diversos interrogatorios sobre diferentes puntos. Laradogoitia no puede precisar donde están las

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oficinas de la organización alemana en Madrid. Cree que son muy numerosas y como le cambiaban de lugar continuamente, no podía darse cuenta de su situación. En Madrid además de pagarle la fonda, le entregaban todo el dinero que precisaba para sus gastos personales. A los jefes alemanes le pareció utilizable Laradogoitia y así lo aprobaron. Después de pasar 10 o 15 días volvió con Lang a Bilbao para comenzar la instrucción de agente. Vivía con Lang en el primer domicilio que antes hemos señalado en la calle Aguirre y comenzó a instruirle en diversos aspectos de la labor de espionage. Laradogoitia hacía uso libre del coche de Lang que estaba provisto de una completa colección de placas de diferentes puntos de España que eran cambiadas casi diariamente con el fin de despistar. A Laradogoitia le entregaban dos mil pesetas al mes, aparte de las comidas corrientes, etc., que tenían lugar en el domicilio de Lang con quien vivía. Como primer paso Lang le propuso la entrada como intérprete en el Consulado americano de Bilbao en donde estuvo desde diciembre de 1942 hasta febrero del 1943. Laradogoitia no puede precisar de que medios se valió Lang para que el Consulado Americano le admitiera como intérprete. Supone que Lang tiene una influencia decisiva por algún medio. El Consulado Americano no conocía ni sospechó la relación de Laradogoitia con los alemanes. (Este hecho confirma lo acertado de la sospecha que la Organización Vasca nos cursó en su día sobre el consulado americano de Bilbao.)

PRIMERA SALIDA DE LARADOGOITIA: A los alemanes les interesaba que Laradogoitia con su conocimiento del inglés y del pueblo americano podría trabajar en América, y a tal fin el 2 de mayo le embarcaron en Bilbao a bordo del buque "Aldecoa" con destino al Brasil a fin de que allí procurara llegar a los E.U. Fué embarcado como palero bajo el nombre de Antonio Casares Oyal, natural de Dobres, Bega de Liebana, provincia de Santander.

El barco recibió órdenes de ir a Pernambuco en vez de Río de Janeiro para coger combustible. El 14 de mayo llegó a Pernambuco y más tarde a Río de Janeiro. En Río de Janeiro Laradogoitia desertó del barco conforme al plan previsto y comenzó a trabajar la llegada a E.U. Se puso en relación con elementos partidarios de la España republicana y con el jefe de los franceses libres que le ayudaron mucho. También se puso en relación con la Delegación Vasca en New York, escribiendo a Manuel de la Sota, quien le facilitó la documentación vasca. Los alemanes le mandaron a Brasil porque en aquél entonces no había servicios de barcos españoles a los E.U. Laradogoitia vió que dada las enormes dificultades no podía conseguir su propósito de llegar a los E.U. y como ésta era su finalidad según sus planes personales para descubrirse ante las autoridades americanas, no le pareció conveniente utilizar soluciones que le fueron propuestas de ir a México y a Buenos Aires. Se comunicó con Lang explicándole cual era su situación y el 10 de octubre de 1942 se embarcó en Río de Janeiro en el "Cabo Hornos" rumbo a Bilbao. En el barco entró de polizón. En aquel mismo barco las autoridades brasileñas habían desembarcado algunos alemanes marinos del "Graff Spee" que también embarcaron clandestinamente en el "Cabo Hornos". En Trinidad los ingleses llevaron a cabo un control meticuloso del barco, visto el antecedente a que nos referimos, y Laradogoitia lo pasó sin ser descubierto. LLegó a Bilbao el 19 de noviembre del mismo año. El hecho de haber venido de polizón sin ser descubierto y el haber conseguido la documentación vasca de la Delegación de New York hizo que creciera ante la consideración de los alemanes y estos le tuvieran en gran aprecio como elemento probado. Con este motivo aumentó la amistad y confianza del jefe Lang. Laradogoitia aprovechó el viaje en el "Cabo Hornos" para estudiar la tripulación y elementos que le rodeaban. Al llegar a Bilbao informó a Lang de la imprudencia de algunos de ellos, a quienes descubrió como agentes. Lang, al comentar la información de Laradogoitia, confirmó y completó los datos que éste había obtenido: con anterioridad los hemos consignado ya.

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INSTRUCCION DE LARADOGOITIA: Después de su segunda llegada a Bilbao, siguió en gran intimidad con Lang quien completó su instrucción técnica. Este abarcó todos aspectos: técnica y práctica; en la teórica, el uso de comunicaciones secretas y problemas cuya información de América interesaba a los alemanes.

Comunicación secreta: Le instruyeron en el manejo de claves y de escritura oculta. En las claves le dieron la fórmula de cifrar en números y en letras que señalamos en el documento que se adjunta número 1. Lenguage camuflado en correspondencia ordinaria según sistema que se indica en el documento adjunto número 2.

La escritura oculta abarca los procedimientos siguientes: agua; limón; orina; "purguen" o "tanoftalina"; piramidón. Agua: A base de escribir con lápiz en un papel seco sobre uno mojado pegado en un cristal. Al secarse el papel mojado queda sin ningún signo y recobra los caracteres impresos una vez se vuelve a mojar. Limón y orina son conocidos. Para revelar los caracteres secretos emplear una plancha eléctrica bien caliente hasta que el pepel se ponga de color marrón.

"Purguen" o "tanoftalina". Utilizar alcohol no menos de 42 grados, media copa de alcohol, copa tamaño de licor para 0.05 gramos, se disuelve bien y no cambia de color. Se escribe con pluma de trazado ancho para no rasper el papel. Se escribe en sentido transversal al papel, poniendo la escritura correinte de cobertura en el sentido ordinario. Revelado: Sosa disuelta en agua, empleando mucha cantidad de sosa. Se moja un trozo de algodón y se pasa por encima del texto oculto que aparece en color rojo. También se usa amoníaco con buenos resultados si la amoníaco es puro.

Procedimiento Piramidón. Preparado: ginebra pura de la mejor, la misma cantidad señalada con anterioridad para cada pastilla y se disuelve en la misma forma aunque con más dificultad que en el caso último. Para escribir se usa un palillo (mondadientes) colocando en la punta algodón para que sirva de fuente. Se escribe con la mínima presión sobre el papel. Se seca el papel no menos de treinta minutos o mejor una hora. Una vez secado el papel se la baña con ginebra en un recipiente de cristal bien limpio. Se seca entre periódicos y se le plancha con un peso. Una vez secado el papel se toman dos hojas de papel de la misma calidad, poniendo en medio el papel escrito a fin de frotarlo por ambos lados para que quede en situación y aspecto enteramente normal. Después se escribe el texto de cobertura. Revelado: es lo mismo que el anteriormente señalado.

Contraseña para el procedimiento de escritura oculta que se emplea. Procedimiento: agua; fecha de la carta escrita al final de la misma. Procedimiento limón y orina; fecha en el medio del papel al comienzo de la carta. Purguen y piramidón; a la derecha y comienzo del papel en que se escribe la carta. Advertencia: Los textos de cifra en letra y número pueden ser utilizados según los casos para ser transmitidos por radio o en escritura oculta enviado por correo ordinario o los "Carteros" de que luego hablaremos. Los alemanes son partidarios de emplear la escritura oculta por medio de los sencillos procedimientos indicados porque entienden que dada su sencillez se estiman deshechados por los enemigos. El caso es que este sistema hasta la fecha les ha dado según ellos muy buenos resultados, como lo ha comprobado en la oficina el mismo Laradogoitia.

Instrucción sobre puntos de información de E.U. que les interesa a los Alemanes.

1. Producción de armamentos, tipos de armas, modelos.

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2. Composición numérica del ejército americano. (Mucha información de ésta se puede obtener de la prensa según las instrucciones de los alemanes.)

3. Situación de las unidas del ejército y insignias propias que utilizan dichas unidades.

4. Cuantas divisiones especiales se preparan y existen para desembarcos.

5. Dependencia del Presidente Roosevelt respecto al Estado Mayor y en que forma, cuando y cómo, el Estado Mayor le manda al Presidente Roosevelt en tiempo de guerra.

6. Número de barcos que forman los convoys que salen de los E.U., los puntos de partida. Destino de los convoys, armamento de cada buque y composición de la escolta.

7. Nombre y el mayor detalle posible sobre los generales destinados a diversos países.

8. Información sobre el espíritu del país y tensión de guerra en la población.

9. Pérdidas navales y bajas del ejército. Tipos de aviones americanos, armamento, capacidad de vuelo, etc., pérdida de aparatos.

10. Situación alimenticia y productos para uso de la población civil señalando lo que abunda y lo que escasea.

11. Vías de comunicación dentro de los E.U.

12. Situación exacta de cualquiera fábrica que trabaja en asunto de armamentos. Señalar puntualizando la diferencia, situación, etc., de las fábricas de armas pequeñas: fusiles, ametralladoras, etc., de las fábricas de gran calibre: tanques, cañones, etc.

13. Capacidad del radio de acción de los submarinos americanos y capacidad de submersión.

14. Descripción de los caracteres de las cargas de profundidad, fuerza de explosión y alcance de profundidad de las mismas. (Según Laradogoitia los alemanes creen que las suyas son superiores pues alcanzan a 160 metros de profundidad mientras que las americanas llegan a 100 metros. Esta impresión le deducían de una fotografía publicado en la revista "Time" del 13 de julio de 1942. En la fotografía aparecía un submarino capturado a los alemanes y las explicaciones pertinentes. También les interesó mucho lo que la misma revista publicó sobre la organización de una división de 35 mil hombres.)

15. Signos que distinguen los tanques ligeros, pesados y medianos.

Instrucción Práctica: Al mismo tiempo que Laradogoitia recibía la instrucción técnica y teórica que hemos apuntado, le tenían en la oficina trabajando en descifrar toda clase de comunicados que allí llegaban. Los comunicados que se le entregaban eran siempre cartas o escritos procedentes de diversos sitios. No recibía comunicaciones telegráficas. En esas cartas se barajaban

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las claves y escritura oculta a que anteriormente nos hemos referido. Las cartas llegaban de Bilbao u otros puntos de España procedentes en último término de Buenos Aires; Cuba; Santos (Brasil); Montevideo; y muy pocas de México, por ser éstos los centros de recepción de los trabajos en América. Laradogoitia dice que no eran informaciones de asuntos muy importantes. Algunas comunicaciones que procedían de la zona de Natal eran muy precisas en asuntos de movimiento de barcos americanos. Su jefe alababa frecuentemente a un agente que actuaba por allí y un día se lamentó de que le habían eliminado por intervención aliada.

Uno de los centros de recepción de correspondencia de América en Bilbao es José Mendez (se pasa por el nombre de José Urrutia) y la dirección es C. de la Salve, Bilbao, que quiere decir "Cuartel de la Salve". El tal Mendez es un sargento de la Guardia Civil que forma parte de la plantilla de ese cuerpo en Bilbao cuyo cuartel está en el lugar apuntado. Es de 6' de altura, 70 kilos, pelo castaño. Viene a ser una especie de subjefe a las órdenes de Lang. Anteriormente recibía también correspondencia Aurelia Canales de 32 años, domiciliada en Bilbao en la calle Heros 28, cuarto piso. Ultimamente dice Laradogoitia que se ha dado órdenes para que no se envíe correspondencia a esta mujer.

SITUACION Y MISION ULTIMA DE LARADOGOITIA: Después de la preparación intensiva y minuciosa a que nos referimos, los alemanes dieron por fin con el medio para que Laradogoitia pudiera cumplir la misión para la que había sido preparado. Los alemanes le prepararon embarque en el vapor "Manuel Calvo" como fogonero y a nombre de Gregorio García Ortiz, natural de Guecho, Vizcaya, de 35 años, datos que constan en la cartilla de navegación que le fué entregada y que está en poder del capitán de dicho barco hoy en el puerto de Philadelphia. El barco partía desde Gijón para Cuba y New Orleans. En esta creencia estaban los alemanes hasta última hora. El día antes de salir por motivos y órdenes que Laradogoitia ignora al "Manuel Calvo" le cambiaron la ruta y le señalaron el ir directamente de Gijón a Philadelphia. Días antes de salir, estando ya Laradogoitia en Gijón para hacerse a la mar, los alemanes le dieron las últimas instrucciones en la creencia de que el barco tocaba Cuba, y en Habana comenzara la realización del trabajo previsto. Las notas que los alemanes le hicieron llegar al momento de la salida contenían las siguientes partes: Lista de Carteros. Contrato de Laradogoitia. Carta de presentación para Hermógenes Martín Badillo, Barcelona III, Garage, Habana, Cuba. Claves, escritura secreta, e instrucciones complementarias. Según Laradogoitia todas estas notas eran bastante extensas y detalladas con datos precisos. Venía ser un resumen muy bien hecho de las advertencias y lecciones que le habían ido dando a fin de que fijara los puntos y no los olvidara. Como anteriormente hemos señalado diversos aspectos de las instrucciones que había ido recibiendo y que Laradogoitia nos ha dicho antes de llegar a este lugar del relato, solamente indicaremos lo que sirva de información complementaria.

1. Lista de carteros. Se le daba la relación de los agentes meros transmisores de comunicaciones que navegan en diversos barcos que vienen a puntos diferentes de América. Los nombres de los barcos que recuerda Laradogoitia de memoria son "Monte Amboto", "Monte Albertia", "Monte Isabela", "Monte Iciar", "Marqués de Comillas", "Cabo de Hornos", "Villa Real de Alaba", "Josiña", "Cabo Huertas", "Magallanes".

Laradogoitia tomó el nombre de los carteros y los apuntó en un cuaderno. Quedaron con éste depositado en la Aduana de Philadelphia y del que tiene conocimiento el "Navy" por la forma y circunstancias que más adelante explicaremos. La forma de actuar estos carteros es la siguiente: En general cree Laradogoitia que son personas que no están al corriente de la misión que desempeñan y que desde luego no conocen el contenido de las misivas. En los puntos de A-

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mérica donde lleguen se le entrega una carta que en el sobre no dice más que "Para Joaquín (Fernandez)". Este es un Guardia Civil que reside en Plencia, Vizcaya, desde hace muchos años y muy conocido, a quien se le denomina en el pueblo por el apellido "El andaluz". Dentro del sobre hay otro en el que se pone el nombre de Martincho u otra de las denominaciones con que se le llama a Lang. El sobre externo debe estar pegado a lo largo de un borde con el interno para que se note si ha sido violado. Al cartero de que se trate se le indica: "Hace el favor de entregar esta carta a Joaquín "El Andaluz" de Plencia para que se la haga llegar a mi familia". Joaquín Fernandez acude a la llegada de todos los barcos que vienen de América en los que tiene entrada libre porque va vestido de uniforme de la Guardia Civil cosa que le permite actuar sin limitación alguna. Para ciertos órdenes que de España deben venir a América se utiliza el procedimiento inverso y es Joaquín Fernandez el encargado derrealizarlo. El se relaciona directamente con Lang.

En el vapor Magallanes recuerda Laradogoitia que al Contramaestre actual se le pueden hacer entregas diciéndolo lo siguiente: "De parte del mutilado de guerra que entregue la carta al banquero suizo amigo del mutilado". Este mutilado de guerra es un tal Emilio Antón que fué tripulante del barco y hoy se halla separado por enfermedad. Este es un agente de Lange y por la fórmula que es preciso emplear, dice Laradogoitia, que el Contramaestre es otro agente pues debe estar directamente relacionado con Lang.

2. Contrato. En este documento se estipula la relación económica y primeros pasos de Laradogoitia. Ya hemos dicho que Laradogoitia como agente alemán lleva el nombre de la letra G correspondiendo a Guernica. Laradogoitia recuerda de memoria el texto del contrato que él ha referido de la siguiente manera. "G tratará de desertar en Cuba y acto seguido se presentará con la carta de presentación a Hermógenes Martín Badillo, Barcelona 111, Garage, Habana, Cuba. Se prevee que nuestro amigo Hermógenes le preste a Guernica toda clase de ayuda y protección necesario para trabajar en Cuba satisfactoriamente. Es preciso que para el tiempo que permanezca en Cuba, Hermógenes le ayude a legalizar su situación y también apoyarle con los recursos necesarios para camuflarle debidamente en un trabajo normal. Acto seguido G tratará de obtener informaciones que nos interesan. Una vez establecido el servicio entre ambas partes y siendo satisfactorios los resultados que obtenga G se le facilitarán mil dólares para nombrar algún colaborador si él lo ve necesario. Siendo preciso que G se entreviste con su hermano en los E.U. con el fin de que sea instruído en los términos explicados a G, se le enviarán mediante uno de nuestros carteros una reppetable suma de dinero en dóllars. G obtendrá ayuda de la Casa Vasca en Habana si es preciso, para ir a México, donde en un pueblo de la frontera con los E.U. se vea con su hermano a fin de instruirle en la forma indicada y le dará el número de órdenes de radiotelegrafía por si se hiciese con un colaborador radiotelegrafista. G entregará a su hermano mil dóllars con el fin de que siga sus actividades en los E.U. Si G viera necesario o conveniente establecerse en México o en Cuba, su hermano mandará todos los informes tanto personales como de sus colaboradores directamente a G bien por radio o por carta. G revelará todos ellos y les transmitirá por la vía más rápida posible, siendo conveniente mandarlos bien por Cuba o por Buenos Aires. En caso de que G no hallase un radiotelegrafista, mandará las cartas por vía aérea a Hermógenes en Cuba y también a Beranga a Buenos Aires de donde Beranga los remitirá a sus padres en Vizcaya de donde nosotros lo recogeremos. Después de las primeras cartas, viendo pruebas suficientes de que la línea está establecida entre América y España, a G se le acumularán en esta oficina fondos ilimitados para poder seguir trabajando con eficacia. Las recompensas pagadas a G serán de la misma forma, ilimitadas. Una vez ya probado de que el asunto marche bien se le asegurará un mensualidad a los padres de G a donde G también

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"escribirá algunas cartas mediante sus carteros o amistades personales en los "barcos españoles a la dirección de sus padres de donde nosotros nos ocupamos "de recogerlas. A G se le entrega de momento contra recibo el máximo permiti-"do, cincuenta dólars y 25 mil pesetas a sus padres". Esta comunicación era copia. Parece que el original fué mandado a los jefes de Lang y cree que otra copia a Berlín.

3. Carta a Hermógenes. Esta era una carta redactada por Lang en términos familiares para el agente de Cuba presentándole al portador G. Le trató de primo a Hermógenes. El contenido no tiene importancia. Dice Laradogoitia que la destruyó antes de desembarcar en Philadelphia. Los otros papeles fueron destruídos con anterioridad salvo el cuaderno al que anteriormente hemos hecho referencia. Más adelante aclararemos este punto y el hecho de que aparezca en la mata de Lang el hermano de Laradogoitia.

4. Claves y escrituras ocultas. Era un resumen de lo que anteriormente hemos referido sobre el particular y a los documentos que adjuntamos explicativos de las claves.

5. Instrucciones complementarias. En las instrucciones complementarias también había según Laradogoitia algunos a título redundario que hacen referencia a asuntos tratados ya. Las instrucciones a que aún no nos hemos referido son

a) [illegible] se le mandará más tarde, en caso de que él no haya resuelto el problema, el nombre y dirección de algún telegrafista para que transmita sus mensajes a España.

b) La Honda tiene que ser de 42303 m. y 211515 con señal de llamada "v v v v v ?". La contestación será "v v v v v !". El servicio alemán estará a la escucha 24 horas llamando de vez en cuando. Para el uso de la clave por radio se suprimirán las letras ñ y la q usando la nh y la k para reemplazarlas.

c) Cuando España entre en guerra, G mandará todos sus informes por carta escrita o por radio a Doña María Pereira De'Ceu, Rua Cohelho, Lisboa. (Fijaremos el número de la calle que está en el cuaderno depositado en la Aduana de Philadelphia.)

LLEGADA DE LARADOGOITIA A ESTADOS UNIDOS: El vapor "Manuel Calvo llegó el 17 del corriente mes a Philadelphia. No había sufrido control alguno por el camino. En Philadelphia les hicieron una revisión abordo ante la cual Laradogoitia pasó con el nombre de embarque y que consta en la cartilla de marino, sin dar a entender nada. La carta de presentación que traía para Cuba dirigida a Hermógenes la rompió, y mucho antes el conjunto de los papeles que le envió Lang a Gijón. Llegado a puerto americano, tenía la preocupación de que si la carta a Hermógenes era descubierto sin haber previamente declarado a las autoridades americanas toda su situación, como esperaba hacerlo, se le podrían haber derivado perjuicios irreparables, sin que declaraciones posteriores le hubieran servido de gran cosa. Por ello estudió la forma de plantear adecuadamente su asunto, observando el terreno en Philadelphia y la forma en que se llevaban los interrogatorios, etc. Se encontró en el puerto con José María Arriandiaga, segundo oficial del vapor "Gecho", persona a quien conocía y que por sus antecedentes era de entera confianza, pues había sufrido persecución y postergaciones de parte de las autoridades franquistas por sus simpatías y adhesión a la causa vasca.

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Hablando con cautela con José María Arriandiaga, éste le manifestó que estaba en relaciones con un lieutenant del Navy llamado L. B. Harper. Laradogoitia le preguntó si se lo presentaría, y habiendo aceptado José María la proposición le puso en comunicación con el mencionado lieutenant a quien tras largas sesiones explicó detenidamente gran parte de lo que en este escrito dejamos señalado. El Lieutenant L. B. Harper manifestó que el asunto lo pondría en conocimiento de sus superiores y que quedaba en libertad para hacer lo que quisiera. Seguidamente vino a New York y se puso en relación con nosotros que era lo que deseaba desde el primer momento.

EXPLICACION QUE LARADOGOITIA DA A SU ACTITUD: Laradogoitia manifiesta que dada la forma indefensa con que fué expulsado de los E.U. y puesto a la disposición de las autoridades de Franco debía acogerse como protección a las ofertas que le propusieron los alemanes, aceptadas las cuales esperaba sacar continuos beneficios e incluso conseguir llegar a América, dar cuenta a las autoridades americanas de datos que le podrían interesar y de esa forma ser admitido normalmente en el país. Laradogoitia tiene un hermano llamado Antonio residente en Emmett, Idaho, de oficio pastor, y él aprovechó esta circunstancia para hacer ver a los alemanes lo bien que podía realizar un plan de acción en combinación con su hermano y alcanzar los objetivos que aquellos persiguen. Para ser lógico con la forma en que salió de los E.U. y el mal ambiente que él manifestó tenía en este país, el plan lo proyectó de forma que el no viniera a los E.U. y que lo desarrollaría desde Cuba o México. Este plan lo concretó después de su vuelta de Río de Janeiro. Antes dada su interés de llegar a América les propuso el viaje a Brasil pues que de otra forma no veía posibilidad de llegar hasta aquí.

NUESTRA IMPRESION: Nosotros conocemos de antes de su salida de E.U. a José Laradogoitia y a su hermano Antonio. Este último, Antonio, es muchacho que siempre ha sido de entera confianza, buena conducta personal, y totalmente unido a nuestro ideología, cosa que ha demostrado en repetidas ocasiones con toda clase de pruebas. José Laradogoitia ha tenido fama entre los vascos del Oeste de persona poca seria, en contraste con la conducta recta e íntegra que lleven en general los vascos en aquella parte de los E. U. Los vascos le llamaban "Joeguzurra" palabra vasca que significa "José el de las mentiras" por los abundantes narraciones y extravagancias que solía habitualmente contar a sus amigos. Llevaba una vida irregular de joven despreocupado y libre. En cierta ocasión fué llevado a la cárcel de Boise por haber extendido cheques sin disponer de fondos por un valor que no ascendía de mil dólares. De la cárcel de Boise fué trasladado a las cárceles de Mount Home y Salt Lake City. Por gestiones nuestros se consiguió arreglar el asunto y sacarle de la cárcel. Todo esto era consecuencia de la forma libre en que vivía. Posteriormente las autoridades americanas lo expulsaron del país en primer lugar porque estaba irregularmente sin cumplir las leyes de inmigración --cosa muy corriente entre los vascos por no ser amigos de papeles-- y además seguramente por no ser buena la reputación que públicamente tenía. Nosotros hemos estado en corriente y en detalle de toda esta situación y podemos aportar las pruebas que se estimen oportunas. La Delegación Vasca en New York intervino en varias gestiones para que no fuera expulsado del país cuando se encontró en el Oeste y cuando fué traído a New York. José Laradogoitia puso su mayor empeño en que no les sacaran de los E.U. Las gestiones de la Delegación no dieron un resultado lo suficientemente rápido para impedir la expulsión. La última carta que la Delegación Vasca le escribió a José Laradogoitia a Ellis Island fué devuelta porque ya había sido puesto abordo del "Marqués de Comillas" en la forma que al principio hemos relatado. A Laradogoitia le hemos hecho dos extensos interrogatorios en días separados. El primero dejándole hablar libremente de forma que relatara con espontaneidad sus impresiones. El segundo con todo detalle, haciéndole preguntas intencionadas para ver de cogerle en contradicciones dada la gran cantidad de asuntos y detalles

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de que nos ha dado cuenta. En el conjunto de nuestras conversaciones no ha incurrido en contradicción. Con gran aplomo, seguridad, y precisión ha ido respondiendo a todas las preguntas que se le han hecho y a los problemas que se le han planteado.

Personalmente da la impresión de ser inteligente, muy despierto, con apariencia de poca cosa, pero con gran dominio de los asuntos en que está mezclado [illegible] aparente tranquilidad de conciencia, como quien no actúa por segunda intención sino con lealtad al servicio de un interés vasco y democrático.

Dado el espíritu aventurero e inquieto que en sí encierra José Laradogoitia y teniendo en cuenta la situación difícil en que se vió al encontrarse en el "Marqués de Comillas" para ser puesto en Europa donde Hitler dominaba y parecía que iba a ganar la guerra, nos parece lógico admitir el que al principio Laradogoitia tuviera idea de ponerse al lado de los alemanes para beneficio propio y situarse en posición sólida ante el futuro. Pero también admitimos que más adelante pensando la cosa, se habrá conducido de acuerdo con las manifestaciones que hace ahora. Nos parece difícil que en ésta, su postura, haya adoptado la posición de abrirse ante nosotros para mejor servir a los alemanes. De todos modos sería preciso el estudiar bien toda esta relación, medirla y observar sus movimientos y reacciones en el futuro. Por sus antecedentes, relaciones y ambiente creemos poder asegurar que en Laradogoitia no han cabido ni caben hoy simpatías por Franco y menos por los alemanes.

IMPRESIONES VARIAS DE LARADOGOITIA: Nos ha proporcionado algunas impresiones sobre asuntos diversos.

1. El Jefe Lang es persona inteligente, hábil, de gran energía en el trabajo. Se pasa meses enteros sin ver a su señora que vive en Madrid. Es de conducta austera y rígida.

2. De los alemanes que le rodeaban ha captado las siguientes informaciones. Que Alemania tiene actualmente 50 mil aviones en línea y 75,000 en reserva para los que no disponen de gasolina. Se muestran confiados en el fin favorable de la guerra para ellos. Durante el próximo verano esperan que Alemania ponga fuera de combate a Rusia a la que a su fuerza atacará al Japón por Siberia. (Laradogoitia admite el que los alemanes se esforzaran en darle buena impresión con el fin de que no desfalleciera en la misión que le encomendaban.)

3. En cierta ocasión le preguntó Lang qué cantidad de aviones creía que E.U. fabricaría el año 43. Laradogoitia contestó que 60,000. El jefe alemán añadió que seguramente la cantidad sería superior a esa cifra. Y terminó afirmando que los construídos en el año 1942 pasarían de 45,000 aviones.

4. Laradogoitia dice que los alemanes son los absolutos dueños de España. La policía está a su entera disposición. Mandan como si fueran los soberanos. Disponen y destituyen incluso a oficiales del Ejército Español si les interesa por alguna razón. Siguen enviando alimentos a Alemania. En varias ocasiones le ha oído decir a Lang que en 24 horas ponen un millón de hombres en España. A los alemanes no les preocupa el más mínimo la cuestión de la restauración monárquica, asunto al que no hacen alusión ni referencia alguna. Delante de él hablaban bien de los vascos. Afirma que el ambiente del País Vasco sigue cada vez más firme en favor de las Naciones Unidas.

5. Laradogoitia ha visto en la oficina de Lang un mapa con las fortificaciones que se llevan a cabo en la costa cantábrica. Las obras las realizan los Españoles pero la dirección es alemana. Las fortificaciones se extienden

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por todos los lugares estratégicos de la costa y están hechos a base de emplazamientos fijos de artillería y fosos de defensa. El ha visto en el alto de Gorliz (Vizcaya) que domina al mar emplazamientos de piezas de 15 y medio, lo mismo en Baquio y en el Cabo Machichaco. En estos dos últimos lugares piezas de mayor calibre que el 15 y medio. Como prueba de la precisión con que llevan estas operaciones señala que le llamó la atención el hecho de que en el mapa que examinó había una observación sobre una playa desierta entre Gorliz y Bermeo, playa pequeña y por él desconocida a pesar de ser casi vecino, en la que se señalaba "Playa pequeña pero apta para desembarcar para su configuración y fondo. Está bien defendida."

6. Cuando Laradogoitia estuvo en Brasil se enteró de la salida o paso de un convoy americano de Natal con destino al desembarque de Africa. Dice que por esta referencia él se supuso la operación que se proyectaba pero no la comunicó a los alemanes porque pudiera haber sido de graves consecuencias. La referencia la obtuvo de unos soldados americanos. Dice que estos eran indiscretos.

7. Al Lieutenant L. B. Harper ha dado una información sobre la existencia de una base submarina alemana en la costa del Brasil entre Santos y Río de Janeiro, a unas 45 millas de éste último lugar, en unos bajos de arena. La referencia la obtuvo de un agente alemán en el Brasil.

NOTA FINAL: Salvo el párrafo en que damos nuestra impresión, todo lo demás lo hemos trascrito según la referencia de Laradogoitia sin añadir por nuestra parte nada. Hemos cambiado en algo el orden de su expresión para darle una unidad a nuestra nota.

Dado el conjunto del problema planteado por Laradogoitia, creemos existen firmes posibilidades de descubrir una red numerosa de agentes alemanes en el Continente Americano si a Laradogoitia se le permite seguir su misión debidamente controlado y por pasos previstos y estudiados. Como su colaboración con los vascos está recomendada por Lang, creemos que nosotros podríamos dirigir las gestiones sin riesgo para la misión, además de contar con la Organización Vasca en los países sudamericanos y de estar compenetrados con la mentalidad de Laradogoitia. Se nos figura de urgencia el adoptar una decisión sobre el caso.

New York, 22 de mayo, 1943

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Documento Nuro. 1.

Sistema de cifra en letras y números



Texto del despacho:

SALE UN COCHE DE

NUEVA YORK

Texto cifrado en letras:

Q O-K F-2 H-F M-3 Z-Y O-E O-K 2-D W-Y A-Y S-KK-

Texto cifrado en números:

S A

64-31-64-19----

Observaciones:

Para el cifrado en letras se usa solamente el cuadro de letras comprendido en el trazado a tinta; para el cifrado en numeros el cuadro integro.

El cuadro en tinta comienza a trazarse con las letras que contiene el nombre del mes en que se escribe el despacho de que se trate. Si el nombre del mes tiene dos letras repetidas, se suprime la segunda de repetición: Enero, se escribiría: ENRO. El cuadro de numeros se comienza con la fecha del despacho. El cuadro indicado está hecho a base de la fecha 31 de mayo. Si la fecha no tiene mas que un numero, este se coloza encima de la primera letra.

Importante. Tengase en cuenta el final del apartado b) del numero 5 de la pagina 8 del informe. En el cuadro que presentamos está suprimida la letra ñ, suprimiendo la Q, hay que separar la HI en dos cuadros.

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Documento Nro 2.

Sistema para cursar una comunicación, camuflada entre el texto de una carta ordinaria.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	J	K
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

S A L E U N . . . . .

4 5

Ejemplo Hermano

4 3

Observaciones: Un número equivale a la cantidad de letras unidas en el interior de una palabra. Si el final de una palabra debe unirse con la palabra siguiente, la última letra tendrá un signo horizontal: ejemplo la letra o o- Si la última letra es final de serie que cuenta un número, el signo será vertical: ejemplo la letra o o'

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LETTERS

Copies left to Col Wilson 5/29
Copy to Lyon 5/29

May 27, 1943

A Spaniard, hereinafter identified as ABC, was deported from the United States in the Fall of 1941 and subsequently recruited in Bilbao by the German Intelligence Service. Contact with that Service was established through Valeriano Peña who was the barber on the steamer "Marques de Comillas" and also a German secret agent. Peña is about 42 years old, 5' 11" in height and ABC explained his situation to him and expressed pro-Franco sympathies. After interrogation in Bilbao by Sr Cabanas of the local police who consulted a Sr Aparicio, the Chief of the Bilbao Police, ABC was called on the telephone at his hotel by an individual who said he wished to speak to him about being an information agent. Although this individual's Spanish was good, his accent indicated that he was not a Spaniard. Ten minutes later ABC was visited by a man who said he had been in touch with the police who had interrogated him and that he wished to make his acquaintance himself. This visitor introduced himself under the name of Emilio. He said he was a Swiss national and that he was in the service of the Germans. He asked ABC for information regarding conditions in the United States, etc, and then suggested an appointment for another day at which time Emilio suggested that ABC join the German Intelligence Service, a suggestion which was accepted. Emilio expressed a desire to meet [redacted] family and at this meeting Emilio was accompanied by three men, one an apparent German whose name is not known and the others, Jose Gallego, 24 years old, dark with black hair, 5' 7 1/2" tall, and Alejandro del Carmen, 6' tall, blonde, mustached, 32 years old, weighing 75 kilos, both men belonging to the Spanish Secret Police.

ABC accepted the proposal made by Emilio and the latter suggested he go to Madrid to meet his superiors and to arrange for instruction. He went to Madrid where he stayed at the Hotel Alcoriza, Avenida Jose Antonio No. 20 of 22. Arrived at the hotel he was called by telephone from Emilio's home, and appointments were arranged discreetly in various places where he saw various Germans who submitted him to several interrogations on different subjects. The location of the office of the German organization in Madrid was not disclosed to him. ABC seemed useful to the German leaders and they approved him. After ten or fifteen days he returned with Emilio to Bilbao to begin his studies as agent. He lived with Emilio at Calle Aguirre No. 1, 3d floor, right, and commenced his studies. He was given free use of Emilio's automobile which had a large collection of licenses tags from different parts of Spain which were changed almost daily. He received 2,000 pesetas a month in addition to the meals which he had in Emilio's home where he lived.

The German identified as Emilio is said to be a Chief of the Gestapo in Spain in charge of the Bilbao district. His real name, or at least that under which the Germans know him, is Jorge Lang. He is a man 5' 10 1/2" tall, dark with blonde hair combed back, weighs 72 kilos, 41 years old, and married to a Spanish woman, Antonia (?) Crespo, daughter of the well known monarchist of

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SECRET

that name, a good-looking woman. His home in Madrid is at Infantas 22, 2d floor. Emilio (or Lang) uses currently for mail addresses, etc, the name of Emilio Martincho and also uses a card with the name of Julio Martin. The Bilbao office where Lang carried on all his work is located at Almeda Mazarredo No. 10, 3d floor, right, telephone 19391. It is a large apartment which is cared for by a woman with two daughters whose names are not known. Five or six Germans work regularly in this office. There is one room which is kept locked and in which it is supposed there is some technical apparatus or other things of value and where it is believed there is also a radio transmitter. A radio receiving set has been seen in another room. The Germans receive correspondence for the office in the Hotel Excelsior in the names of third parties and very frequently in the name of Emilio Martincho, Julio Martin and likewise in the name of Enriqueta (last name unknown), Calle Colon de Larreategui (number likewise unknown) who serves as intermediary.

It is believed that Lang has some sixty agents in Bilbao and its vicinity some of whom, or a considerable number of whom, work in various ships. For example, Francisco Montes of Valladolid, 22 years old, 5' 5 1/2", 130 pounds, dark, machinist's assistant in the "Monte Contes"; Pablo Moreno, agent in the "Cabo Hornos", occupying various positions in that boat, 5' 8", 150 pounds, 28 years; also a man called Luis whose first name is not known, likewise an agent in the "Cabo Hornos", 5' 4 1/2, 130 pounds, dark, Gallician, 22 years old. One of the most experienced agents in the same vessel is Dr Torres, the second surgeon of the ship, 38 years old, 5' 11", 70 kilos, dark. In addition, Rafael Gutierrez Cuesta who lives in Madrid, Calle Orense 13, who spent four months in Buenos Aires returning to Bilbao in November, 1942, 5' 10", chestnut hair, 150 pounds, 35 years old. Another is Benardo Romillo who lives at Calle Sendeja 7, Bilbao, and who was a Lieutenant of Franco's during the Civil War, 5' 7", chestnut hair combed back and hair on his temples, 140 pounds. The engine room steward in the "Manuel Calvo" previously was in Cuba where he carried on active totalitarian propaganda; he is another agent as is the "Agregado" of the same ship one Emilio Pis (?) who frequently visits with German agents in San Sebastian and Bilbao.

ABC was sent to Brazil about a year ago with instructions to make his way to the United States from that point. He was shipped as a member of the crew with false papers. Finding it impossible to reach the United States from Brazil he communicated with Lang and was instructed to return to Spain. He stowed away on the "Cabo Hornos" and went through the Trinidad Control without being discovered. His success in getting safely back to Spain made a great impression on Lang and a considerable intimacy developed between them while Lang completed his technical instruction. This instruction included the use of codes and secret writing, as follows:

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Secret Writing

Five methods of secret writing were described; water, lemon, urine, "Purgwen" or "Tonoftalina" and Pyramidon. In using water one writes with pencil on dry paper over a sheet of damp paper fastened to a mirror. When dried the dampened paper remains with no marks whatsoever and the message impressed thereon in disclosed by dampening it a second time. Lemon juice and urine are known. To disclose the secret characters written in these media use a hot electric iron until the paper turns brownish. The method for using "Purgwen" or "Tonoftalina" is to take a cup of alcohol of not less than 42 degrees, the cup being the size of a liqueur glass of .05 grams and dissolving the substance therein without changing the color. Writing is done with a broad pen so as not to scratch the paper. The message is written lengthwise of the paper, the covering writing being placed in the usual way; namely, crosswise. To disclose the message baking soda is dissolved in water, using a large amount of soda, and a rad of cotton dampened in this solution is rubbed over the hidden text which then comes out in red. Ammonia may also be used successfully if the ammonia is pure. In the Pyramidon process pure gin of the best quality is taken in the same amount as indicated above (a liqueur glass holding .05 grams) and in this a tablet is dissolved. For writing one uses a toothpick placing cotton at the end to serve as the source of the moisture. Transmitting is done with the least possible pressure on the paper and the paper is then dried for not less than thirty minutes and preferably for an hour. After being dried the paper is immersed in a bath of gin in a clear glass dish and is then dried again between magazines and ironed with a weight. When dry two sheets of the same kind of paper are taken and the paper bearing the message is placed between them and then rubbed on both sides until it looks entirely normal, the covering text is then written on the paper. The developing process is the same as above;namely, soda or ammonia.

In order that the recipient of a letter containing secret writing may know that secret writing is to be found therein certain signs are indicated. When the water process has been used the date of the letter is written at the end. When the lemon juice or urine processes are used the date is written in the middle of the sheet of paper at the top of the letter. When the "Purgwen" or "Tonoftalina" or Pyramidon method is used the date appears at the top of the letter at the right.

While in Bilbao, Agent A3C was employed in deciphering communications arriving there. Such communications consisted always of letters or other written matter originating in various places. No telegrams were received. The letters contained cipher and hidden writing and came from Bilbao or other places in Spain, originating in Buenos Aires, Cuba, Santos (Brazil), Montevideo and to some extent from Mexico. Some communications written from the Natal districts were very definite on matters relating to the movement of American ships and Agent frequently praised the Agent who furnished that information and expressed regret that he had been eliminated through Allied intervention. One

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of the receiving stations in Bilbao for correspondence from America was José Mendez (he used the name of José Urrutia) whose address was C. de la Salve, Bilbao, which means "Quartel de la Salve". Mendez is a Sergeant of the Civil Guard, is 6' high, weighs 70 kilograms and has chestnut hair. He seems to be a sort of sub-chief under Lang's orders. One Aurelia Canales used also to receive correspondence. She was 32 years old and lived in Bilbao at Calle Heros 25, 4th floor, but later instructions were given that correspondence should not be sent to that woman.

Messengers used for transmitting letters were said to be placed on the Spanish ships "Monte Amboto", "Monte Albertia", "Monte Isabela", "Monte Toiar", "Marquez de Comillas", "Cabo de Finos", "Villa Real de Alaba", "Josina Cabo Huertas" and "Magallanes". The method of using the messengers on these boats is as follows: In general it is believed the messengers do not know the nature of their mission or the contents of the messages. The outer envelope is addressed "para Joaquin (Fernandez)". This man is a Civil Guard living in Plencia for many years and well known there. Within this envelope there is another on which is the name of Martiño or another of Lang's aliases. The outer envelope must be stuck along one edge to the inner envelope so that it will be known if it has been opened. The messenger to whom the letter is given is asked to be good enough to deliver this letter to Joaquin "so he may pass it on to my family". Joaquin Fernandes meets all the ships arriving from America and has free access to them since he wears the uniform of a Civil Guard. He has direct relationship with Lang. Two other agents of Lang are an Earl[illegible]nton who was a member of the crew of the "Magallanes" and probably the boatswain (Contramaestre) of the same vessel.

When Agent AXX's instructions were completed he was shipped again on a Spanish vessel with directions to establish himself in the Western hemisphere and develop a network of sub-agents. He was told that when Spain entered the war he should send all his reports by letter or radio to Doña Maria Pereira DeCan, Rua Conselho da Rocha 82, 1st floor, Lisbon.

Ciphers and Codes

The basis for coding telegraphic and written communications is a letter square containing 25 spaces and horizontal and vertical columns afford three-place combining the 10 digits in two columns of 5 digits each. The placing of the letters and digits is determined by the date (or day of the week) of the communication. The specimen used in this memorandum is based on the date May 31.

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		0	9	8	7	6
		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	Y	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	H I	J	K	L	N
9	6	P	Q	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square contains Q)

		0	9	8	7	6
		1	2	3	4	5
2	3	M	A	Y	O	B
1	4	C	D	E	F	G
0	5	H	I	J	K	L
9	6	N	P	R	S	T
8	7	U	V	W	X	Z

(This square omits Q)

SA/LE / UN / CO/NV/OY / DE / NU/EV/A Y/OR/KK/
QO/NF / ZH / PM/JZ/YO / ED / HZ/DW/I A/YS/KK/

S A L E U N C O N V O
64 32 54 43 71 55 41 34 55 72 34

Y D E N U E V A Y O R K
33 42 43 55 71 43 72 32 33 34 63 53

1) ... works for English, German, Spanish, Portuguese and French.

2) Divide message into groups of 2 letters. If last group has only one letter, write that letter again.

3) For radio use H and Q are omitted K being used for Q and nh for H. When Q is omitted, H and I appear in separate squares.

4) For ciphering in letters use only letter square.

5) For ciphering in numbers use whole diagram.

6) To construct the letter square:

   a. The letters of the square are filled in by beginning with the name of the month, or less frequently, the day of the week, on which the report was written and continues with the remaining unused letters of the alphabet in their normal order. In deciphering, only trial and error method will show which system has been used.

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b) If name of month or of day of week has a repeated letter or letters, all repeated letters are dropped; thus ENERO becomes ENRO, and SABADO becomes SABDO.

c) The vertical and horizontal squares containing numbers are filled in as follows: The unitary digit of the date appears above the first letter of the name of the month and the tens digit appears directly at the left of such first letter. From the unitary digit the numbers are written in ascending order to the right, then up and to the left.

From the tens digit the numbers are written in ascending order downwards, then to the left and up. When the date has but a single digit, write this digit above the first letter of the square, and put zero to the left of this same letter, in the right hand vertical column.

7) To encipher with letters:

a) Locate positions of the 2 letters of the first group of two, and regard them as situated at diagonally opposed corners of an imaginary parallelogram.

b) The 2 letters at the other diagonally opposed corners of this parallelogram, will be the first 2 letters of the enciphered message. The first letter written is the one on the same horizontal line as the first letter of the Text group of 2 letters.

c) If both letters of a group appear in the same vertical or horizontal line, the cipher text would be the same letters, written in reverse order.

d) To decipher, reverse procedure.

8) To encipher with numbers:

a) Message not divided into groups of 2 letters.

b) Only the digits appearing in the columns immediately adjacent to the letter square are used.

c) Locate the letter on the square, then find and put down the first number to the left in the same horizontal column; then find and put down the first number appearing above the letter and in the same vertical column with it. There will thus be 2 digits for each letter.

d) To decipher, reverse the procedure.

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Concealing cipher text in innocent message.

The basic squares are constructed as follows, the one on the left containing Q and the one on the right omitting that letter. In general ñ and q are omitted and nh and k used instead.

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	HI	J	K
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	I	J
3	K	L	M	N	O
4	P	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

S A L E U N / S A L E U N
43 11 31 15 45 33 / 43 11 32 15 45 34

QUER/IDO / H/E/ESA/L/O/
4/ 3 / 1/1/ 3/1/1/

1) The two digits representing a letter are determined by selecting first the digit horizontally opposite it and then the digit vertically above the letter in question.

2) These number values are concealed in the innocent text by leaving a gap between letters: thus, if 43 is to be concealed in "Querido" the word would be written with a break, as inconspicuous as possible, after the fourth letter, that is between the r and the i: Querido

3) If the last letter of a word is the last letter of a numerical group, and need not therefore be counted in with any letters from the following word, then that last letter should end with an upward stroke, thus: e, z, y etc.

4) If the last letter of a word must be joined with letters from the following word to fill out the numerical group, then the letter ending the word ends in a horizontal stroke, thus: i, e, g, a etc.

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INTERROGATION OF JOSE LAUNABOGOITIA MENCHACA
(June 11, 1943)

When you went back to Spain from Rio, just how did you go about getting ashore from the ship without having any papers?

Before I went ashore I was left on board the S.S. Cabo de Hornos at the Captain's orders, so I went to the Captain's quarters as I was told.

Who held you? The shore police. I had a talk with the Captain and he told me that he had already sent one of his mates to the Military Marine Office, to the Chief (Comandancia). The Captain said I would have to wait on board until this man came back with the answer. The reason for this he said was chiefly because I was of military age, and he cautioned me against leaving the ship without telling him first, and I promised him I would not. This was approximately 5:30 in the evening.

Then I went down to the mess hall and was having my dinner when this man Lang and Lage walked right in. Lang called me to a corner and asked me what my situation was, or if I had any. Then he talked with the shore police, and I told him I was left aboard at the Captain's orders. Then he asked where the Captain was. I told him he would be in his cabin. He told me to take him up there, so I did. The Captain was not there, and we found him just coming out of the telephone booth.

Was the telephone hooked up to shore? Yes. (?) نعم

Mr. Lang introduced me, and himself as Emilio Martinez, and told the Captain he came to arrest me. He asked the Captain if there was anything to pay for and he could pay my passage right then or later on. The Captain answered that it would not be necessary for anyone to pay my expenses aboard ship, as he was not allowed to receive any money.

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Why did he say it was unnecessary?

He was not allowed to take any money from the passengers, and referred Lang to the Steamship office to pay. This was Saturday night, and the Captain told Lang he would like to meet him Monday noon at the steamship office, if he cared to do so. Lang told him he would be there by Monday noon, and the best time for him to go up there with me was about 12:00. The Captain said he would like to have some kind of identification card or something from him before he could let me go. After he said that, Georg told him what he was. He told him he was a German officer and that I was directly under his command, and he also said he would go see the Governor of the Province of Vizkaya that afternoon and have everything fixed so I could leave the ship.

Didn't he show any credentials?

The Captain didn't ask for any. The Captain just took his word. Before we left the ship, Lang wrote him a sort of written note that he would be responsible for what becomes of me, etc.

Did the Captain seem to know Lang on the ship? No.

Somehow did he have to show any credentials? No.

What was the Captain's name?

His first name was Jose. I don't remember the second name. Possibly Bosch?

So then you actually got off the ship Monday?

I got off that same Saturday night, when I went ashore to the Civil Guard also with Lang.

The next day in Bilbao, what happened after that? ~~Did you get any instructions in secret writing?~~

No. He kept me busy answering questions.

Did you get any instructions in secret writing at any time between then and coming to this country?

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No, he did that before I went to Rio.

Can you tell me who Francisco de la Morena is?

I have an idea his was the address given to me at Lang's office, before I sailed to Rio, as a man in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He is some kind of a business man, I don't know the kind of business or what type. If I remember right, that was it.

You were to get in touch with him?

Yes. If I went to Argentina, I was told I might get some kind of support on my arrival or afterwards in Argentina, that he was very much pro-Axis, as I was told.

Can you tell me anything about Ramon Garcia in Houston?

That address was given to me at Lang's office before I left for Rio by a sailor who was a courier for Lang. His name was Juan Arrizavalaga.

Is he a contact, too?

This Garcia? They explained to me that if I ever come to the U.S.--he was explained the same way as this other man in Buenos Aires--also pro-Axis. He knew him, he said.

You said Lang did receive cables in Bilbao. You never saw them?

No, sir. I saw him handle them himself.

How did you know he got them?

I could see in his office that he had them.

How were they delivered?

I don't know. I think he got them from some other address. He was called quite often, especially to the Colon de Larreategui.

Who is [redacted]?

She was one of the mail drops during the time I was in Rio. She lived at Nerve 126.

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That is the same address where you sent the telegram?

Yes, it is an apartment house. This was to the left. The telegram I sent to the right.

Can you tell me some more about depth charges? What did he have to say about them?

In talking about depth charges, they said they already had rumors the U.S. Navy department were sinking quite a few of their submarines off the coast, in the North Atlantic, just because they could locate the submarine and they could see where the depth charge exploded. He said the submarine was no deeper in the water than the depth charge made its explosion.

How deep did they say that was?

If I remember right, he said 180 metres the submarine would go down. The U.S. or Allies' depth charges function for maximum effect at 60 or 80 metres.

What did he want to know about depth charges since he knew this?

I learned that after I came back from Rio. Of course, he wanted to get further information if they had made any improvements. It would be quite important.

Did he think they had made further improvements?

He didn't know at the time, but thought they may have before long.

When you got over here you were to find a radio operator if possible. How were you expected to do that?

I don't have the slightest idea, since I didn't have any idea of doing any work in favor of the Germans in the U.S.

What did you expect to do?

I don't know exactly what I was to do, but I wanted to clear myself above everything, and I wanted to tell the U.S. or an allied government.

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What did Lang expect you to do?

Lang expected me, after I jumped ship, if I did, in the U.S.,I would contact my brother in the U.S. and if possible go back to Mexico where I would be less molested.

Didn't Lang give you any help on how to get in touch with a radio operator? What kind of person to look for, or how to investigate him?

No, he never said anything like that. I was to use my own judgment because I knew the work was very dangerous, and he was unable to tell me as it was the other side of the ocean to judge what the situation was.

No organizations or people you were warned about, or particular instructions?

I was warned to be very careful to write two or three different messages before I sent the original one, to concentrate myself just as much as I could on the work, and do it very carefully.

He wanted you to write several messages, ordinary ones, before you wrote any information?

Well, he also told me it would be a good idea to send some letters like that, but what he was referring to was that he wanted to be sure that the letter was a secret message, written in certain terms no one would be suspicious of, and it wouldn't be visible to the naked eye.

That is for secret writing? or the cover letter?

The cover letter was to be written in careful terms also.

Did you get any instructions for the cover letter?

I was to write the letters, for example, like from one member of the family to another, although it might not really be from one member to another, to use those codes.

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Any other type of letter you were to write for cover? Did the cover letter vary according to the secret writing? No, sir, it didn't.

He told me to only write, as I said before, from one member of the family to another.

What type of letter?

No to give anything important, and just go on and on.

How were you to sign the letters?

I was to sign the letters with any name of a person I knew actually existed in the country, giving his return address and all.

How could he be sure this letter was from you and not from another agent he had?

He never told me anything about that, but he kept all my letters separately I noticed when I went back there.

Did you ever sign the secret part of the letter? No.

Was there ever any indication in the secret letter as to what part of the country it came from? No.

How could you tell in Bilbao where letters came from?

We could only tell by the cover writing, date, and so on, so only we could tell.

Could you give us from memory a couple of typical secret letters such as you developed in Bilbao?

I'm afraid I couldn't remember all of it.

Want to make an attempt to reproduce one or two?

Very glad to, but afraid it wouldn't do much good. I knew the terms letters were written in.

Let us hear them.

The letters were most of them written in sort of telegram message-like,

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i.e., "ten ships left Buenos Aires today, route certain" and also said, "Radio Buenos Aires Brazil involved in war within a certain date." I remember reading about that before I went to Rio a few days. All written in that short telegraphic system. The cover letters always appear to be from one member of the family to another, though some of them vary from one kind to another. I remember reading one letter from one friend to another, but most were from one member of a family to another, at least 95% of the ones I recall.

Now then, you said a few minutes ago you had no intention of working in this country for the Germans. When did you begin to feel that way?

All the time since I met Lang. I thought a second job from Lang would lead me back to the U.S., and that is where I wanted to be.

Did you have the same feeling in South America?

Yes, I had this same feeling there.

Did you do anything about it--get in touch with Americans or British down there?

No, I didn't, because I was afraid I wouldn't know what to do then, but I thought that later on I might go back to Spain because I learned the shipping lines between were less regular as they used to be, and thought by going back to Bilbao I would get further instructions and be sent to the U.S. as I was planning to, and be a lot safer to do that here than in S.A.

Why?

I didn't know anyone I could confidentially talk to in S.A., although I remember meeting a British secret agent. I don't remember his name.

How did you know he was British?

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I was introduced to him. He was under the influence of liquor, and he told me he was. I met him in Rio at the Casa Bar Carioca. The owner, Dominguez, seemed to know this fellow very well, this British agent, so he told me that there was a possible chance that man would help me as he was a Britisher, and he thought he occupied a pretty high position in Rio.

Why didn't you do anything about it then?

Because I didn't know him well enough, and I didn't know what his reactions would be afterwards.

Through your friend Dominguez couldn't you have gotten to know him better?

Well, sir, I didn't intend to do that as I told my friend Dominguez I was a Spanish political refugee I thought it would be a better idea to wait.

Well, if your friend Dominguez thought of you as a Spanish political refugee, what could the British man do for you?

He thought he could give me a decision as to whether to jump ship (Aldecoa) in Rio or continue to Santos.

At this time you didn't know Dominguez very well, did you?

It was the first time I had met the Englishman, but I had known Dominguez a few days before that.

You were more prepared to talk about your situation to Dominguez than to the Englishman?

Yes, indeed.

While you were working in Bilbao, could it have been possible to get in touch with American or British to get out of your situation?

I went to the American consul between January and the last day of February this year, but couldn't speak to him that day because he was away for some

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time.

Do you know what his name was?

If I remember right, his name was Wanamaker.

Did you work for him at one time?

No, sir, I was around quite a bit, but didn't work for him; it was the next street from me. I didn't know whether to display myself to him, because I was afraid Lang would find out and think I was making some kind of a statement. The office was located about a block away, and I was on friendly terms with the people in the consulate. They told me they made arrangements for me to come one afternoon. They said Mr. Wanamaker would be waiting for me on a certain day, but I was afraid then that Lang may get suspicious and something might happen, so I didn't go back.

Did Lang resort to violence when situations occurred he didn't like?

He told me so.

Can you tell us some of the details?

Well, sir, he explained to me about some people double-crossing him in Spain and he ordered their execution, and they were executed right away. As he put it, more than one.

Did he ever say who gave the orders?

No, sir. This was before I went to Rio.

Can you tell me who a man is by the name of Wilde in Buenos Aires?

That is the address, not the name. His name is Martin Milbao. He is a member of the family, my brother-in-law. His sister married my brother. He jumped ship, and was in the armed service in Spain. He went aboard ship as a crew member.

What ship?

I don't know. It was a cargo ship. I don't remember the name.

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I was told some time before going to Rio there was a man in Mexico, to go to him.

Just told you, wasn't written down?

That is right.

Admiral Raeder? No!

Rudolph Hess? Not the one in England?

Ever hear Lang mention him? No, sir.

Doriot? No, sir.

Fulgencio Batista? No.

Orgaz? No.

Zeitzer? No.

Castillo? I know a Castillo who jumped ship here in New York. That is the only one I would know.

Was he a member of the crew? Yes, he was.

Was he a member of Lang's organization? Not that I know of. He didn't have my passport. He just disappeared from the ship.

Jordana? Wouldn't be the Spanish officer who is in charge of Foreign Relations?

Ever hear Lang speak of him? No, on some occasions he probably did, but I don't remember.

Cardenas? He wouldn't be the ex-President of Mexico?

How about Sangroniz? I know a Sangroniz in Spain. He is a business man.

What else do you know about him? I don't know a thing except he is the husband of one of my cousins.

How about Juan Beigbeder? No, sir.

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Can you tell us whether Lang ever mentioned these places or went there:

Yes.

Elferoll?

What connection?

He didn't mention any connections, but he made several trips there.

Any idea for what reason?

He always told me he had to make connections with some other officer in

Elferoll.

Did he state whether a Navy or Army officer?

No.

Yes. He mentioned that the same way as the

Laforunna?

first time.

When he traveled, did he go alone or take some one with him?

As a general rule he took someone of his friends, seemed to be people

working with him.

I couldn't say.

Bilbao?

Ever brought anything back from the trip with him?

Always carried a large briefcase, so I don't know.

Ever appear nervous, worried or excited or happy when he returned?

I can recall one or two times he was quite disgusted about his trip.

When he had feeling like that I didn't dare ask him what had happened,

because it was none of my business.

No, sir.

He ever make a trip to the Azores?

No, sir, no trips made that I

Canary Islands?

know of, but I recall he told me they had a radio station in the Canary

Islands. As a matter of fact, the wave lengths were given me in those

small photographs built on the boat. They were about 1" and 1½", containing

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photographic copies of instructions on the larger ones, and the two smaller ones had several wave length numbers on them.

Pictures with wave length writing?

Reduced pictures from the larger piece of paper.

Microphotographs? Yes. I had two of those and one with five or six instructions on it.

Negatives or positives?

They were positives.

Did you ever hear him mention Mallorca? No.

Gibraltar? He mentioned, but no trips there.

What did he say about it?

I can't recall what he said, but the possibility of British troops walking into Spanish land from there.

Worried, or merely a passing comment? Didn't seem to be worried.

Spanish Morocco or Tangier?

Never made any trips to Southern part of Spain since they had other headquarters at Barcelona and Malaga.

Several trips to Irun.

Irun?

(from the border into France? Yes. He showed me a fictitious passport used for that purpose.

Spanish, German or French passport?

It was from the Swedish government.

Happen to recall what name on it?

Georg and a second name that sounded like Lang, but had an F or S in the name of it, but it sounded like Lang.

What was his destination in France?

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No, I don't know.

He didn't say whether he was going to Bayonne?

No, sir, he didn't say.

Did he mention Barion? Larrau(?)

He mentioned it quite a few times, something about going to Barion. I don't remember what for, but I am pretty sure that was it. He didn't tell me anything important.

Bordeaux? No.

Toulouse? No.

Escandiet Urdenitz No, I'm sure he never mentioned it.

Ever heard it mentioned yourself?

I haven't the least idea where it could be, but sounds close to Spanish border in the Basque territory.

Ligueral? Familiar, but don't know where I heard the name. If I remember right, it is located toward the southern part of Spain, in the mainland of Madrid.

Lillon? Mentioned on several occasions in general conversation, nothing particular.

Ever hear him any other mention of her?

Not until the last day did he mention anything about Maria since he told me anything would be written down and sent me the last hour.

Tree of Guernica? No.

Ever have a friend who was a Major in the German Army who died just north of the Spanish frontier in France?

He mentioned on several occasions he had lost several good friends in this war but never mentioned where it occurred or anything like that. His father died last summer.

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(c) passages

Pasquates?

He made several trips there, with just the general comment he had to see some friend.

Pasquates?

Know any reason for him to be interested in Pasquates?

I have a reason why he would be interested because he might have some other man working there.

Why would it be an interesting place to be working?

It is located, to my knowledge, between Bilbao and Bayonne and its being a sort of watch post in case of any British or Allied landings.

What are the main industries?

The main industries would be fishing factories or fishing business.

Are the following significant, and have you ever heard of them:

Dencione Bureau? No, sir.

Direction Seguridad? Yes, I know it would be in Madrid,

by the codes the Chief of Spanish Police.

Ordinary police?

It would be headquarters of all police, but the biggest part of them

I think the Secret Police headquarters.

Long ever he worked with that organization or his superiors, or cooperated with them?

Long was a good friend of Caballero, the Chief. He secured me a document from him so I couldn't be molested while driving the car, or when I was in any place in Spain without his knowledge.

What pattern of card?

It was a typewritten note on a sheet of paper, with a black line all around it, and it had, issued in Madrid, a seal, and letters referring to the meaning of the document.

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Picture or photo? No.

Fingerprint? No.

Physical description? It did have that.

Miranda de Ebro Was an important railroad station

some place not far from Madrid.

Long mention it? No.

Ever sent there? Not that I know of.

Any other reason to be important? Not the least idea.

Never heard that in connection with any other kind of activities or

interest? No, not that I know of.

Stura Abteilung? No. Don't understand German, so

it would be impossible.

Expression "S.S." used? No, don't recall it.

Iberia does F.A. stand for? No.

Lonto del Union? No.

Agencia Transatlantica? Would be possibly transatlantic

agency in Bilbao, Steamship Co.

Agencia Transoceanica? No. Ever have heard that expression in

South America? No. Yes.

Blue Division?

Any opinions?

Yes, he expressed himself as though it was doing a good work, and he

knew with an odd occasion that the soldiers were for the greatest percent-

age Pro-Republican soldiers, as it would be dangerous to keep them in

Spain. Also, he said it would be a good place for them between two fires

with nothing left for them but to fight. Even if not much good to German

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attitude towards the war, they would have to defend themselves so there would be war between the Russians and the Blue Division.

Mention any activity in connection with recruiting for Blue Division?

Yes. Lang himself took me one time to Madrid to the Army Post where this man called for volunteers in Russia. No one offered, so this man just pulled out a list and called off names. So he sent those to Russia.

Colonel Angold? No.

Do you know whether Lang ever put any advertisements in the newspapers about anything? No.

Ever noticed him paying particular attention to advertisements in the newspapers? No.

Did he have a body guard? No, he didn't. He was carrying a firearm all the time.

He one acting as a strong arm man in the organization? No.

What about names on the Manuel Calvo? The Captain?

From Barcelona, Catalan.

First Officer? Don't know his name, although I should know it because I had quite a bit of conversation with him.

How did you happen to converse with the First Officer when a stoker, isn't that unusual?

Most of the conversation after we came to the U.S. since I could speak English and acted as interpreter for them.

For whom did you interpret?

For American officers and also went to Customs main office with the Second Officer and ship's doctor and the Third Engineer. Aboard ship I acted as interpreter for the First Engineer, giving descriptions of the ship and all provisions needed. With the First Mate aboard ship did same work. Later on I was on the upper deck most every day to act as

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interpreter if officers came aboard.

Did the Manuel Calvo sail from Gijon? Yes. The port is named Musel. The bigger ships don't go to Gijon.

When you did sail from Spain last you found out at the very last moment the ship was not going to Cuba, you attempted to telegraph Lang. Why not telephone?

I thought a telegram would be faster as I would have to wait my turn for the telephone.

A long line?

Sometimes have to wait a few hours before you can contact Bilbao or any other point.

Like to know a little more about the telegram. How do you send the messages, same as in this country?

It is sent through the telephone exchange. The lady took the telegram and she called to Gijon, and it was transmitted to Bilbao there. I waited at that office until I had an answer; it was something less than an hour.

Actually get an answer?

The said there was no one to receive the telegram at that place at the moment.

Did you know then when the ship would sail?

I was told the ship would leave very soon.

Weren't you afraid you would miss it?

I could see the ship from where I was. If the ship were leaving I could still get there before they were off.

What was the text of the message?

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I signed it Jose and told him "Sailing direct to Philadelphia", giving the exact hour of leaving.

What was the hour?

We were supposed to sail about 7:00, and I wanted to be sure not to get it too late if he wanted to contact me. I also told him I would wait for a reply, giving him the address of the telephonic center where I was.

What time did you actually sail?

That evening or night.

Did you tell the telephonic exchange to try the message later, or telephone any other addresses? No.

Why not?

If I couldn't get him there at this certain address, it wouldn't be necessary for me to get him at some other place, as I was pretty certain they would reach him.

How long before you found out the ship's course was changed?

That same afternoon.

Was it announced to anyone else, or would it be in the papers previous to this?

There were a lot of rumors going about ship that it was going to the U.S., and other rumors that it was going to Cuba. I kept quiet and waited to see.

Previous to this last trip, when you came over here, do you know from what port that ship returned to Spain?

Yes, I think it was Philadelphia.

Do you know whether on its last trip the ship was sent to any other Spanish ports?

Bilbao.

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You joined the ship at Bilbao?

Ship sailed from Bilbao to Musel.

You sent the telegram to Lang from Bilbao?

Ship started from Bilbao?

Do you think at the time it left Bilbao it was intended to go to Cuba, or the change only made at Musel?

In my opinion, as told by Lang, not known.

No other ports touched afterwards?

No place at all.

See any ships or any convoys on the way over?

Saw one or two Spanish ships, both going towards Spain; saw a Portugese ship going towards Portugal; and then saw a Greek tanker coming towards the U.S.; and about 500 miles before we got to Bermuda Island we passed one of the Allied war ships.

Did this ship attempt to stop you?

No. I noticed it when I cam to the upper deck as being quite far in the distance.

Any airplanes?

Didn't see any. We heard sound of motors, but saw none.

Near the U.S.?

No. About 1 day before we arrived at the Bermuda Islands.

Know the names of any other officers?

No. I don't remember the names of officers. As I told you, I addressed them as First, Second and Third.

Any of them working for Lang?

No, I have no reason to believe they were working for anyone, but I was told in Philadelphia that the Second Officer was watched by the U.S. author-

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itiss as being a suspicious man.

Who told you that, some of your friends?

It was one of my friends aboard the S.S. Gaucho in port at the same time, the Second Mate.

Name of purser?

No purser.

Steward?

Yes, we had two stewards but I acted as interpreter. I don't remember their names. I had to lead them around to keep them from getting lost.

Crew members?

Most of their second names: ---------- Castillo

stoker -- Jose Garraizar

fireman -- Pablo Mena

fireman -- Jose Iglesias

? -- Gutierrez (Gutierrez (?))

fireman -- "Pepe"

Messboys?

I recal the name of one, Carmona--believe it is his first name.

Any reason to be suspicious of Carmona?

I was told that he was working for Lang by Francisco Montes. He told me to be careful with him. He asked me if I knew him. I said I did. He says he is the kind of man, if you told him you were working for Lang, would go back and tell him.

Montes knew you were working for Lang?

Lang sent me a letter or note to meet this fellow Francisco Montes when I came aboard the S. S. Monte Contes as apprentice engineer. He told me that I should go to him and ask him if he has something for me from Lang, as

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they were coming from Bilbao a few days after we left. I thought as might have something so I went to him and said I was sent by Lang. He asked me some other names, Urrutia and Andalus. I told him I knew them, and he asked me if I had a note with me. I told him "No". I never told him I had some things with me. He asked me if I ever worked on this line before. I told him I was told to watch for a few things. He sai' they might want to give me instructions, you being a new man, they thought possibly we might have a chance out here to have a talk. I told him maybe yes. He asked if I knew anything about this latest secret writing that I should use. He told me there was an old method that could be used successfully since the Allies won't be suspicious of your using such an old method, such as lemon juice.

I told him I didn't know anything, so he told me how everything should be written as capital letters, and made me write some samples of them and showed the way it appears the writing is deciphered. I told him I would remember that and he didn't have to go any further in the details. I asked him what they would like most to get for information while going to the U.S. aboard ship and back. He told me the most important information they would like to get from fellows working aboard ships was description of everything as to ships just as closely as one could, even to the color of the ship's paintwork, cannons and guns, size of ship and description of ship if possible, the navy-yards and everything about their construction. He asked me if Lang gave me any money. I said he gave me a few dollars, so he said I could buy some American newspapers and magazines and bring them back, as we are doing with all of them. He gave me all those

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instructions which I had known very well prior to that, but I never told him I had.

Then this was late in the afternoon, and we went home together and we spent that evening running around like most of the sailors do, and we came back to the ships a little before midnight, and they told me they were sailing for La Coruna that afternoon and would report back and give me further instructions in case I forgot some of them that he had already told me. I told him I couldn't go back as I was working. He sailed that night.

The Campuzano, a Spanish tanker which he had just left, which came from the U.S. and had made several trips, and he was around Lang's office a few days and he wanted him to take this other ship for a trip. He was going to make a round trip and get a larger ship coming to the U.S. and continue his work while on ship.

Tell us what you know about Maria.

I don't know a thing except her name and address. I was told it was the address to be used if Spain gets in the war.

Did other agents have this address?

I don't know. I think Carmona, but I wouldn't have any reason.

Any of these men express an opinion about Lang?

They seemed to like him very much.

Did they think he was a clever man?

They thought him a pretty straight man, and I was told Lang likes everything pretty straight and on time, and they thought he was quite a good man.

Do you know any of the names of people aboard ship we haven't mentioned

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yet?

No, I don't remember any at this moment. Most just first names, and the second mate, like I have said before.

Lang ever talk about German Army or Navy?

He never mentioned the Army or Navy. The armed forces he mentioned quite often as the best army in the world. The Spanish Army would be just as good as the German Army, but outside of these two, he didn't think there would be another army like them in the world.

Ever mention any Generals or Admirals?

He mentioned General Rommel as being one of the best generals.

Von Arnhaim? No.

Halder? No.

Any naval officers he knew or any submarine commanders?

I don't remember their names. I don't speak German and even hearing them two or three times it would be hard to remember.

German Campaign?

He said there were 500 new submarines out this spring, out in the water.

Lang himself received army training?

I don't know.

What countries had he visited?

I could say he had been in Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France (he spoke good French) and that was all, I guess.

How was his Spanish?

He spoke good Spanish.

Use the th sound?

Yes he did, but he also had a very distinct German accent, as in R.

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Anything in his speech to indicate that he learned it in some other country than Spain? No.

Nothing. He learned most of his Spanish in Spain as he told me he was working in one of the German Spanish banks in Madrid for quite a long time.

University Graduate?

I would say yes, but he never told me.

Visited England? No.

U.S. or S. A.? I don't think so, but he never told me. He could spell English a lot better than I can.

Was he an airplane pilot?

He was in the air forces a lot, but I don't think he was a pilot.

Any commercial air service from Bilbao to Madrid while you were there?

No, they were torpedoing the airport outside Bilbao.

Do you know Antonio Alonso Sebastian? Don't know him.

Calle Bramon? What interest might you have had in that street? Could it have been where Berenga lived?

No, I'm certain it wasn't. It seemed like a Calle, and I was pretty sure it was #31.

The expression Diagonal Norte mean anything to you? No.

Supposing it is the name of a street in Buenos Aires, would it remind you of anything? No.

Do you know whether Buenos Aires is divided into postal districts?

No, I don't know that.

Do you know Aracel No.

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Hilario Gorrado?

He was purser aboard the Cabo de Hornos, and friend of Andaluz, and one of the mail carriers.

Is he still on the ship?

Was the last I heard of.

Juan Cuesta Barbosa? Name sounds familiar, but can't say who he is.

Rufino Merlina? No, I can't remember.

Have you heard the name before?

I would be afraid to say so, I don't think so.

Know any other names that sound close to that?

The railroad station Molina.

Diego Beltran? No.

Think he is a courier?

He may be because I am pretty sure all these couriers' names, except the one mentioned.

Salomon Fernandez? No.

That address where you lived in Rio, what is the correct spelling?

#10 Travess Baron (Barao) De Guarapiran, First Floor.

Did the Spanish lady own the whole house?

No, she rented it.

Did you ever hear of Vidal y Guarnido? No.

You said there were some 16" coastal defense guns along the coast. Did you see these yourself?

Yes, I saw them one day when I drove with Lang. Lang told me they were 16" guns. He could see them from a short distance.

Could you see the entire barrel?

The muzzle part of it was covered.

Covered with mats, or a small shed?

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I remember just the barrel part was covered.

Set in cement?

Yes, mounted in cement.

In circular cement pit?

Couldn't say that.

How far from the ground was the muzzle of the gun?

The muzzle, barrel, or front was approximately 5' above the ground.

Looking at the gun sideways?

Yes, we went around it.

So you saw it from the rear and front?

I saw it both ends, and from the rear.

How high was the breach at the maximum above the ground?

About 3', or something like that.

Iron platform that looked as though it moved with the gun?

Don't remember that detail.

Looking into the ~~funnel~~ muzzle of the gun, did it look about 16"?

I couldn't judge it, as it was covered, and I couldn't say that.

Was it covered with some kind of canvas?

Yes, blue canvas, the same color as the guns were painted.

Any small sheds near the building?

Yes, sort of under ground and right close to the guns.

Lang say whether the ammunition was stored in underground sheds near there?

Lang said the underground place was for ammunition, and for the men to stay.

Circular iron rail around the gun? Yes.

Did it look as though it would have to be raised up before firing?

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Well, sir, I didn't get much of an idea on that line. Naturally I had the idea that it would be operated up and down.

Would you have any idea whether that gun could fire at right angles on the coast, or straight out to sea?

Lang told me it could be moved in a circle, in any direction.

Do you know whether that gun could be moved on tracks?

No, I didn't see any tracks. The place was on a cement base.

Can you estimate how long the barrel was? 18', 25', 10'?

The gun was approximately 12' to 14' long.

Lang make any other observations while you were there? How far it could shoot?

He said they were quite powerful, the ones along the coast.

How far in metres or kilometres?

I asked him if they could fire 30 miles, and he said better than that.

Describe the calibre of the gun in inches or millimetres?

Neither.

Did he say how they moved it?

I never asked him that.

Any electric wires that you could see?

None that I could see.

Any gas or Diesel motors around?

There were quite a few men working around there that day, and they were using gas boilers or something like that.

Lang say the gun came from the Maginot Line?

Most of it comes apart before it is installed. It was brought from Bretagne where the military park is. Guns brought there in all sizes and

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kinds.

The gun was painted blue?

Yes.

The shore line along there straight or is it on a promontory or peninsula?

It is located on a high, rocky point, on a rather V projection.

Just one gun?

Another one little way up the hill.

See or hear about any more?

Yes, I saw a whole plan of fortifications of northern Spain in Lang's office. I took a look at that time, and I thought it might not look too good to Lang if I took too good a look, so I just took a short look.

There was a beach marked out with a circle where it said there was a proper place for landing, and I remember it was located between Cabo Machichaco and close to Elanchobe. Elanchobe is a town.

Barbed wire on the beaches there, or slightly back?

I could see barbed wire which was used during the Civil War. Outside of that I couldn't see any. It was all in rolls.

Any towns protected by anti-aircraft guns that Lang spoke of? No.

Any machine gun posts? No, not a one.

Was Lang upset at any particular time?

I noticed on several occasions he was quite worried. Several times before I went to Rio, he didn't act to be in a very good humor.

Have you never seen him going around with other people than Germans or Spaniards? Or Portuguese? Or Americans?

Any foreigner with him I was always told was a German, and they spoke

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in German.

You asked about Colonels before. I remember he mentioned something about the Colonel of the Civil Guards, Hegwid, was a good personal friend of his, and I saw him in a car with Lang several times.

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10 June 1943

[illegible]

Mr. Lang is a man of 4[illegible] years of age - approximately 5' 10½" tall - dark hair - dark complexion - sort of a round face - straight nose - [illegible] of body - approximate weight 19[illegible] or 160 pounds - wears [illegible] - [illegible] all the time - wears light clothes - [illegible] - [illegible] brief case along all the time [illegible] between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock [illegible] a lot.

[illegible] license plates? Yes [illegible] sort of life?

[illegible] visit his family much.

[illegible]

[illegible] time, but this winter [illegible] with him.

[illegible] and a lot. He kept his [illegible] Alcantara Mansion 10) Agents #2's

[illegible] native word from him?

[illegible] sent out by ship by a courier.

[illegible] send me all the spending [illegible] him on the other side.

[illegible] America was sent to you

[illegible] when I started out for [illegible] Turner and $4,500

Exp[illegible]

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10 June 1943

Lang

Mr. Lang is a man of 45 years of age - approximately 5' 10½" tall - dark hair - dark complexion - sort of a round face - straight back - lot of hair - approximate weight 165 or 170 pounds - wears glasses - wears a hat all the time - wears light clothes - mostly grey - carries a brief case along all the time. He gets up in the morning between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock and has his breakfast. He travels quite a lot.

Does he have a car? Yes

What kind? It is an open car. (Opel cars)

I understand that he has interchangeable license plates? Yes

Does Lang seem to have a very affectionate sort of life?

Yes, but as a matter of fact, he doesn't visit his family much.

What is Lang's wife? She lives in Madrid.

Does he have children? Yes

Do they live in Madrid? Yes, most of the time, but this winter they were visiting Christel's time and stayed with him.

Does he live in a house? He changed around a lot. He kept his office at Alameda 10. Then we moved to Alameda Miramedo 10)

When you were in South America did you receive word from him?

Yes, I received one letter that was brought out by ship by a courier.

How were the accounts paid? They would send me all the spending money by courier and I was supposed to be paid on the other side.

Long after a month you were in South America was sent to you by courier? Yes

In what way did they give you the money? When I started out for South America they gave me $3,000 in U. S. Currency and $4,500 in Spanish bank notes.

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This questionnaire with 14 or 15 things Lang wanted you to find out, did you memorize it or keep it in writing?

No, I memorized it.

Whose idea was it that you might go to a village on the Mexican border? Lang's idea.

With what in mind? In order to contact my brother in the United States.

How were you supposed to contact your brother?

I was to write a letter to my brother that I was in Mexico and that I would like to visit him. If it was not possible for me to come to the United States, he thought it would be possible for me to sneak into the United States by the border.

Lang thought the best thing for me would be not to spend too much time in the United States but to return back to Mexico and establish myself in Mexico or where I thought the safest and best place to work.

Didn't Lang feel that your writing your borther might attract curiosity? He told me in writing my brother to mention that I was there and I would like to see him because I didn't see him for a long time.

Did Lang ever suggest that you come to this country in the capacity of a Mexican farm worker? Yes

Was this to be in Mexico? Left at my own judgement.

Any suggestions? He said El Paso, Texas would be a good place to go and some other smaller town in Arizona. A border town in Arizona.

Do you recall the town? I can't say.

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Do you know if he ever sold any insurance? No sir.

Is the office located in a business building? It is located in an apartment ~~business~~ house.

How many people working in the office? Now there is one man - Jose Rudiur, who takes care of the office. I noticed another young man also in the building. Jose Urrutia really Jose Mendez.

Is he related to the man you telegraphed to? No

On these radio messages as to wave lengths were you told any particular time these messages were to be sent? Yes, I was told they would be calling most every hour of the 24 hours a day.

I was given the signal that they were using and what I should use - 5 V's interrogation mark for Mundaca - 5 V's exclamation point for Golco.

Do they have safes in the office? Yes they have a heavy safe.

What make is it? I don't remember.

Is it/German make? Yes, Lang bought it on his vacation. It is a lock and combination safe.

Did any agents ever cable to Bilbao when you were there in open messages not code? Not that I know of. Although I knew he was receiving cabled messages, but I never saw them.

You don't know whether they were in code or not? No sir.

Do you know whether Lang cabled to Germany? No sir.

Did Lang ever tell you he knew any German personalities? Yes

Did he ever speak of knowing a man by the name of Canarus? No sir

What people can you recall? He mentioned he knew Hitler personally and Goering also.

Did he ever mention Himmler to you? No sir

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I went to the telegraph office and waited for an answer.

You had time in 40 minutes? Yes. There was no one there to receive it.

At what time of day were you told when the ship was not going to stop at Cuba? 16th or 17th of April in the afternoon.

What time? Approximately 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

It sailed that night? Yes

How near was the telegraph office to the ship? Just around the pier.

And you were wiring to Bilbao? Yes Addressed to Lang Heros 26

What name did you use? I used some kind of cover name - Jose.

And the name of the family at Heros 26? The telegram was addressed to Julio Martin Heros 26, Bilbao.

By that name they knew who the telegram was for? Yes

Who actually lives there? A family, the young ladys' name Josefina Zarrifa, and her husband's name Francesco Urrutia.

Could you have sent that message to any other address? Yes

But Lang wouldn't get it right away.

Why would he have gotten it right away when you sent it to this address? They got Lang's telephone number and they connect Lang.

I could have sent it to Cuartel De la Salve

So you think Lang will be surprised if you didn't return on the ship? No, I was told to use my own judgement. If it wasn't possible for me to jump ship at Cuba to wait for a ship to come to New Orleans.

Does Lang present that his office is the office of some commercial concern? Yes, I remember he told several different parties he was running a life insurance office.

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How would these couriers know it wasn't a trap if you rang up the steamship offices to make the appointment? Would you meet them at the steamship office? Not at the office I would send word to meet him at a certain cafe.

How did they know they wouldn't walk into the hands of the police? They identified me by my picture.

Was there any password? There was no password of any kind.

Did you ever have any personal trouble with Lang? No sir.

Any one in Bilbao who did? No

Did he ever send any one to the United States or South America that he wanted to get rid of? No sir.

Does this man in Cuba communicate with Lang? I guess he does.

Do you know him? No

Does Lang communicate with him? Yes I think he does.

Do you know how? I don't know now.

Am I correct in understanding that you knew the ship would not get in Cuba before it sailed from Bilbao? Yes sir.

How long? Possibly 40 minutes.

In other words Lang didn't know the ship was coming to the United States? He didn't know.

Did you know 40 minutes beforehand? I was told they were going straight to the United States before going to Cuba.

Did you make any effort to notify Lang of that? I sent an urgent tele ram to Cuba if his ex mail drops. The telegram came back to me.

As soon as you found out the ship was not going to Cuba you wired Lang? Yes

Was the wire received by Lang? No It wasn't received by Lang because there was no one to receive it at the address.

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This man Barringa did you ever meet him in South American? Has he got a radio? I don't know although I was told by Lang that there was a radio in Buenos Aires.

Anything more about Barringa? He seems to be an important man in Buenos Aires.

When you went there did you hear anything about English mines in the Bay of Biscay? Yes I heard that the fishing boats were having a little difficulty getting away from the mines and that one or two were sunk by the mines. I read in the papers that quite a few Iberian mines were captured.

When you came over this last time how is it you happened to save the notebook with the list of names? I saved it in order to keep a list of the new couriers I had given during the last trip. I couldn't remember it by memory.

Did you buy that notebook before you sailed from Spain? The notebook was given to me by Lang before I went to South America.

How were you to make contact with these couriers?

I was told that when this ship arrived, if I wasn't in Cuba, I would have to get in touch with a man on these boats and find out when they arrived. I was told it would be very easy by calling the steamship offices.

If a boat were in and one of the couriers aboard, then what?

I would send word in to have him meet me at a certain place. I would have to name a place and he would meet me there.

Do you think that the couriers know what they were engaging in?

Do all they do it as a friendly gesture? I think most of them know I have my doubts of them, but I remember in my instructions Lang told me this man didn't know anything that was going on.

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wherever I was located.
Did Lang seem to feel that he was more interested in getting information from Cuba and Mexico and Latin America in your case or from the United States? He was more interested in getting information from the United States then any other place.
He wanted you to work up to the United States? Yes
Do you know whether he sent any word directly to the man in Cuba to expect you? I could see by the way the letter was written that the man knew some one was coming.
Did Lang express any personal opinion of this man in Cuba? He said that he had a great deal of confidence in the man and that the man could help him any way he needed.
This man was a personal friend of his? Yes
You don't know whether he was a German or not? His name seems to be Spanish - Bardello
Does he have a radio? Not that I know of.
Did Lang ever say anything to you about his opinion on whether or not the Allies would invade Spain or whether Germany would invade Spain? Yes, he made some statements about it. He said there was a chance the Allies would invade Spain and that the Germans would place a million men along the Mediterranean coast in Spain by about time.
Have you heard anything at all from Lang particularly about numerous German troops stationed along the German frontier - trim young troops or old troops? He told me they had quite a large number of troops along the Spanish border but he never told me whether they were young or old.
Did you have any money when you came here? Yes $50.00 in American money.

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Did he ever say anything about the crash of the clipper in Lisbon?

No sir.

Did that occur at the time you were still in Spain? Yes sir.

On your last trip over here you had with you among your papers

a contract? Yes

It was typed? Yes

Do you know who typed it? Lang himself.

Do you think there are any copies of that? Oh yes. They always

make 2 or 3 copies of the original.

Where would these copies go? I don't really know but I am

completely sure some of them were going to Madrid.

Must be since you were carrying the copy with you? He sent it by

one of his men.

Expecting you to take it along with you or use it there?

To read it, memorize it and then destroy it.

When you got to Cuba to meet the man how did you make yourself

known to him? He sent me an introduction letter to this man

Lebo.

How were you to be paid when you were in Cuba and here?

The instructions read that I would be paid $1,000 in U. S. currency

by this man in Cuba. At first I was to take this letter without

making any changes and this man was to help me legalize my stay

in Cuba for the time being and if necessary, to find me some kind

of a small job where I could be covered and also an excuse to be in

Cuba. Later on he wanted me to go on to Mexico. He told me I

was to get protection at the Bolivia Delegation in Cuba.

Any further privileges to pay you beyond the $1,000?

Yes. After that my wife to come by courier to Cuba or the U.S.

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Do you have any idea how many men Lang had working for him along those lines, observing fortifications? No sir.

Do you know whether he had any English or American friends? No sir, I doubt it.

Did he belong to any clubs? No sir.

While you were working in Bilbao did you see any American newspapers or magazines? Yes

How were they brought in? Most of the time by Andalans - from the Spanish ships. He met the fellows in various ports of Spain and on various ships and there were couriers who brought these magazines and letters in.

The couriers, were they paid for the magazines? They werepaid either by Lang or Andalans.

Any particular magazines that stand out in your memory? Yes sir. Life, Time, Newsweek, and the American magazine.

Did Lang everexpress any opinions about the Allies or about the English or Americans? Yes sir. He told me a good many times that the Allies are badly mistaken about this war and that they are going to lose this war.

Did you ever have any conversation with Lang on the subject of depth charges? Yes sir. I recall he once told me that the death charges the Germans had were superior to the one the Allies had or something like that.

Did you ever hear Lang make any comment about the German Ambassador Von Holtke? No sir.

Have you ever heard him comment on Franco? Yes sir

Favorable? He was favorable to Franco but not directly to Franco himself, to the Franco regime.

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Do you know who they were? I met one superior before I went to Rio.
Do you remember his name? No, I don't remember his name but I know a pretty good description of the man.
Where did you meet him? I met him in Bilbao.
When you came over this last time you had with you various letters? No, I didn't have anything on me. I did give a letter to the courier to hide for me in case I was found aboard ship. I gave it to him to take to Bilbao because at that time I didn't know I would make it aboard ship.
What did you say in the letter? I told him that I wanted to go back to Bilbao since the shipping communications between Spain and the United States were restored and I thought it would be a lot easier for me to come to United States by Spain and not from South America.
When you came over here this last month you had certain papers with you? Yes
Did you keep them on your person? No, I kept them pretty well covered in the coal bin, and when I arrived in port I decided to destroy them because I thought they may be discovered and I won't have a chance to explain myself. You were acting as a stoker? Yes
Going back to the question of radio, can I recall the radio frequencies were Mundaca 21515 and 42303 Goico. Mundaca is the town where Domingo lived and most of the fellows called him Mundaca. Goico was a town used for me to remember a radio wave.
Was that relation to the radio wave? So I would remember the lengths instead of writing down a wave length I would write down Goico and that would mean something from the air.

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What instructions did Lang give you about getting hold of radio transmitters over here? He told me to try to get a radio operator in this country or whatever country I was going to. He told me that if I could not find one here that he would later send me an address of a radio operator in Mexico. You yourself was not taught how to operate a radio? No

Do you know if any men in Lang's office operate a radio? No

Did Lang himself? Yes, I am pretty sure of that, because of the way he spoke about the radio. I questioned him further but he said that I should just give the wave length to the radio operator and he would know what it is all about.

Did he tell you who it would be? No, he said if I couldn't find one myself he would send me the address of one in Mexico.

Do you know whether Lang had any radio communication with Madrid or Berlin? No

Do you know how he communicated with Berlin or whether he communicated with Berlin? No sir.

What relations did Lang have with the German Consulate in Bilbao? I couldn't say but they were very good friends and visited each other quite often.

What information did Lang want to get out of Spain? The information he wanted to get out of Spain was whether Spain was to get into the war and keep a close watch over coastal fortifications. He was also watching the coast pretty closely for a possible landing. There were rumors going on Bilbao that the British would make a landing in the Northern part of Spain. I remember he took his car and took me with him and we went to Gorliz. He went to the highest point there and spent most of the afternoon there.

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Will you give us a list of them? Some came from Cuba, Venezuela, Buenos Aires, interior part of South American countries, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Have you ever seen any that came from this country? No sir.

I don't remember seeing any that came from the United States.

While you were in Lang's office in Bilbao did you ever definitely see any radio communications? I did not see any radio communications but I saw a radio set which was brought up while I was in the office consisting of a large wooden case, a reception case and a transmitter. Lang told me he didn't know where to set it up and that he was awaiting orders from Madrid. I asked him about the receiving set and he said he were going to use it right here.

What kind of antenna did they use? Did they have one you could see outside of the house? No, I didn't look for it because the buildings are pretty tall.

How did this box arrive, by express? That's something I couldn't say. I know it was brought up by a truck and I saw two men bringing it up in the elevator.

Coming back to Lang, what would you say in your opinion was his position in the German intelligence service? In my opinion he is a military observer.

Have you ever heard the word abwehr? No sir.

Did Lang ever use the word, Gestapo? No sir.

Do you think that he was near the top of the German organization in Spain or was he one of the less important people? I think he was the head man for the Bilbao branch and he also had a superior in Madrid.

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These letters from men in Bilbao that were written in plain water were they signed? No sir.

In the open text was that signed?Yessir

Do you recall any names? No sir.

These were brought in by couriers on ships? No, they weren't all brought in by couriers because I only saw the paper I did not see the envelopes and I couldn't tell whether it was brought in by ship or not.

Couriers on some occasions did bring in letters to Bilbao?

Yes sir.

How did the couriers hide the mail? They would have to use their own judgement, because I don't think Lang would be able to tell them where to hide the letters?

Lang himself didn't give you any instructions how to get the letters out only? He told me not to keep any letters or possible information on me or in my cabin or any addresses that I thought were from any of the couriers or some other person, that would look to be urgent.

Where did he tell you to put them? He never told me where to put them.

How many letters did you have each day? I developed approximately 15 or 20 letters all the time.

Were other men doing the same work? Lang was doing the same work and he did quite a lot of work. Most of the time he did a lot of this work himself but I couldn't say how many letters he was receiving, but he did receive quite an amount of mail.

Do you have any idea of the places where these letters came from ?

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In the shipping information, the movements of ships, wasn't that all out of date by the time it arrived? Yes sir.

Did Lang think that information was valuable? Yes, he said it had a certain value, because they could judge what the actual shipping in these ports would be and they were figuring something out of that. Nationality of the boat, close description and approximate tonnage of the ship's cargo, nature of the cargo and the destination, of course. Destination most important.

What was Lang's position in your judgement? He would be a military observer.

Has he a military rank? Yes, he told me about his rank. I think he was a Captain in the German army. He did the same work during the Civil War in Spain that he is doing now. He was with the Condor Legion.

Do you think that the British knew about Lang?

I think that it is possible that the British knew what he was doing or they may have been suspicious about his work.

Did you see any evidence of anybody being suspicious of him? I was told by Lang that a person was following him one morning. He told me what he did to get away from this man.

What did he do to get away from this man? He told me a young man was following him and there was a possible chance the man wanted to know where he lived. He said he took a trolley bus and that was the method that he used to get away from him. Instead of coming straight to the office he went around 2 or 3 blocks and he was sure [illegible] he ascertained the place nobody was following him. He also gave all these instructions to the other people. I asked him why he didn't take a cab and he said there was a chance that a person could get a license number and then trace the cab.

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Does Dona Nilia herself work? No, she has another daughter who is attending school and she does her housework.

Were there any other borders at the house while you were there? Yes, there was a brother of hers and one of their cousins also. They just roomed there as they worked outside during the day.

While you were there did you do anything in the nature of espionage, or did you just try to get out of the country?

Yes, I had to keep going. The largest part of the information I got was from the newspapers and I added a lot of it to that.

How many reports did you send to Lang? About 2 a month, although they didn't contain any secret writing or information because I didn't have enough to say.

How many letter did you get back from him? Just one.

How often were you paid? I wasn't paid in Rio.

What other places in Brazil did you visit? I visited Nichteroy.

Did you go down to Santa Catharina province? No, I didn't go outside of Rio.

On your way back on the Cabo de Hornos, except while you were in Trinidad, you were out in the open? Yes, I was with the rest of the passengers.

Did you have a cabin assigned to you? No sir.

Where did you sleep? On board the ship on deckchair, because it was too warm to sleep in a cabin.

The passengers also? Yes

While you were in Bilbao you used to read communications from other people? Yes

Were they coded? They were letters which were written in plain words. I used to write most of the shipping information.

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with his family and I would have Doña Maria's son to run around with.
Was he employed? He was owner of the Cantina.
Where did you meet Dominguez? When I was aboard ship.
He was coming back from Spain? No sir, I believe he said he made
a trip in 1932. We found this place and we got talking to him and
found out he was pro-republican. He arranged to have an interview
with this fellow he called and he came right away. I explained
the situation to him and he advised us to remain aboard ship until
the last day. Which I intended to do. If I stayed aboard ship
the last day, if possible, the last hour, the captain wouldn't have
a chance or the time enough to report a missing man to the authorities.
We were in Rio approximately 20 or 25 days. I don't remember
exactly. We were to/take petroleum aboard and the ship was to
sail approximately at 3 o'clock.
Dominguez was to load petroleum at Rio? The petroleum was for the use
of the ship. We were taking only 300 tons of it, it would only
take about 3 or 4 hours to load. At noon time I dressed up and
left the ship. I told Dominguez I jumped ship as the ship was to
sail in the afternoon. Then he called Cantina that I was there.
Dominguez said he would be down 6 o'clock that night. He came down.
Then he promised me that he will have everything straightened out
that he is in very close contact with the authorities in Rio.
Then he said if necessary, to get to President Del Vargas and that
the president would let me stay for the duration of the war. Then
Dominguez spoke to his aunt about a Spanish refugee being at the
place and if she had a place for me he would appreciate it and I
appreciate it because it would be better than a hotel.
You first met him in Rio, is that right? Yes

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Spanish refugees going to Chile and he was told that this man Cathala was the man who straightened out the passports.

Will you tell us what position Cathala had there? He was a representative of the Free French and he also was an importer and exporter in the cement business from South American countries. Mostly from Argentina, Buenos Aires and Chile.

Was his business confined to South America? As far as I know yes.

Did he export to Europe? He said he didn't and I took his word for it.

Do you know the name of the family you lived with in Rio?

The lady's name was Dona Maria Pareillis.

Is she married? She is a widower.

Were you in touch, while you were there with anyone in this country or in Spain. I was in touch with Lang in Spain, outside of that I wasn't in touch with anyone else.

How did you spend your time down there? I spent most of my time down there going around with Dona Maria's son, who owns another bar at the Cantina Carioca. In the morning we used to go to the latter front on the beach and stay there until 11 o'clock and then noon we had lunch together at his mother's place and then in the afternoon we went to a theater or took a walk, if it was hot then we went to the beach. Late in the afternoon when he completed his business I went home early and went to sleep about 8 P.M.

Was this a Spanish, Portuguese or Brazilian family? Spanish

Did you learn to speak Portuguese when you were there? Not very much, but I could get by.

How did you find this family? I met this familythrough their neighbor, Antonio Domingues. He told me that I would be a lot better

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another man on the other side of the line so I got by easy enough.

I stayed in Trinidad approximately 3 or 4 days.

How many second class passengers were there? About 100

You had plenty of money with you on this trip? Yes, I had about 12,000 pesos in Spanish money.

What was your address in Rio? Barron D.Guaratiba #10

Was that the place you found for yourself or were you told to go there? I found it myself.

What sort of a place was it? It was a family - as a matter of fact I made friends with one of their nephews who was the owner of the Casa Caribe.

Did this family suspect what you were doing? No, I told them I was a political refugee and I was also asked how I had so much money. I told them I came from very good family and my mother gave me the money to get out of Spain.

When you were in Rio you met a Frenchman? Yes

Will you tell us how you met him? Around the Aldecoa

What was his name? Catalin

On evenings after work on board ship, we found this Casa Caribea

I talked to this Spaniard and he began talking to him one day.

He seemed to be very much pro-republican that is from the way he

talked and talked.

What was his name? Antonio Dominguez.

What was your specific assignment in Rio? What was your work?

I didn't work at all. Were you in contact with other people while

you were there? I was contacted by Lang, nobody in Rio.

Going back to Dominguez, is he the owner of Casa Carioca? Yes

So he told me he has a friend that may do me some good. They had some

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trip would be easy and that the stewards wouldn't ask for passports. Do you remember the names of the other two sailors? No We all got together as soon as we got aboard ship. There was a Spanish officer aboard ship and there was a table at the gateway. I was told to keep on going when I got on the ship. As I was walking on board to the stern part of the ship, I was stopped by a Spanish officer and he brought me back, just then one of the two sailors said I was a passenger, he let me go and I continued walking. That night I stayed on deck in a deckchair. Next morning when the breakfast bell rang I went down to the mess hall as I was told to do. They placed me with some other passengers, but when I told them I was going to Bilbao, Spain, they placed me at some other table with another fellow who was also going to Bilbao. That was my table until I arrived at Bilbao. The ship sailed out the very same day about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and then we arrived at Puerto Cabello, Venezuela.

What did you do at Trinidad? At Trinidad we were called on the loud speaker to line up. The first class passengers to get on the starboard side of the ship and the second class passengers to line up on the other side and the crew members of the ship to be lined up on the bow part of the ship.

Were you lined up with the crew? No, with the second class passengers. They also said that the passengers should keep their passports in their hand. I lined up with the regular passengers just the same, because I knew the ship would be searched. Two British officers were checking the passports and there was one standing at the table who gave the final O.K. When my turn came I did not wait to be called - there was one man ahead of me and I went around him to stand in front of the other man. I went around

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letter - I cannot get the chemicals for the ink, - he would know that this letter came from you?

I wrote to him and told him that I still had some difficulties with my stomach trouble and I couldn't get the right kind of medicine I was using in Spain. He answered that he had talked up to Dr. Jorge and Dr. Jorge told him that I shouldn't use the medicine anymore, but to drink plain water - that would be better for me. He wanted me to use water instead of ink. And you used water instead of ink? You and I also obtained the chemicals that I wanted.

Is Tenerife a pitch refining? I think it could be used as a purge.

Is it a thing such as ex-lax that you could buy it under?

I believe it is purgen.

The Canfolina and the purgen are the same? Yes

When you went back on the Cabo de Buena who brought you aboard?

The boat brought me aboard. I told him I would like to go back to Spain. I couldn't obtain a British visa and I wanted to go [illegible] as a steward. I offered him 1,000 pesetas if he could get me aboard. He said he had a friend of his who may help me. [illegible] this friend and this friend said he would help me. [illegible] the friend's name? No, but I know he was messboy [illegible] passengers. We bought a few things before [illegible] ship such as lavaterin and other things we needed. [illegible] the best time for me to go on board would be at [illegible] When we were [illegible] aboard ship we met two other [illegible] As soon as I got on board ship I [illegible] me the bill. I asked if the steward [illegible] and how much trip. They thought the

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Do you remember the names of any of these couriers? Yes, the one that contacted me. Domingo Bivio. BIEBAD

He travelled on any particular ship? Cabo de Hornos

How did he conceal these letters in transit? As I was told these letters were given to him by one of the couriers.

How did they get the letters off the boat and the money and so forth without being seen? The letter that he brought to me was in his own pocket.

Did they examine the sailors who were leaving the ship in Brazil? No they didn't.

Did you have some particular place down in Rio or Brazil where you would meet the people? That was arranged by me the first time I talked to this man that I would meet him down at the Florida Bar.

I gave this man a letter that didn't have any secret words and the letter that I received from Lang was written on the same terms. He indicated for me to go to Buenos Aires in order to see if I could get a job in one of these South American boats coming into the United States. Instead, I took a boat and went back to Spain.

Did they tell you to see any particular person in Buenos Aires? Yes they did, but I don't exactly remember the fellow. Later I was given the name of a man who I think was Barranga. It was mentioned 4 different times in the letter but they never gave me the address of this man.

You spoke of some catch words in the letter you wrote to Lang? I told him that I couldn't get the chemicals that were needed to make up my secret ink.

What was that chemical? Tannoftalina

Did you and Lang have an agreement so that when you said in the

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

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

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

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Maria DO Carmo Pereira e Rua Coelho da Rocha 62, 1.º Lisboa

HUSTON, TEX.
RAMON LARCIA
GREENWOOD, ST. 13
(Comercio)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Basque Intelligence 11,247
X 482
X Communications

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 10, 1943

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

1. On March 22nd pursuant to your suggestion, I wrote to J. Edgar Hoover concerning the help they are giving us in our communications implementing the Basque project. (Copy enclosed).

2. Attached is a reply from Hoover, dated April 3, 1943 which though not addressed to me, is responsive to my letter and, I think, indicates a cordial spirit of cooperation. The signature "John" (not "Edgar") is that of Mr. Hoover, I am told by Captain Moore (C.I.) who knows him.

W.H.S.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 3, 1943

Mr. Ernest Cuneo
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ernie:

This will acknowledge receipt of the communication of Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson, dated March 22, 1943, concerning the Basque Intelligence Service.

I appreciate the suggestion of Mr. Shepardson that a second copy of the material received by you from the Basque organization be made available here. However, inasmuch as the Bureau at Washington receives constant reports made by its field representatives, such an additional copy would not seem to serve any useful purpose.

I am glad to find that the Bureau's cooperation in the matter of communications is of assistance to you and trust that it will continue to be so.

Sincerely,

/s/ John

COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1943.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Pennsylvania Avenue at 9th,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

We have just received another communication from our Basque friends below the border, reaching us through the facilities of your people down there. We appreciate, as always, your help and cooperation.

We have instructed our friends that whenever they hand any material to your representatives for transmission, they are to deliver at the same time a copy of the material for your files. It has occurred to me that you might also find it useful to have copies of the material as it arrives here, in addition to the copies delivered to your people in the field. If so, let me know, and I will see that you are supplied.

Meanwhile, I trust that some of the information already delivered to you has been of interest.

Sincerely yours,

Whitney H. Shepardson

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SECRET

11 23 42

28 June 1945

x FBI

To Mrs Marion O'Donnell

From Spencer Phenix

In going through my files preparatory to my departure from the New York office, I find some papers which I think belong more properly in the General's personal files under your control than in the Registry. I am therefore sending herewith for your decision, perhaps after consultation with him, the following documents:

1. An original letter from Edgar Hoover dated April 7, 1942, together with a copy of the General's reply and a copy of a memorandum from Allen Dulles dated May 5, 1942 all dealing with Donald Downes.

2. A collection of papers dealing with the relationship of the New York office with the Mazzini Society. In view of the official position of one of the individuals to whom payments were made it would be most embarrassing if details of this matter should become generally known.

3. A collection of papers regarding the case of a Basque seaman named Laradogoitia. The newspapers have recently given some publicity to an FBI release in which that agency claims great credit for his accomplishments as a counter espionage agent. Our Basque friends knew about him and his background before the FBI did and they were questioning him and making the information available to us when the FBI suddenly intervened and took control of the situation and the individual. If the question ever arises regarding this matter it may be worth while for the background information to be available to the General.

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

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SECRET

May 26, 1943

Basque G Project

Saturday afternoon, May 22, George Dyas telephoned to say that our B friends had developed a very interesting lead and that the information was being incorporated in a memorandum which was to be ready Sunday in time for him to take it to Washington. I suggested that we have the memorandum photostated here on Sunday so that copies would be available. We accordingly arranged to meet our B friend at the office Sunday noon, go over the material with him and have photostats made. The memorandum contained exceedingly significant information and Mr Dyas took it to Washington so that he might discuss the matter first thing Monday morning with Mr Shepardson, Mr Mayer and General Donovan. Meanwhile, it was our understanding that our B friends would take care of G pending a decision as to how Washington wanted to proceed with the affair.

Mr Dyas telephoned me Monday after his discussion there that the General was very much interested in the possibilities and wanted to press ahead with the matter.

I spent Tuesday in Washington and participated in conferences with the General as a result of which the active cooperation of the Navy Department was enlisted and we were assured of Navy support in handling the problem. In the course of the afternoon Mr Dyas was informed from New York that the FBI had questioned our B friends, apparently at the instigation of the Naval officer who conducted the first interrogation of G at Philadelphia. We understood that this questioning was done in a friendly manner and felt no cause for alarm.

This morning our B friend called and discussed with me at considerable length the interview which he and his associates had had with the FBI yesterday. We considered what steps should be taken and I got the impression again that G was being taken care of by our B friends.

Sometime later I had a telephone call from Mr Dyas saying that the General wished us to arrange at once to have G removed from his present abode and taken to some safe place where he would be watched by our B friends until we ourselves could arrange for his protection. I told Mr Dyas that in my talk with the B representative earlier I had asked about the removal of G from his present residence and had been given to understand that our B friends thought this would be a mistaken step. Mr Dyas replied that regardless of their views the General wanted the thing handled that way and gave me several statements to be communicated to our B friend. I was not able to reach him on the telephone and dictated these statements to Miss Bailey who finally got in touch with him and read them to him, as follows:

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"1. Get our friend immediately under our control and protection. OSS will assume full responsibility. Any question raised by the FBI is to be referred to OSS as is any question raised by the Navy.

2. The man is coming up from Washington immediately to share in the protection of our friend.

3. Until our Washington man arrives will Mr I please keep our friend under Basque protection, not letting him out of sight at any time.

4. The Navy headquarters in Washington and OSS want to start instructing our friend as rapidly as possible and that is why we want him in a place where we know he is safe and where there can be no interruptions.

5. Please remove him from his present residence as secretly and as inconspicuously as possible so as not to cause any commotion.

6. We will greatly appreciate it if Mr I could draw up a summary of the questions asked, the answers given and the ground covered in the FBI interrogation.

We know we are giving Mr I a very difficult problem but our very top man wants it done in this way and is confident that Mr I can work the matter out satisfactorily."

Our B friend informed Miss Kasley that he did not believe it possible to check on the whereabouts of G and he asked me to call him, which I did, to learn for the first time that our B friends had not seen G since 4:30 yesterday afternoon when they saw him get into an automobile bound for FBI headquarters in New York. They had reason to believe that he was still in the custody of FBI as late as 6:30 PM but they had no further information beyond the fact that he did not have breakfast or lunch at his usual restaurant where they expected to see him.

After numerous telephone conversations with Washington and with General Donovan in New York I was asked by the latter to get in direct touch with the FBI in New York to ascertain the status of the situation and how soon OSS and the Navy could proceed with their plans for G. After trying to reach Mr Conroy through his Secretary, Miss Tate, I spoke with Mr Woods (Messrs Woods and Matthews were the ones who interrogated our B friends) who said he was not handling the case but would communicate with the man who was and ask him to telephone me. Later Mr Granville telephoned to say he was conducting the interrogation of G. I asked him how soon the

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Navy and we could get in touch with him and he said our Washington office should get in touch with FBI headquarters in Washington to make the necessary arrangements and that upon instructions from Washington he would let us have access to G. I asked him if they were through with their interrogation and he answered in the negative. I asked him if he thought anything had been done which would disclose G's interrogation by FBI in such manner as to "blow" him and was told that so far as the FBI was concerned nothing of the sort had been done. I emphasised the importance the Navy and we attached to this matter and the embarrassment caused us by having our program delayed. Mr Granville indicated that he thought the matter could be promptly cleared in Washington so that we could proceed. I asked Mr Granville if it were necessary for General Donovan to get in touch with Mr Hoover himself and he answered in the negative saying that if our Washington office communicated with one of the Assistant Directors it would be sufficient. I reported this information to General Donovan who asked me to telephone Mr Mayer to arrange to go with Mr Shepardson and the Naval officer assigned in this matter to call on the FBI Washington headquarters and try to solve the problem. General Donovan was the representations made in a dignified but strong way pointing out that the Navy regarded the question as of paramount importance to them. I so advised Mr Mayer and was informed later that Mr Shepardson, Mr Dyas and Captain Moore had an appointment with Mr Hoover at the FBI for 3:30 PM Thursday, May 27.

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INTERVIEW WITH THE COLONEL

After an exchange of impressions on irrelevent matters, I indicated my idea of submitting for his consideration some of our points of view in order that our dealings with each other might be based on a perfect understanding of our situation as an organization, of our problem and of the spirit which guides our conduct in our work. I added that, since President Aguirre was going to have an interview with the Colonel, I would not touch upon the problem of our collaboration with OSS, but that I would devote myself to other matters, and in particular would give him full information about our plans in the economic field, a delicate question, to which we attach primary importance.

The Colonel went back to the allusion to OSS, and asked me if we were collaborating with this organization and in what way. I answered that it would suit me to explain it to him in detail, but that as I had previously pointed out, President Aguirre in his most recent conversation had not felt it necessary to discuss that subject, in the belief that the Colonel had already been informed of it, since we supposed that he had been advised that our collaboration with the Military Attaché in South America had been effected through OSS; furthermore, I added that I understood that President Aguirre, in his first interview with the Colonel a month and a half ago, had clearly indicated to him that we were collaborating with General Donovan.

I then explained the matter to him as follows:

For more than a year we have been collaborating closely and officially with OSS. As a result of this collaboration, we have set up a plan of action which, with its ramifications, is in effect in South America and in the Basque Country. The first plan to be put into effect was that which had to do with South America. It started with the President's trip and has been functioning steadily since that time. OSS pointed out to us at the start that South America did not come within the sphere of its jurisdiction, except in very concrete instances which had direct bearing in Europe. They decided, however, to aid our organization, because they understood that great benefits could be gotten for the Cause which we are defending, and results have proved this to be so.

I also said to him: With the sincerity which is essential in our dealings with you, I must point out that we have not observed the existence of an exclusive attitude on the part of OSS; from the very beginning they have shown special interest in

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putting us in touch with the Army and the FBI, both of which groups we should serve in South America, just as we have been doing."

The Colonel stated that he did not understand how it was possible, while giving all information to the Army and to the FBI at the same time, to maintain the independence of the services. I answered that this difficulty had been foreseen, and that the instructions which I had given during my trip, as well as those given by Mr. Lesarte, were in the following form: all information which the Basque Services obtain through their own initiative shall be given to both the FBI and the Army, so as to enable both agencies to have complete information. All specific missions assigned by the FBI and the Army shall be executed and the results thereof given only to the American service which requested it. I added that I had had occasion to be certain that our people, well understanding the problem, had acted with strict compliance.

Concerning the action in our Country and its ramifications, I told him that the realization of the plan has been slower than in South America, because thegreater difficulties of the problem have made more detailed studies necessary, a thing that can easily be understood. Some of these difficulties, of a technical nature, are evident -- networks, trips, etc. But I cannot enumerate them in their entirety, since we have not yet begun to investigate them, nor have we asked if this is a field which does not concern us. At the present time action is already under way; the network of which we speak has been carried out in agreement with, and with the aid of, OSS. The financial problem has also been settled according to our requirements, after the situation had been studied and all aspects of it taken into consideration.

At this point the Colonel received a telephone call in which it was stated that the interview with the President had been postponed to the following week, due to the absence of the General.

The Colonel then asked me if I had spoken with OSS of our conversations with him. I answered: "Yes, Colonel, I have done so. We believe we are obliged to do so for reasons of the same loyalty with which I have spoken to you. We do not consider it indiscreet to discuss such a subject with the official services of the United States." The Colonel added: "Now I understand several terms of the telephone conversations that I did not understand at the time."

The Colonel made clear several times in the course of his conversation that he was ignorant of our collaboration with OSS, which he thought had not passed beyond the stage of exchanges of impressions and of friendly relations in matters pertaining to Europe. It was

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also evident that it had never been his intention to interfere with any other service, least of all in a surreptitious manner. He indicated that perhaps -- he did not make a definite statement -- the matter of choosing one or the other was in the hands of President Aguirre, and that probably the General could clarify this problem. I answered that everything possible should be done to avoid this situation, which would hardly be an agreeable one for President Aguirre. I stated that our purpose and desire is to aid America, to whose Cause we feel as strongly attached as to our own, and that it is up to the American authorities to indicate to us which way they believe to be most opportune. The Colonel agreed pleasantly, said that he would do his best to see that this situation did not develop, and that our position appeared logical to him.

I also brought to his attention the points stated in a separate note. The Colonel received them very well.

I explained fully to him our standards in financial matters, and do not repeat them here, because you already know them well. I told him that our propaganda organizations (newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, cultural groups, etc) are completely separate from the intelligence service. We have decided that the first groups should be supported in each country by gifts from friends. The money obtained for the intelligence service is to be used exclusively for that purpose and for no other, its receipt and expenditure to be controlled with scrupulous care.

In summarizing, following are my impressions of the Colonel: He appears to be thoughtful and considerate person, friendly and tactful. He shows much zeal for the work. Judging by the satisfactory outcome of the interview, he understands the matter under consideration, and has a good memory for details. As the conversation proceeded, he spoke with greater confidence and courtesy, including the period after the telephone call and my complementary and clarifying explanation. I believe that he is convinced that we are handling the matter with due seriousness, with a loftiness of purpose and with a firm desire to serve the Cause to the best of our ability.

April 21, 1943

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THE LINE OF THOUGHT SUGGESTED TO THE COLONEL

In the course of our conversation I expressed to him a point of view which is exclusively ours, and which arose from deep thought on several aspects of the problem on which we are commenting.

I informed him that in the instructions sent to our Organization in the Basque Country, there was reference to the separation and independence of the two organizations which work in the field of intelligence: the Basque Army and the civil Organization. This was done to improve efficiency, to diminish risks, and to efficiently promote the reorganization of our Army, at the same time giving its elements a preoccupation and a practical orientation which would distract it from other spontaneous activities not in accordance with the plans which have been outlined.

Given this division, we believe it might be a worthwhile idea to unite each one of these organizations with the corresponding American group. In this separation we see essentially the advantages of greater efficiency, less risk of division, and a slighter danger than with a single network, which might fail because of an accident on the part of the American services or of our own. In addition, we feel that in practice this plan would prove advantageous for all, in the solution of problems which continually present themselves in the operation of the services. I advised him that our concern was not how best to control a set number of agents, but rather how best to organize a whole people for service to the United Nations.

I emphatically called his attention to the following points:

1). It is exclusively our concern. It arises from the consideration of certain actions within our scope. We naturally do not intrude into the sphere of those who, with more authority and greater knowledge, have a wider outlook on the problem.

2). We are setting forth this, our opinion, so that insofar as possible our way of thinking may be understood. It should not be thought that this is done with any ulterior motive; it is done because our interest lies in the outcome of the work. By no means do we think of obtaining advantages, economic or otherwise. This aspect, like the others, should be treated with absolute clarity.

3). We admit that this way of looking at the problem may not be the right one in the last analysis. His chiefs, together with General Donovan, can decide what they believe to be most advisable.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: April 20, 1943

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

Supplementing my earlier memorandum of this morning, I have talked with New York again.

What they told me was that the "Colonel" had spoken to the Basques and that the "Colonel" had told them that General Kroner or General Strong might be wishing to see them on Thursday or Friday of this week.

Stupidly I thought that the "Colonel" meant you, though I should have known better. The man referred to is an Army Colonel who has been contacting the Basques and with whom they were scheduled to have had a meeting today, but I understand it has been called off.

The question raised by Mr. A of the Basques, therefore, has more meaning than was apparent at first. He was asking whether, in case he came to Washington, to see General Kroner or General Strong, you would wish to have a first-hand report from him on what took place at that meeting.

The New York office tells me that it is possible that after the Basques have given to the Colonel (he speaks for General Strong) the reply which has been arranged for them to

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give - see Spencer Phenix's memorandum - perhaps there will be no meeting in Washington this week with Kroner or Strong after all.

W.H.S.

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x Gromback Cof
x Esquire.
x Proposition
x Thomas Gregory

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 20, 1943

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

SECRET

The attached memorandum from Spencer Phenix has just this moment come to my hand. It contains a full account of the transaction until now with the exception of this mysterious telephone call which I told you about and which I am now tracing back through the New York office.

W.H.S.

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April 19, 1943

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To General Donovan

From Spencer Phenix

On April 16, 1943 Mr Gregory Thomas was informed that a Colonel Grombach (spelling uncertain) had approached Messrs Aguirre, de la Sota and Irala some three weeks ago with a proposition along the following lines:

General Marshall had asked General Strong to obtain the collaboration of the Basque services and agents in Spain for the purpose of opening intelligence connections to France, Belgium and Italy. Colonel Grombach introduced the above-named Basques at the Athletic Club in New York to a Colonel (perhaps General) Smith who they were told would be leaving for North Africa via Clipper to Portugal and through Spain on April 21 for the purpose of giving final instructions to the United States Military Attaché, Colonel Hohenthal before any change in the present arrangement affecting intelligence in Spain might have been consummated.

Colonel Grombach offered the Basques practically unlimited financial support in exchange for their providing agents now in South America who would be brought to the United States for training in espionage and wireless operation, the sum of $1,000,000. being mentioned in this connection. These agents, the Basques were told, would be transferred to Spain and inducted into the existing Basque services there which would then work under the direction of Colonel Hohenthal. Wireless sets would be provided for the Basque agents in Spain and the United States Army Intelligence would handle communications and transportation.

The Basques to whom this proposition was made did not mention their ties with OSS as they wished to consult the desires of General Donovan before giving an answer to Colonel Grombach. They are to meet with Colonel Grombach on Monday, April 19, at which time they are to give him their decision. Colonel Grombach reported to the Basques that his service which is supposed to develop sources of information from the European underground was forbidden by the State Department to have direct dealings with any other underground group than the Basques.

Mr Thomas explained that no action must be taken by OSS which would jeopardize our Basque friends in connection with the foregoing. The information was given to him by President Aguirre with the understanding that it would not be used in any way that might endanger the present pleasant relations which exist between his people and services on the one hand and OSS and certain other Government agencies on the other.

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On Saturday morning, April 17, I telephoned Whitney Shepardson a summary of the foregoing. Mr Shepardson said that he agreed with Mr Thomas and we that no issue should be made of this matter at the present time if it could be avoided. He suggested that the position of our Basque friends should be that they came to us because they were in something of a quandary and desired our guidance. He said that he would report the matter to you with that recommendation and would let me know before the end of the day if you wished any different course pursued.

Mr Shepardson telephoned late Saturday afternoon that you were in agreement with the general procedure outlined but that you wished to have it made clear by the Basques in their conversation with Colonel Grombach that they had been dealing with OSS as a recognized agency of the United States Government and that all their relations with us had been of a secret nature which obviously could not be discussed. I reported this to Mr Thomas and he will suggest to the Basques that they inform Colonel Grombach today that his question had placed them in something of a quandary since they had been maintaining close official relations for many months with the OSS, a recognized agency of the United States Government and had received no intimation from the OSS that this close association involving relations of a secret nature which obviously could not be discussed was not to continue. In these circumstances they felt that they could agree to enter upon any new relationship with the Army or any other agency along the lines suggested without first having the matter cleared with the competent OSS authorities so that they were certain not to do anything that would conflict with their current responsibilities to OSS or give rise to any misunderstanding in connection therewith.

Since writing the above I have learned that Mr Thomas has already informed his Basque friends along the lines indicated above.

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Basque 11,746
x Intelligence

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
x Cuba
x Navy, Dar
x German

SECRET

May 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: Whitney Shepardson

Basque representatives of OSS have put us in contact with a person in touch with German intelligence agencies in Spain and the Western Hemisphere. This man has already given us very interesting information on methods, operation and personnel of German Intelligence here and abroad. He has given us likewise some information concerning American convoys. This man should proceed to Cuba to contact German intelligence personnel there. This will permit him, working for us, to penetrate German intelligence activities in connection with American convoys. It is known at the present time that German submarines are active in the Caribbean area and especially off the north coast of Cuba.

It is absolutely necessary for the development and proper utilization of this unique contact that the subject contact German agents in Cuba through whom he will have direct communication with German intelligence in Europe, and through whom he can uncover enemy intelligence in this hemisphere, in the Atlantic, and in the African and European theaters. This operation is of such an international and delicate nature that the direction and supervision of it must be reposed in the hands of a unified control, since it cannot operate successfully unless both the Western Hemisphere and European aspects of it are handled simultaneously and in coordination.

We are at present conferring with representatives of the Navy as to the best procedures to be followed. In addition to this I suggest that all conferences or other means necessary to guarantee that direction and responsibility for this operation be kept under the control of the Navy and OSS be undertaken urgently.

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